Stakeholders Theory and Theory of the Firm: a study on the hierarchy of objective-functions in Brazilian companies

Discussion opposing the Theory of the Firm to the Theory of Stakeholders are contemporaneous and polemical. One focal point of such debates refers to which objective-function companies, should choose, whether that of the shareholders or that of the stakeholders, and whether it is possible to opt for both simultaneously. Several empirical studies. have attempted-to test a possible correlation between both functions, and there has not been any consensus-so far. The objective of the present research is to examine a gap in such discussions: is there (or not) a subordination of the stakeholders` objective-function to that of the shareholders? The research is empirical,and analytical and employs quantitative methods. Hypotheses were tested and data analyzed by using non-parametrical (chi-square test) and parametrical procedures (frequency. correlation `coefficient). Secondary data was collected from he Economitica database and from the Brazilian Institute of Social and-Economic Analyses (IBASE) website, relative to public companies that have published their Social Balance Statements following the IBASE model from 1999 to 2006, whose sample amounted to 65 companies; In order to assess the objective-function of shareholders a proxy was created based on the following three indices: ROE (return on equity), EnterpriseValue and Tobin`s Q. In order to assess the objective-function of stakeholders a proxy was created by employing the following IBASE social balance indices: internal ones (ISI), external ones (ISE), and environmental ones (IAM). The results have shown no evidence of subordination of stakeholders` objective-function to that of the shareholders in analyzed companies, negating initial expectations and calling for deeper investigation of results. Its main conclusion, which states that the attempted subordination does not take place, is limited to the sample herein investigated and calls for ongoing research aiming at improvements which may lead to sample enlargement and, as a consequence, may make feasible the application of other statistical techniques which may yield a more thorough, analysis of the studied phenomehon.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.

Information strategies and the theory of the Firm

Information costs play a key role in determining the relative efficiency of alternative organisational structures. The choice of locations at which information is stored in a firm is an important determinant of its information costs. A specific example of information use is modelled in order to explore what factors determine whether information should be stored centrally or locally and if it should be replicated at different sites. This provides insights into why firms are structured hierarchically, with some decisions and tasks being performed centrally and others at different levels of decentralisation. The effects of new information technologies are also discussed. These can radically alter the patterns and levels of information costs within a firm and so can cause substantial changes in organisational structure.

The economic theory of the firm as a foundation for international business theory

The economic theory of the firm is central to the theory of the multinational enterprise. Recent literature on multinationals, however, makes only limited reference to the economic theory of the firm. Multinationals play an important role in coordinating the international division of labour through internal markets. The paper reviews the economic principles that underlie this view. Optimal internalisation equates marginal benefits and costs. The benefits of internalisation stem mainly from the difficulties of licensing proprietary knowledge, reflecting the view that MNEs possess an ‘ownership’ or ‘firm-specific’ advantage. The costs of internalisation, it is argued, reflect managerial capability, and in particular the capability to manage a large firm. The paper argues that management capability is a complement to ownership advantage. Ownership advantage determines the potential of the firm, and management capability governs the fulfilment of this potential through overcoming barriers to growth. The analysis is applied to a variety of issues, including out-sourcing, geographical dispersion of production, and regional specialisation in marketing.

The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm

The entrepreneurial theory of the firm argues that entrepreneurship, properly understood, is a crucial but neglected element in explaining the nature and boundaries of the firm. By contrast, the theory of the entrepreneurial firm presumably seeks not to understand the nature and boundaries of "the firm" in general but rather to understand a particular type of firm: one that is entrepreneurial. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the two. After briefly delving for the concept of entrepreneurship in the work of Schumpeter, Kirzner, and (especially) Knight, the paper makes the case for the entrepreneurial theory of the firm. In such a theory, the firm exists as the solution to a coordination problem in a world of change and uncertainty, including Knightian or structural uncertainty. Taking a historical or developmental perspective, the paper then examines the changing nature of the entrepreneurial coordination problem over the life-cycle. In this formulation, "the entrepreneurial firm" is a nascent firm or proto-firm facing a problem of coordinating systemic change in economic capabilities. Lacking (by definition) adequate guidance from existing systems of rules of conduct embedded in markets or organizations, the entrepreneurial firm typically relies on a form of organization Max Weber called charismatic authority. In the end, although there is no such thing as a non-entrepreneurial firm, firms that must solve coordination problems in a world of novelty and systemic change ("entrepreneurial firms") are perhaps the purest case of the entrepreneurial theory of the firm.

On the opportunism-independent theory of the firm

Previous developments in the opportunism-independent theory of the firm are either restricted to special cases or are derived from the capabilities or resource-based perspective. However, a more general opportunism-independent approach can be developed, based on the work of Demsetz and Coase, which is nevertheless contractual in nature. This depends on 'direction', that is, deriving economic value by permitting one set of actors to direct the activities of another, and of non-human factors of production. Direction helps to explain not only firm boundaries and organisation, but also the existence of firms, without appealing to opportunism or moral hazard. The paper also considers the extent to which it is meaningful to speak of 'contractual' theories in the absence of opportunism, and whether this analysis can be extended beyond the employment contract to encompass ownership of assets by the firm. © The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Cambridge Political Economy Society. All rights reserved.

Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm

This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

Towards a theory of the small firm: theoretical aspects and some policy implications

Includes bibliography

The Hierarchical Structure of the Firm: A Geometric Perspective

This paper incorporates hierarchical structure into the neoclassical theory of the firm. Firms are hierarchical in two respects: the organization of workers in production and the wage structure. The firm’s hierarchy is represented as the sector of a circle, where the radius represents the hierarchy’s height, the width of the sector represents the breadth of the hierarchy at a given height, and the angle of the sector represents span of control for any given supervisor. A perfectly competitive firm then chooses height and width, as well as capital inputs, in order to maximize profit. We analyze the short run and long run impact of changes in scale economies, input substitutability and input and output prices on the firm’s hierarchical structure. We find that the firm unambiguously becomes more hierarchical as the specialization of its workers increases or as its output price increases relative to input prices. The effect of changes in scale economies is contingent on the output price. The model also brings forth an analysis of wage inequality within the firm, which is found to be independent of technological considerations, and only depends on the firm’s wage schedule.