Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of Justice

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.

The influence of justice theories on international climate policies and measures

While the justice implications of climate change are well understood by the international climate regime, solutions to meaningfully address climate injustice are still emerging. This article explores how a number of different theories of justice have influenced the development of international climate regime policies and measures. Such analysis is undertaken by examining the theories of remedial justice, environmental justice, energy justice, social justice and international justice. This article demonstrates how each of these theories has influenced the development of international climate policies or measures. No one theory of justice has the ability to respond to the multifaceted justice implications that arise as a result of climate change. It is argued that a variety of lenses of justice are useful when examining issues of injustice in the climate context. It is believed that articulating the justice implications of climate change by reference to theories of justice assists in clarifying the key issues giving rise to injustice. This article finds that while there has been some progress by the regime in recognising the injustices associated with climate change, such recognition is piecemeal and the implementation of many of the policies and measures discussed within this article needs to be either scaled up, or extended into more far-reaching policies and measures to overcome climate justice concerns. Overall it is suggested that climate justice concerns need to be clearly enunciated within key adaptation instruments so as to provide a legal and legitimate basis upon which to leverage action.

The Capabilities Approach as a Foundation for an Ethical-Political Theory of the Good

L’approche des capabilités a été caractérisée par un développement fulgurant au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années. Bien que formulée à l’origine par Amartya Sen, détenteur du Prix Nobel en économie, Martha Nussbaum reprit cette approche dans le but de s’en servir comme fondation pour une théorie éthico-politique intégrale du bien. Cependant, la version de Nussbaum s’avéra particulièrement vulnérable à plusieurs critiques importantes, mettant sérieusement en doute son efficacité globale. À la lumière de ces faits, cette thèse vise à évaluer la pertinence théorique et pratique de l’approche des capabilités de Nussbaum, en examinant trois groupes de critiques particulièrement percutantes formulées à son encontre.

Internal doubts about Cohen's Rescue of Justice

G.A. Cohen's Rescuing Justice and Equality is the culmination of twenty years' work on Rawls's theory of justice. In this paper I distinguish three prongs of attack advanced by Cohen, and show how two of the prongs (the claim that egalitarianism includes productive demands and the claim that equality is best understood as 'luck egalitarianism') are incompatible.

A critique of Nancy Fraser's theory of social justice : self-determination and the Mohawks of Kahnawá:ke

La présente étude se concentre sur le travail de Nancy Fraser sur la justice sociale, lequel a suscité beaucoup d’intérêt dans la littérature au cours des dernières années. La reconnaissance et la redistribution sont les deux piliers originaux de son approche: les désavantages dont souffrent les gens dus au dénigrement culturel ou à la privation économique. Ces deux concepts servent à diagnostiquer et fournir le soutien moral aux multiples luttes que les victimes d’injustice entreprennent avec l’objectif d’établir une participation plus égalitaire à la société. Cependant, que peut-elle dire cette approche des groupes qui sont marginalisés et cherchent l’autogouvernance (ou la séparation même) plutôt que l’intégration dans la société? Le travail de Fraser manifeste une résistance envers les droits du groupe, et un silence quant à l’autodétermination. Mon intervention prend comme objectif d’inclure ces formes d’injustice dans son approche, la rendant plus sensible aux dynamiques des groupes et capable de répondre à leurs revendications trop souvent négligées sous prétexte de l’égalité. La question est, l’égalité de qui?

A Restorative Theory of Criminal Justice

In this project, I defend a restorative theory of criminal justice. I argue that the response to criminal wrongdoing in a just society should take the form of an attempt to heal the damage done to the community resulting from crime. I argue that the moral responsibilities of wrongdoers as wrongdoers ought to provide the framework for how a just society should respond to crime. Following the work of R.A. Duff, I argue that wrongdoers incur second-order duties of moral recognition. Wrongdoers owe it to others to recognize their wrongdoing for what it is, i.e. wrongdoing, and to shoulder certain burdens in order to express their repentant recognition to others via a meaningful apology. In short, wrongdoers owe it to their victims and others in the community to make amends. What I will deny, however, is the now familiar claim in the restorative justice literature that restoring the normative relationships in the community damaged by criminal forms of wrongdoing requires retributive punishment. In my view, how we choose to express the judgement that wrongdoers are blameworthy should flow from an all things considered judgment that is neither reducible to the judgement that the wrongdoer is culpably responsible for wronging others, nor the judgement that the wrongdoer in some basic sense “deserves to suffer” (or “deserves punishment,” etc.).

Girls and violence : the case for a feminist theory of female violence

Rises recorded for girls’ violence in countries like Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States have been hotly contested. One view is these rising rates of violence are an artefact of new forms of policy, policing, criminalisation and social control over young women. Another view is that young women may indeed have become more violent as they have increasingly participated in youth subcultural activities involving gangs and drugs, and cyber‐cultural activities that incite and reward girls’ violence. Any comprehensive explanation will need to address how a complex interplay of cultural, social, behavioural, and policy responses contribute to these rises. This article argues that there is no singular cause, explanation or theory that accounts for the rises in adolescent female violence, and that many of the simple explanations circulating in popular culture are driven by an anti‐feminist ideology. By concentrating on females as victims of violence and very rarely as perpetrators, feminist criminology has for the most part ducked the thorny issue of female violence, leaving a discursive space for anti‐feminist sentiment to reign. The article concludes by arguing the case for developing a feminist theory of female violence.

Review essay : Crime, risk and money : "The Currency of Justice : Fines and Damages in Consumer Societies" and "Crime and Risk", both by Pat O'Malley

Sharing some closely related themes and a common theoretical orientation based on the governmentality analytic, these are nevertheless two very different contributions to criminological knowledge and theory. The first, The Currency of Justice: Fines and Damages in Consumer Societies (COJ), is a sustained and highly original analysis of that most pervasive yet overlooked feature of modern legal orders; their reliance on monetary sanctions. Crime and Risk (CAR), on the other hand, is a short synoptic overview of the many dimensions and trajectories of risk in contemporary debate and practice, both the practices of crime and the governance of crime. It is one of the first in a new series by Sage, 'Compact Criminology', in which authors survey in little more than a hundred pages some current field of debate. With this small gem, Pat O'Malley has set the bar very high for those who follow. For all its brevity, CAR traverses a massive expanse of research, debates and issues, while also opening up new and challenging questions around the politics of risk and the relationship between criminal risk-taking and the governance of risk and crime. The two books draw together various threads of O'Malley's rich body of work on these issues, and once again demonstrate that he is one of the foremost international scholars of risk inside and outside criminology.

Duty to the court and the administration of justice : some examples, implications and clarifications

No liberal democracy can survive without popular trust in its judicial system. The legal profession and the judiciary enjoy a level of independence and autonomy from the executive that makes them both powerful and privileged. A UNIQUE AND ORGANIC DUTY: So long as the courts are seen to fulfil their duty to guard against encroachments by the executive on the freedoms and rights of individual citizens with integrity and credibility, they maintain enough public support to retain their normative authority. But support for those with power and privilege is easily undermined. It is contingent upon trust. Lawyers who breach that trust in ways that go to the heart of the legal system ought to expect to be made examples of and to suffer severe penalties. The good news is that the sorts of breach discussed here should be neither difficult to anticipate nor to avoid – in theory. In practice, smart and honest lawyers sometimes fall foul of these duties for all sorts of understandable (if not condonable) reasons. Law does not get practised in a social or cultural vacuum. Lawyers are people, and people have weaknesses, failings and stresses...

Conrad Summenhart's theory of individual rights and its medieval background

This study focuses on the theory of individual rights that the German theologian Conrad Summenhart (1455-1502) explicated in his massive work Opus septipartitum de contractibus pro foro conscientiae et theologico. The central question to be studied is: How does Summenhart understand the concept of an individual right and its immediate implications? The basic premiss of this study is that in Opus septipartitum Summenhart composed a comprehensive theory of individual rights as a contribution to the on-going medieval discourse on rights. With this rationale, the first part of the study concentrates on earlier discussions on rights as the background for Summenhart s theory. Special attention is paid to language in which right was defined in terms of power . In the fourteenth century writers like Hervaeus Natalis and William Ockham maintained that right signifies power by which the right-holder can to use material things licitly. It will also be shown how the attempts to describe what is meant by the term right became more specified and cultivated. Gerson followed the implications that the term power had in natural philosophy and attributed rights to animals and other creatures. To secure right as a normative concept, Gerson utilized the ancient ius suum cuique-principle of justice and introduced a definition in which right was seen as derived from justice. The latter part of this study makes effort to reconstructing Summenhart s theory of individual rights in three sections. The first section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the right of the individual or the concept of an individual right. Summenhart specified Gerson s description of right as power, taking further use of the language of natural philosophy. In this respect, Summenhart s theory managed to bring an end to a particular continuity of thought that was centered upon a view in which right was understood to signify power to licit action. Perhaps the most significant feature of Summenhart s discussion was the way he explicated the implication of liberty that was present in Gerson s language of rights. Summenhart assimilated libertas with the self-mastery or dominion that in the economic context of discussion took the form of (a moderate) self-ownership. Summenhart discussion also introduced two apparent extensions to Gerson s terminology. First, Summenhart classified right as relation, and second, he equated right with dominion. It is distinctive of Summenhart s view that he took action as the primary determinant of right: Everyone has as much rights or dominion in regard to a thing, as much actions it is licit for him to exercise in regard to the thing. The second section elaborates Summenhart s discussion of the species dominion, which delivered an answer to the question of what kind of rights exist, and clarified thereby the implications of the concept of an individual right. The central feature in Summenhart s discussion was his conscious effort to systematize Gerson s language by combining classifications of dominion into a coherent whole. In this respect, his treatement of the natural dominion is emblematic. Summenhart constructed the concept of natural dominion by making use of the concepts of foundation (founded on a natural gift) and law (according to the natural law). In defining natural dominion as dominion founded on a natural gift, Summenhart attributed natural dominion to animals and even to heavenly bodies. In discussing man s natural dominion, Summenhart pointed out that the natural dominion is not sufficiently identified by its foundation, but requires further specification, which Summenhart finds in the idea that natural dominion is appropriate to the subject according to the natural law. This characterization lead him to treat God s dominion as natural dominion. Partly, this was due to Summenhart s specific understanding of the natural law, which made reasonableness as the primary criterion for the natural dominion at the expense of any metaphysical considerations. The third section clarifies Summenhart s discussion of the property rights defined by the positive human law. By delivering an account on juridical property rights Summenhart connected his philosophical and theological theory on rights to the juridical language of his times, and demonstrated that his own language of rights was compatible with current juridical terminology. Summenhart prepared his discussion of property rights with an account of the justification for private property, which gave private property a direct and strong natural law-based justification. Summenhart s discussion of the four property rights usus, usufructus, proprietas, and possession aimed at delivering a detailed report of the usage of these concepts in juridical discourse. His discussion was characterized by extensive use of the juridical source texts, which was more direct and verbal the more his discussion became entangled with the details of juridical doctrine. At the same time he promoted his own language on rights, especially by applying the idea of right as relation. He also showed recognizable effort towards systematizing juridical language related to property rights.

Recognition and Redistribution in Theories of Justice Beyond the State

We consider here how cultural and socioeconomic dimensions of justice beyond the state are related. First we examine cosmopolitan theories that have drawn on John Rawls's egalitarian liberal framework to argue that a just global order requires substantive, transnational redistribution of material resources. We then assess the view, ironically put forward by Rawls himself, that this perspective is ethnocentric and insufficiently tolerant of non-liberal cultures. We argue that Rawls is right to be concerned about the danger of ethnocentrism, but wrong to assume that this requires us to reject the case for substantive redistribution across state boundaries. A more compelling account of justice beyond the state will integrate effectively socioeconomic and cultural aspects of justice. We suggest that this approach is best grounded in a critical theory of recognition that responds to the damage caused to human relations by legacies of historical injustice.

Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication:The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared

This article examines the relationship between the methods that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) use to decide disputes that involve ‘human’ or ‘fundamental’ rights claims, and the substantive outcomes that result from the use of these particular methods. It has a limited aim: in attempting to understand the interrelationship between human rights methodology and human rights outcomes, it considers primarily the use of ‘comparative reasoning’ in ‘human’ and ‘fundamental’ rights claims by these courts. It is not primarily concerned with examining the extent to which the use of comparative reasoning is based on an appropriate methodology or whether there is a persuasive normative theory underpinning the use of comparative reasoning. The issues considered in this chapter do some of the groundwork, however, that is necessary in order to address these methodological and normative questions.

A minor theory of the transit of materiality into discourse, Via Campesina.

In this thesis I explore how the material properties of plant seed enter the political discourses of the international peasant coalition the Via Campesina and coalition member the National Fanners Union of Canada (NFU), querying how this process might be employed as a resource for a transformative eco-social politics. I employ several post-structural theoretical constructs, configuring them together as a "minor theory". This minor theory provides the basis for a "minor" reading of three sets of Via Campesina and NFU texts. The aim of these readings is to track the movement of seed from a local agricultural concern to a transitive political one, across both the material and discursive registers. In surfacing the presence of the seed's physical properties in the three texts, I highlight the distinctions between the constraining seed of corporate industrial agriculture, and the social and agroecological opportunities resulting from what I call a "Seed Event".

Ethic of Care versus Ethic of Justice? The Gender- Corruption Nexus: Testing the New Conventional Wisdom

Ce papier utilise des données empiriques sur le Ghana afin d’examiner comment, le genre, en tant que système social, génère des dilemmes moraux dans le secteur public. Les hommes et les femmes se sentent obligées de choisir des conditions privées de moralité dans le secteur de l’éthique publique. Ce papier démontre que les références qui délimitent les personnalités comportementales sexuées et qui sont utilisées pour justifier le plus haut degré de standard éthique des femmes peut aussi être potentiellement source de corruption, si les femmes essaient de respecter les attentes en matière de genre dans la conduite des obligations publiques. Fondamentalement, le papier argumente que l’éthique sexuée- supposant la division entre éthique de la compassion et éthique de la justice- pourrait perpétuer des comportements qui nient l’éthique du secteur public, mais se conforme à l’éthique sociale. En utilisant les travaux de Carol Gilligan (1982) sur la théorie du développement moral, il conclut, inter alia, que le recrutement des femmes dans le secteur public devrait être promu en tant que droit plutôt qu’à partir de leur probité morale présumée supérieure. Promouvoir les femmes dans le services publics sur la base de leur éthique supérieure pourrait s’avérer contre-productif si les espoirs étaient déçus.