Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality (Part 1)

Formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. The conclusion that the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm's-length model that applies to multinational banks, despite significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues, is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks. The formulary apportionment model looks to the economic substance of the multinational entity and, in this sense, adopts a substance-over- form approach. Formulary apportionment further recognizes the impossibility of using arm's-length pricing for economically interdependent multinational entities. A final advantage to formulary apportionment, which is also a consequence of this model achieving greater inter-nation equity, is the elimination of double taxation.

The taxation of multinational banks : alternative apportionment through a unitary taxation regime aligning with economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks currently is governed by the general principles of international tax. However, it is arguable that there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant the consideration of a separate taxing regime. This article argues that because of the unique nature of multinational banks, the traditional international tax rules governing jurisdiction to tax and allocation of income do not produce a result which is optimal, as it does not reflect economic reality. That is, the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment. Formulary apportionment is considered as an alternative that reflects economic reality by recognising the unique nature of multinational banks and allocating the income to the location of the economic activity. The unique nature of multinational banking is recognised in the fact that formulary apportionment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity. Rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on an economically justifiable formula. Starting from this recognition, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior (or optimal) model for the taxation of multinational banks. An optimal regime, for the purposes of this article, is considered to be one that distributes the taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions, while, simultaneously allowing decisions of the international banks to be tax neutral. In this sense, neutrality is viewed as an economic concept and equity is regarded as a legal concept. A neutral tax system is one in which tax rules do not affect economic choices about commercial activities. Neutrality will ideally be across jurisdictions as well as across traditional and non-traditional industries. The primary focus of this article is jurisdictional neutrality. A system that distributes taxing rights in an equitable manner between the relevant jurisdictions ensures that each country receives its fair share of tax revenue. Given the increase in multinational banking, jurisdictions should be concerned that they are receiving their fair share. Inter-nation equity is concerned with re-determining the proper division of the tax base among countries. Richard and Peggy Musgrave argue that sharing of the tax base by countries of source should be seen as a matter of inter-nation equity requiring international cooperation. The rights of the jurisdiction of residency will also be at issue. To this extent, while it is agreed that inter-nation equity is an essential attribute to an international tax regime, there is no universal agreement as to how to achieve it. The current system attempts to achieve such equity through a combined residency and source regime, with the transfer pricing rules used to apportion income between the relevant jurisdictions. However, this article suggests, that as an alternative to the current regime, equity would be achieved through formulary apportionment. Opposition to formulary apportionment is generally based on the argument that it is not a theoretically superior (or optimal) model because of the implementation difficulties. Yet these are two separate issues. As such, this article is divided into two core parts. The first part examines the theoretical soundness of the formulary apportionment model concluding that it is theoretically superior to the arm’s length pricing requirement of the traditional transfer pricing regime. The second part examines the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an optimal model with a view to disclosing the issues that arise when a formulary apportionment regime is adopted. Prior to an analysis of the theoretical and practical application of formulary apportionment to multinational banks, the unique nature of these banks is considered. The article concludes that, while there are significant implementation, compliance, and enforcement issues to overcome, the unitary taxation model may be theoretically superior to the current arm’s length model which applies to multinational banks. This conclusion is based on the unitary taxation model providing greater alignment with the unique features of these banks.

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality (Part 2)

As stated in Part 1 of this article, formulary appointment does not attempt to undertake a transactional division of a highly integrated multinational entity; rather, it allocates income to the jurisdictions based on economically justifiable formula. This article argues that the unitary taxation model is superior to the current arms-lenght model for the taxation of multinational banks despite significant implementation, complicance and enforcement issues. Part one of the article gave some background on the taxation of multinational banks, followed by a discussion of their uniqueness, and the theoretical benefits of the unitary tax model for multinational banking. Part 2 below covers the practical implications of accepting formulary apportionment as an 'optimal' regime for taxing multinational banks.

Taxation of multinational banks : using formulary apportionment to reflect economic reality

The taxation of multinational banks is currently governed by general principles of international tax. However, there are characteristics exclusive to multinational banks that may warrant consideration of a separate taxing regime, as the current system does not produce a result that accurately reflects the economic source of the income or the location of the economic activity. The suggested alternative is unitary taxation using global formulary apportionment.

The taxation of multinational banking income : is the traditional rationale correct?

This article argues that multinational banks have characteristics which are unique and distinguishable from traditional multinational entities. The first distinguishing feature is the unique nature of the services and consequent products supplied by multinational banks, which are aimed at meeting client global demand. The second distinguishing feature is the non-traditional organisational structure that is adopted. This structure, also designed to meet client global demand, introduces issues previously not recognised in the traditional taxation system, which is designed for the structure of traditional multinational entities. The unique differences between traditional multinational entities and multinational banks means there may be the need for a distinct international tax regime. It is argued that there are “outmoded economic assumptions” upon which the present tax laws relating to multinational banks are based. An examination of the unique nature of multinational banks leads to the conclusion that the appropriate tax treatment of these banks is different from the appropriate tax treatment of multinational entities generally.

Interjurisdictional allocation of multinational banking income : aligning taxation principles with economic activity

This thesis argues that one type of multinational entity – the multinational bank – poses particularly significant challenges to the international tax regime in terms of its current profit allocation rules. Multinational banks are a unique subset of multinational entities, and as a consequence of their unique traits, the traditional international tax regime foes not yield an optimal interjurisdictional allocation of taxing rights. The opportunity for tax minimisation, achievable because of the unique traits, and realised through exploitation of the traditional source and transfer pricing regime, results in a jurisdictional distribution of taxing rights which does not reflect economic reality. There are two distinct ways in which the traditional international tax regime fails to reflect economic activity. The first way that economic activity may not be reflected in the distribution of the taxing rights to income from multinational banking is through the application of traditional source rules. The traditional sources rules allocate income where transactions are completed rather than where the intermediation services are arranged. As a result of their unique commercial role as financial intermediaries, by separating intermediary economic activity from legal transactions with third parties, multinational banks may distort the true location of the activity giving rise to income. The second way in which the traditional tax regime may fail to reflect economic activity is through the traditional transfer pricing regime requiring related or internal transaction to be undertaken at an arm’s length price. The arm’s length pricing requirement is theoretically deficient in its failure to recognise the highly integrated nature of multinational banking. In practice, the arm’s length pricing requirement is also difficult, if not impossible, to apply to multinational banks because of the requirement of comparability. The difficulties associated with the current model have resulted in a subtle move by multinational banks towards global formulary apportionment. This thesis concludes that, for the international taxation of multinational banks, the current source regime should be replaced with a system that allocates profits for tax purposes on the basis of income source, with source determined using a unitary taxation or global formulary apportionment system. It is argued that global formulary apportionment is a theoretically superior model that provides both jurisdiction to tax and allocated profits on the basis of the economic activity that generates the income.

Executives as Agents: Expatriate managers in subsidiaries of multinational banks. ACES Working Papers, June 2012

Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.

Transfer pricing and multinational financial institutions : the case for replacing arm’s length price with a unitary approach

The international tax system, designed a century ago, has not kept pace with the modern multinational entity rendering it ineffective in taxing many modern businesses according to economic activity. One of those modern multinational entities is the multinational financial institution (MNFI). The recent global financial crisis provides a particularly relevant and significant example of the failure of the current system on a global scale. The modern MNFI is increasingly undertaking more globalised and complex trading operations. A primary reason for the globalisation of financial institutions is that they typically ‘follow-the-customer’ into jurisdictions where international capital and international investors are required. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently reported that from 1995-2009, foreign bank presence in developing countries grew by 122 per cent. The same study indicates that foreign banks have a 20 per cent market share in OECD countries and 50 per cent in emerging markets and developing countries. Hence, most significant is that fact that MNFIs are increasingly undertaking an intermediary role in developing economies where they are financing core business activities such as mining and tourism. IMF analysis also suggests that in the future, foreign bank expansion will be greatest in emerging economies. The difficulties for developing countries in applying current international tax rules, especially the current traditional transfer pricing regime, are particularly acute in relation to MNFIs, which are the biggest users of tax havens and offshore finance. This paper investigates whether a unitary taxation approach which reflects economic reality would more easily and effectively ensure that the profits of MNFIs are taxed in the jurisdictions which give rise to those profits. It has previously been argued that the uniqueness of MNFIs results in a failure of the current system to accurately allocate profits and that unitary tax as an alternative could provide a sounder allocation model for international tax purposes. This paper goes a step further, and examines the practicalities of the implementation of unitary taxation for MNFIs in terms of the key components of such a regime, along with their their implications. This paper adopts a two-step approach in considering the implications of unitary taxation as a means of improved corporate tax coordination which requires international acceptance and agreement. First, the definitional issues of the unitary MNFI are examined and second, an appropriate allocation formula for this sector is investigated. To achieve this, the paper asks first, how the financial sector should be defined for the purposes of unitary taxation and what should constitute a unitary business for that sector and second, what is the ‘best practice’ model of an allocation formula for the purposes of the apportionment of the profits of the unitary business of a financial institution.

Arm’s length pricing and multinational banks : an old fashioned approach in a modern world

In “Arm’s Length Pricing and Multinational Banks: An Old Fashioned Approach in a Modern World”, Kerrie Sadiq, describes the high level of integration of multinational financial institutions and argues that treating each element within a given operation as a separate entity for transfer pricing purposes is not economically or legally realistic. She proposes instead formulary apportionment as a device for managing this complexity.

Unitary Taxation of the Finance Sector

Multinational financial institutions (MNFIs) play a significant role in financing the activities of their clients in developing nations. Consistent with the ‘follow-the-customer’ phenomenon which explains financial institution expansion, these entities are increasingly profiting from activities associated with this growing market. However, not only are MNFIs persistent users of tax havens, but also, more than other industries, have the opportunity to reduce tax through transfer pricing measures. This paper establishes a case for an industry-specific adoption of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment as a viable alternative to the current regime. In doing so, it considers the practicalities of implementing this by examining both definitional issues and possible formulas for MNFIs. This paper argues that, while there would be implementation difficulties to overcome, the current domestic models of formulary apportionment provide important guidance as to how the unitary business and business activities of MNFIs should be defined, as well as the factors that should be included in an allocation formula, and the appropriate weighting. This paper concludes that unitary taxation with formulary apportionment is a viable industry-specific alternative for MNFIs.