Attributions of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Group Membership and Identification

Three studies examine how people’s attributions of responsibility for terrorist attacks depend on their group membership and their identification with the victim (study 1) or their identification with the victim’s or perpetrator’s ingroup (studies 2 and 3). We observe that people’s group membership (perpetrator group versus victim group) determines the judgments of responsibility for recent terrorist attacks. Members of the perpetrator group hold the direct perpetrators responsible, while members of the victim group perceive the perpetrator world as a whole as relatively responsible as well. Identification with the victim (study 1) or victim group (studies 2 and 3) strengthens attributions of responsibility to the whole perpetrator group, and this relationship is partially mediated by the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the whole group. We discuss possible explanations for this pattern, and indicate the implications of these results in terms of improving intergroup relations.

Oslo terrorist attacks: Analysis, consequences and lessons learned. Transatlantic Security Paper No. 4, August 2011

The attack in Norway, like every attack with a major impact, should and will be carefully analyzed, both by police and by terrorists. If the Norwegian authorities have officially called for a technical evaluation of Counter-terrorism (CT) and rescue national services, many sensitive aspects still remain unsure.

The EU and the 2016 Terrorist Attacks in Brussels: Better instead of more information sharing. CEPS Commentary, 6 April 2016

The Brussels terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016 provoked widespread political condemnation and public outrage. The events have brought to the fore past discussions regarding the limits of member states’ counterterrorism policies and the extent to which the EU could play a role in shaping more effective responses to these acts of violence.

The fall-out from the Brussels terrorist attacks. EPC Commentary, 16 June 2016

On 22 March, Belgium got a brutal wake-up call. In a coordinated attack, two nail bombs exploded in the departure hall of the Brussels National Airport. A little over an hour later, a third bomb exploded inside a metro train passing through Maelbeek station. 32 civilians lost their lives, while more than 300 people were injured. The Islamic State (IS) network, which was responsible for the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, claimed responsibility. The arrest of Salah Abdeslam, the sole survivor of the Paris attacks, on 18 March, seems to have made IS expedite the Brussels attacks following a claim from the Paris prosecutor that Abdeslam would cooperate with the French Justice Department over the Paris attacks.

September 11 : small business assistance provided in lower Manhattan in response to the terrorist attacks : report to the chairman, Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives /

"GAO-02-88."

Self-exciting hurdle models for terrorist activity

A predictive model of terrorist activity is developed by examining the daily number of terrorist attacks in Indonesia from 1994 through 2007. The dynamic model employs a shot noise process to explain the self-exciting nature of the terrorist activities. This estimates the probability of future attacks as a function of the times since the past attacks. In addition, the excess of nonattack days coupled with the presence of multiple coordinated attacks on the same day compelled the use of hurdle models to jointly model the probability of an attack day and corresponding number of attacks. A power law distribution with a shot noise driven parameter best modeled the number of attacks on an attack day. Interpretation of the model parameters is discussed and predictive performance of the models is evaluated.

A discussion of “Estimating the historical and future probabilities of large terrorist events'' by Aaron Clauset and Ryan Woodard

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 appeared to be a harbinger of increased terrorism and violence in the 21st century, bringing terrorism and political violence to the forefront of public discussion. Questions about these events abound, and “Estimating the Historical and Future Probabilities of Large Scale Terrorist Event” [Clauset and Woodard (2013)] asks specifically, “how rare are large scale terrorist events?” and, in general, encourages discussion on the role of quantitative methods in terrorism research and policy and decision-making. Answering the primary question raises two challenges. The first is identify- ing terrorist events. The second is finding a simple yet robust model for rare events that has good explanatory and predictive capabilities. The challenges of identifying terrorist events is acknowledged and addressed by reviewing and using data from two well-known and reputable sources: the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism-RAND database (MIPT-RAND) [Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism] and the Global Terror- ism Database (GTD) [National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2012), LaFree and Dugan (2007)]. Clauset and Woodard (2013) provide a detailed discussion of the limitations of the data and the models used, in the context of the larger issues surrounding terrorism and policy.

Crisis on impact : responding to cyber attacks on critical information infrastructures

In the developing digital economy, the notion of traditional attack on enterprises of national significance or interest has transcended into different modes of electronic attack, surpassing accepted traditional forms of physical attack upon a target. The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on September 11, 2001 demonstrated the physical devastation that could occur if any nation were the target of a large-scale terrorist attack. Therefore, there is a need to protect criticalnational infrastructure and critical information infrastructure. In particular,this protection is crucial for the proper functioning of a modern society and for a government to fulfill one of its most important prerogatives – namely, the protection of its people. Computer networks have many benefits that governments, corporations, and individuals alike take advantage of in order to promote and perform their duties and roles. Today, there is almost complete dependence on private sector telecommunication infrastructures and the associated computer hardware and software systems.1 These infrastructures and systems even support government and defense activity.2 This Article discusses possible attacks on critical information infrastructures and the government reactions to these attacks.

A qualified defense of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan under international humanitarian law

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international law has had to grapple with the fundamental challenges that large-scale violence carried out by non-State actors poses to the traditional inter- State orientation of international law. Questions related to the “adequacy” and “effectiveness” of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law related to the use of force have been particularly pronounced. This paper focuses on the international humanitarian law implications of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan. A highly-advanced modality of modern warfare, armed drones highlight the possibilities, problems, prospects and pitfalls of high-tech warfare. How is the battlefield to be defined and delineated geographically and temporally? Who can be targeted, and by whom? Ultimately, this paper concludes that American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan are not unlawful as such under international humanitarian law, though, like any tactical decision in the context of asymmetric warfare, they should be continuously and closely monitored according to the dictates of law with sensitivity to facts on the ground.

Terrorist transgressions: gendered representations of the terrorist in visual culture

The aim of Terrorist Transgressions is to analyse the myths inscribed in images of the terrorist and identify how agency is attributed to representation through invocations and inversions of gender stereotypes. In modern discourses on the terrorist the horror experienced in Western societies was the appearance of a new sense of the vulnerability of the body politic, and therefore of the modern self with its direct dependency on security and property. The terrorist has been constructed as the epitome of transgression against economic resources and moral, physical and political boundaries. Although terrorism has been the focus of intense academic activity, cultural representations of the terrorist have received less attention. Yet terrorism is dependent on spectacle and the topic is subject to forceful exposure in popular media. While the terrorist is predominantly aligned with masculinity, women have been active in terrorist organisations since the late 19th century and in suicidal terrorist attacks since the 1980s. Such attacks have confounded constructions of femininity and masculinity, with profound implications for the gendering of violence and horror. The publication arises from an AHRC networking grant, 2011-12, with Birkbeck, and includes collaboration with the army at Sandhurst RMA. The project relates to a wider investigation into feminism, violence and contemporary art.

Abnormal behavior detection for early warning of terrorist attack

Many terrorist attacks are accomplished by bringing explosive devices hidden in ordinary-looking objects to public places. In such case, it is almost impossible to distinguish a terrorist from ordinary people just from the isolated appearance. However, valuable clues might be discovered through analyzing a series of actions of the same person. Abnormal behaviors of object fetching, deposit, or exchange in public places might indicate potential attacks. Based on the widely equipped CCTV surveillance systems at the entrance of many public places, this paper proposes an algorithm to detect such abnormal behaviors for early warning of terrorist attack.

European security after the Paris attacks. CEPS Commentary, 24 November 2015

The November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris have prompted the European Union to activate the mutual assistance clause contained in Art. 42.7 of the EU Treaty. Member states are now entering the unchartered territory of large-scale conflict: will they join a French-led coalition of the willing, or is the military intervention against Daesh being Europeanised? This Commentary explores implications of the Paris attacks on European security and recommends coordinated and comprehensive responses to be taken within the EU framework.