Human cooperation in the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov versus Generous Tit-for-Tat.

The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. Since Axelrod's classic computer tournaments and Nowak and Sigmund's extensive simulations of evolution, we know that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. According to recent developments of theory the last champion strategy of "win--stay, lose--shift" ("Pavlov") is the winner only if the players act simultaneously. In the more natural situation of players alternating the roles of donor and recipient a strategy of "Generous Tit-for-Tat" wins computer simulations of short-term memory strategies. We show here by experiments with humans that cooperation dominated in both the simultaneous and the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma. Subjects were consistent in their strategies: 30% adopted a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy, whereas 70% used a Pavlovian strategy in both the alternating and the simultaneous game. As predicted for unconditional strategies, Pavlovian players appeared to be more successful in the simultaneous game whereas Generous Tit-for-Tat-like players achieved higher payoffs in the alternating game. However, the Pavlovian players were smarter than predicted: they suffered less from defectors and exploited cooperators more readily. Humans appear to cooperate either with a Generous Tit-for-Tat-like strategy or with a strategy that appreciates Pavlov's advantages but minimizes its handicaps.

Preliminary study of cooperation in hybrid ad-hoc networks

In this paper, we present a first approach to evolve a cooperative behavior in ad hoc networks. Since wireless nodes are energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay requests. On the other hand, if all nodes decide not to expend energy in relaying, then network throughput will drop dramatically. Both these extreme scenarios are unfavorable to the interests of a user. In this paper we deal with the issue of user cooperation in ad hoc networks by developing the algorithm called Generous Tit-For-Tat. We assume that nodes are rational, i.e., their actions are strictly determined by self-interest, and that each node is associated with a minimum lifetime constraint. Given these lifetime constraints and the assumption of rational behavior, we study the added behavior of the network.

Psychopathie chez les individus non incarcérés et coopération dans un dilemme du prisonnier itératif

Au niveau interpersonnel, la psychopathie implique un manque de considération d’autrui pouvant se manifester par la tromperie, la manipulation et l’exploitation. La présente thèse a investigué la relation entre les caractéristiques psychopathiques d'individus non incarcérés et la tendance à coopérer dans un jeu du dilemme du prisonnier itératif. Un total de 85 hommes ont été recrutés via une annonce qui ciblait des traits de personnalité correspondant à des caractéristiques psychopathiques exprimées de façon non péjorative. Plusieurs méthodes ont été employées pour rejoindre les participants : 46 ont participés en personne après avoir répondu à une invitation affichée dans un journal local ainsi que sur des babillards à proximité d'une université; 39 ont complété l'étude sur Internet après avoir été recrutés via un site web de petites annonces. Chaque participant a répondu à un questionnaire incluant l’Échelle Auto-rapportée de Psychopathie (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) et l’Échelle Auto-rapportée des Indicateurs de Psychopathie de l’Enfance et de l’Adolescence (Seto, Khattar, Lalumière, & Quinsey, 1997). Ils ont également complété une simulation informatique du dilemme du prisonnier itératif comprenant 90 essais. La simulation informatique utilisée pour évaluer les participants en personne ainsi que la version accessible par Internet ont été conçues et programmées spécifiquement pour la présente thèse. La simulation informatique incluait trois stratégies souvent associées au dilemme du prisonnier itératif : donnant-donnant, donnant-donnant-généreux et gagne/reste-perd/change. Les analyses préliminaires ont montré que les participants vus en personne et ceux rejoints par Internet ne différaient pas en termes de variables sociodémographiques, des caractéristiques psychopathiques, de la désirabilité sociale et des réponses au dilemme du prisonnier. Une régression multiple standard a indiqué que les mesures psychopathiques ne pouvaient pas prédire le nombre total de choix coopératifs dans le jeu. Par contre, une corrélation négative a été trouvée entre les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives de la psychopathie et la coopération dans le premier tiers du jeu. De plus, les participants qui présentaient davantage de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives avaient plus souvent réussi à exploiter l'ordinateur en dénonçant alors que la simulation informatique coopérait. Des analyses multi-niveaux ont exploré la contribution de variables au niveau de la décision et au niveau de l'individu dans la prédiction du choix de coopérer ou de dénoncer lors de chaque essai du jeu; les interactions entre ces variables ont aussi été considérées. Les résultats ont montré que les variables au niveau de la décision influençaient généralement plus fortement les chances de coopérer que les variables au niveau de l'individu. Parmi les mesures de la psychopathie, seulement les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives ont montré une association significative avec les chances de coopérer; les interactions avec le premier choix effectué dans le jeu et le premier tiers du jeu étaient significatives. Ainsi, si un participant avait coopéré au premier essai, la présence de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives était associée à une diminution de ses chances de coopérer par la suite. Aussi, durant les 30 premiers essais du jeu, la présence de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives était associée à une diminution des chances de coopérer. La stratégie adoptée par la simulation informatique n'avait pas d'influence sur le lien entre les caractéristiques psychopathiques et la probabilité de coopérer. Toutefois, le fait de jouer contre donnant-donnant était associé à de plus fortes chances de coopérer d'un essai à l'autre pour l'ensemble des participants. Globalement, les résultats suggèrent que les hommes non incarcérés présentant des caractéristiques psychopathiques ne seraient pas nécessairement portés à choisir systématiquement la non-coopération. En fait, les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives de la psychopathie ont semblé se traduire par une tendance à faire bonne impression au départ, tenter rapidement d'exploiter autrui en dénonçant, puis finir par coopérer. Cette tendance comportementale est discutée, ainsi que la pertinence d'utiliser le dilemme du prisonnier itératif et les analyses multi-niveaux pour étudier le comportement interpersonnel des psychopathes.

On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study

The theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.

Espirito de catimbo: a moral magico-religiosa da jurema

This participative research interested in the social praxis attempts to understand the moral principles that set the magic rituals and the places of worship of three jurema centers of the potiguar region of Canguaretama. Among other inner particularly aspects of each focused catimbó-jurema center, it is being discussed the collective standards involved in the reliance and fellowship values assumed in the private magical gatherings by the juremeiras leaders and their partners, in contrast to the prestige seeking and the individualism that influence both the symbolic competitions and the witchcraft works that link these agents to the broader catimbozeiro universe of this region. Finally, the moral practices which make part of the juremeiro left-right dualism are investigated based on the understanding that the referred native pantheonic-ritual dichotomy does not necessarily express two moralities substantially adversed in terms of benefits or harms, but a series of moral actions subject to the specular logic of the tit-for tat. Thus, this research seeks to prove that this moral structure of symbolic reciprocity, as well as the witchcraft centrality in the catimbozeiro world, finds a certain causal link in a world view which guiding principle is the ontological evil of the catholic cosmology

Evolutionary methods for self-organizing cooperation in peer-to-peer networks

The Peer-to-Peer network paradigm is drawing the attention of both final users and researchers for its features. P2P networks shift from the classic client-server approach to a high level of decentralization where there is no central control and all the nodes should be able not only to require services, but to provide them to other peers as well. While on one hand such high level of decentralization might lead to interesting properties like scalability and fault tolerance, on the other hand it implies many new problems to deal with. A key feature of many P2P systems is openness, meaning that everybody is potentially able to join a network with no need for subscription or payment systems. The combination of openness and lack of central control makes it feasible for a user to free-ride, that is to increase its own benefit by using services without allocating resources to satisfy other peers’ requests. One of the main goals when designing a P2P system is therefore to achieve cooperation between users. Given the nature of P2P systems based on simple local interactions of many peers having partial knowledge of the whole system, an interesting way to achieve desired properties on a system scale might consist in obtaining them as emergent properties of the many interactions occurring at local node level. Two methods are typically used to face the problem of cooperation in P2P networks: 1) engineering emergent properties when designing the protocol; 2) study the system as a game and apply Game Theory techniques, especially to find Nash Equilibria in the game and to reach them making the system stable against possible deviant behaviors. In this work we present an evolutionary framework to enforce cooperative behaviour in P2P networks that is alternative to both the methods mentioned above. Our approach is based on an evolutionary algorithm inspired by computational sociology and evolutionary game theory, consisting in having each peer periodically trying to copy another peer which is performing better. The proposed algorithms, called SLAC and SLACER, draw inspiration from tag systems originated in computational sociology, the main idea behind the algorithm consists in having low performance nodes copying high performance ones. The algorithm is run locally by every node and leads to an evolution of the network both from the topology and from the nodes’ strategy point of view. Initial tests with a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma application show how SLAC is able to bring the network to a state of high cooperation independently from the initial network conditions. Interesting results are obtained when studying the effect of cheating nodes on SLAC algorithm. In fact in some cases selfish nodes rationally exploiting the system for their own benefit can actually improve system performance from the cooperation formation point of view. The final step is to apply our results to more realistic scenarios. We put our efforts in studying and improving the BitTorrent protocol. BitTorrent was chosen not only for its popularity but because it has many points in common with SLAC and SLACER algorithms, ranging from the game theoretical inspiration (tit-for-tat-like mechanism) to the swarms topology. We discovered fairness, meant as ratio between uploaded and downloaded data, to be a weakness of the original BitTorrent protocol and we drew inspiration from the knowledge of cooperation formation and maintenance mechanism derived from the development and analysis of SLAC and SLACER, to improve fairness and tackle freeriding and cheating in BitTorrent. We produced an extension of BitTorrent called BitFair that has been evaluated through simulation and has shown the abilities of enforcing fairness and tackling free-riding and cheating nodes.

Teoria dei giochi e Multi-criteria decision-making per reti mobili Ad-hoc: un protocollo di routing

Nell'elaborato si analizzano aspetti della teoria dei giochi e della multi-criteria decision-making. La riflessione serve a proporre le basi per un nuovo modello di protocollo di routing in ambito Mobile Ad-hoc Networks. Questo prototipo mira a generare una rete che riesca a gestirsi in maniera ottimale grazie ad un'acuta tecnica di clusterizzazione. Allo stesso tempo si propone come obiettivo il risparmio energetico e la partecipazione collaborativa di tutti i componenti.

Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the evolution of cooperation

A basic evolutionary problem posed by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is to understand when the paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impossible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by embedding the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma into a population dynamic framework. Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of defectors when their dynamics exhibit short episodes of high population densities with subsequent crashes and long low density periods with strong genetic drift. Such dynamics tend to have reddened power spectra and temporal distributions of population size that are asymmetric and skewed toward low densities. The results indicate that ecological dynamics are important for evolutionary shifts between adaptive peaks.

Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Many problems in human society reflect the inability of selfish parties to cooperate. The “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” has been used widely as a model for the evolution of cooperation in societies. Axelrod’s computer tournaments and the extensive simulations of evolution by Nowak and Sigmund and others have shown that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Rigorous empirical tests, however, lag behind the progress made by theorists. Clear predictions differ depending on the players’ capacity to remember previous rounds of the game. To test whether humans use the kind of cooperative strategies predicted, we asked students to play the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game either continuously or interrupted after each round by a secondary memory task (i.e., playing the game “Memory”) that constrained the students’ working-memory capacity. When playing without interruption, most students used “Pavlovian” strategies, as predicted, for greater memory capacity, and the rest used “generous tit-for-tat” strategies. The proportion of generous tit-for-tat strategies increased when games of Memory interfered with the subjects’ working memory, as predicted. Students who continued to use complex Pavlovian strategies were less successful in the Memory game, but more successful in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which indicates a trade-off in memory capacity for the two tasks. Our results suggest that the set of strategies predicted by game theorists approximates human reality.

Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.

The evolutionary stability of cooperation is a problem of fundamental importance for the biological and social sciences. Different claims have been made about this issue: whereas Axelrod and Hamilton's [Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. (1981) Science 211, 1390-1398] widely recognized conclusion is that cooperative rules such as "tit for tat" are evolutionarily stable strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD), Boyd and Lorberbaum [Boyd, R. & Lorberbaum, J. (1987) Nature (London) 327, 58-59] have claimed that no pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in this game. Here we explain why these claims are not contradictory by showing in what sense strategies in the IPD can and cannot be stable and by creating a conceptual framework that yields the type of evolutionary stability attainable in the IPD and in repeated games in general. Having established the relevant concept of stability, we report theorems on some basic properties of strategies that are stable in this sense. We first show that the IPD has "too many" such strategies, so that being stable does not discriminate among behavioral rules. Stable strategies differ, however, on a property that is crucial for their evolutionary survival--the size of the invasion they can resist. This property can be interpreted as a strategy's evolutionary robustness. Conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit for tat are the most robust. Cooperative behavior supported by these strategies is the most robust evolutionary equilibrium: the easiest to attain, and the hardest to disrupt.

Espirito de catimbo: a moral magico-religiosa da jurema

This participative research interested in the social praxis attempts to understand the moral principles that set the magic rituals and the places of worship of three jurema centers of the potiguar region of Canguaretama. Among other inner particularly aspects of each focused catimbó-jurema center, it is being discussed the collective standards involved in the reliance and fellowship values assumed in the private magical gatherings by the juremeiras leaders and their partners, in contrast to the prestige seeking and the individualism that influence both the symbolic competitions and the witchcraft works that link these agents to the broader catimbozeiro universe of this region. Finally, the moral practices which make part of the juremeiro left-right dualism are investigated based on the understanding that the referred native pantheonic-ritual dichotomy does not necessarily express two moralities substantially adversed in terms of benefits or harms, but a series of moral actions subject to the specular logic of the tit-for tat. Thus, this research seeks to prove that this moral structure of symbolic reciprocity, as well as the witchcraft centrality in the catimbozeiro world, finds a certain causal link in a world view which guiding principle is the ontological evil of the catholic cosmology

Espirito de catimbo: a moral magico-religiosa da jurema

This participative research interested in the social praxis attempts to understand the moral principles that set the magic rituals and the places of worship of three jurema centers of the potiguar region of Canguaretama. Among other inner particularly aspects of each focused catimbó-jurema center, it is being discussed the collective standards involved in the reliance and fellowship values assumed in the private magical gatherings by the juremeiras leaders and their partners, in contrast to the prestige seeking and the individualism that influence both the symbolic competitions and the witchcraft works that link these agents to the broader catimbozeiro universe of this region. Finally, the moral practices which make part of the juremeiro left-right dualism are investigated based on the understanding that the referred native pantheonic-ritual dichotomy does not necessarily express two moralities substantially adversed in terms of benefits or harms, but a series of moral actions subject to the specular logic of the tit-for tat. Thus, this research seeks to prove that this moral structure of symbolic reciprocity, as well as the witchcraft centrality in the catimbozeiro world, finds a certain causal link in a world view which guiding principle is the ontological evil of the catholic cosmology

Human immunodeficiency virus type 1 reverse transcription is stimulated by Tat from other lentiviruses

The tat gene is required by HIV-1 for efficient reverse transcription and this function of Tat can be distinguished from its role in transcription by RNA polymerase II using tat point mutations that abrogate each function independently The mechanism of Tat's role in reverse transcription, however, is not known, nor is it known whether this role is conserved among trans-activating factors in other retroviruses. Here we examine the abilities of heterologous viral trans-activating proteins from jembrana disease virus (jTat), HIV-2 (Tat2), and equine infectious anemia virus (eTat) to substitute for HIV-1 Tat (Tat1) and restore reverse transcription in HIV-1 carrying an inactivated tat gene. Natural endogenous reverse transcription assays showed that trans-activators from some retroviruses (Tat2 and jTat, but not eTat) could substitute for Tat1 in complementation of HIV-1 reverse transcription. Finally, we show that Y47 is critical for Tat1 to function in reverse transcription, but not HIV-1 gene expression. We mutated the homologous position in jTat to H62Y and found it did not improve its ability to stimulate reverse transcription, but an H62A mutation did inhibit jTat complementation. These data highlight the finding that the role of Tat in reverse transcription is not related to trans-activation and demonstrate that other tat genes conserve this function. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).

Pine processionary moth (Thaumetopoea pityocampa) and great tit (Parus major) in Portugal

In the present work, we studied a common outbreaking Lepidoptera species in Portuguese pine stands – Thaumetopoea pityocampa (Den. & Schiff.) - and one of its potential predators – Parus major (L.). The population dynamics of the immature stages of the Lepidoptera was studied in several types of Pinus pinaster (Aiton) plantations in three different areas: Setúbal Peninsula, Abrantes and National Pine Forest of Leiria. Location and plantation structure was the most important factors determining population density of T. pityocampa. Setubal and Abrantes was highly susceptible to attacks by the Lepidoptera, whereas Leiria had lower densities. Young and homogeneous pine stands was more susceptible to attacks than older and more heterogeneous pines stands. However, a desynchronized population of T. pityocampa, in which the larvae develops during summer instead of during winter, reached high densities also in Leiria. The impact of several mortality factors and climatic conditions on the immature stages of the insect (eggs and larvae), in normal and desynchronized populations are discussed, as well as possible evolutionary implications of the sudden appearance of the new version of T. pityocampa. The break of the pupa diapause and adult emergence times the annual life cycle of this insect. Adults from the desynchronized population emerged earlier than adults from the normal population, which in turn determined the change in the larvae development period. Different factors, potentially affecting the timing of adult emergence in both normal and abnormal populations are also discussed. To study P. Major, nest-boxes were placed in the areas of Setúbal and Leiria and they were monitored during three seasons. The nest-boxes increased the density of breeding and wintering birds in the studied pine plantations, indicating that a lack of natural holes are in fact a limiting factor for this populations. The earliest breeding start for this species was recorded in my study area, indicating that Portuguese coastal pines provide good breeding conditions earlier than in other areas of Europe and North Africa. This leads to an overlap between the end of the larvae stage of T. pityocampa and the beginning of the breeding season of P. major. Key-words: Thaumetopoea pityocampa, Parus major, Pinus pinaster, population dynamics, Portugal.

Herbarium Blackwellianum emendatum et auctum, id est, Elisabethae Blackwell collectio stirpium : quae in pharmacopoliis ad medicum usum asseruantur, quarum descriptio et vires ex Anglico idiomate in Latinum conversae sistuntur figurae maximam partem ad naturale exemplar emendantur floris fructusque partium repraesentatione augentur et probatis botanicorum nominibus illustrentur. Cum praefatione Tit. Pl. D.D. Christophori Iacobi Trew ; excudit figuras pinxit atque in aes incidit Nicolaus Fridericus Eisenbergerus ...

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