O imposto territorial rural e os municípios: o impacto nas receitas municipais e a renúncia fiscal

O artigo reúne uma análise do impacto da arrecadação do Imposto Territorial Rural no período de 1995 a 1997 nos municípios paulistas de Bragança Paulista, Franca e Porto Ferreira frente à composição das receitas municipais. A análise é realizada com base nas legislações do imposto vigentes no período e realiza comparações de arrecadação e projeções tendo como referência os valores da terra nua arbitrados pela Secretaria da Receita Federal (SRF) e pesquisados pelo Instituto de Economia Agrícola da Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Agricultura e Abastecimento de São Paulo. Os resultados da pesquisa indicam percentuais de evasão fiscal que atingiram de 18% a 52% e inadimplência de até 31% e esse perfil de evasão se acentua quando a partir de 1996 a SRF deixa de estabelecer o valor da terra nua mínimo (VTNm) e passa a tomar como referência apenas os valores declarados pelo contribuinte.

The politics of fiscal policy during economic downturns, 1981-2010

This article investigates fiscal policy responses to the Great Recession in historical perspective. We explore general trends in the frequency, size and composition of fiscal stimulus as well as the impact of government partisanship on fiscal policy outputs during the four international recessions of 1980-81, 1990-91, 2001-02 and 2008-09. Encompassing 17-23 OECD countries, our analysis calls into question the idea of a general retreat from fiscal policy activism since the early 1980s. The propensity of governments to respond to economic downturns by engaging in fiscal stimulus has increased over time and we do not observe any secular trend in the size of stimulus measures. At the same time, OECD governments have relied more on tax cuts to stimulate demand in the two recessions of the 2000s than they did in the early 1980s or early 1990s. Regarding government partisanship, we do not find any significant direct partisan effects on either the size or the composition of fiscal stimulus for any of the four recession episodes. However, the size of the welfare state conditioned the impact of government partisanship in the two recessions of the 2000s, with Left-leaning governments distinctly more prone to engage in discretionary fiscal stimulus and/or spending increases in large welfare states, but not in small welfare states.

Tax performance and reform in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)

Includes bibliography

Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures

This paper uses a survey experiment to examine differences in public attitudes toward 'direct' and 'indirect' government spending. Federal social welfare spending in the USA has two components: the federal government spends money to directly provide social benefits to citizens, and also indirectly subsidizes the private provision of social benefits through tax expenditures. Though benefits provided through tax expenditures are considered spending for budgetary purposes, they differ from direct spending in several ways: in the mechanisms through which benefits are delivered to citizens, in how they distribute wealth across the income spectrum, and in the visibility of their policy consequences to the mass public. We develop and test a model explaining how these differences will affect public attitudes toward spending conducted through direct and indirect means. We find that support for otherwise identical social programs is generally higher when such programs are portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures than when they are portrayed as being delivered by direct spending. In addition, support for tax expenditure programs which redistribute wealth upward drops when citizens are provided information about the redistributive effects. Both of these results are conditioned by partisanship, with the opinions of Republicans more sensitive to the mechanism through which benefits are delivered, and the opinions of Democrats more sensitive to information about their redistributive effects.

The Politics of Local Autonomy: Measuring Cantonal (De)Centralisation in Switzerland

In Switzerland, there are 26 systems of cantonal decentralisation because regulating municipal autonomy is an exclusively cantonal competency. Existing measures of local autonomy/cantonal decentralisation are confined to measuring the real or perceived distribution of functions. Alternatively, they weigh expenditures (Dafflon 1992) or tax revenues (Dlabac and Schaub forthcoming) of municipalities against those of the canton. Complementing these indices, this paper additionally measures the politics dimension of cantonal decentralisation. Seven aspects are measured: intra-cantonal regionalism, cumuldesmandats (double tenure of cantonal MP and mayoral office), territorial quotas for legislative and executive elections, direct local representation and lobbying, party decentralisation, the number and size of constituencies, and direct democracy (communal referendum and initiative). This results in a ranking of all 26 cantons as regards the politics of local autonomy within their political systems. The measure will help scholars to test assumptions held for decentralisation in general, be it as a dependent (explaining decentralisation) or as an independent variable (decentralisation—so what?), within but also beyond the Swiss context.

The Goldkrieg: Revaluing the Bundesbank's Reserves and the Politics of EMU. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 08.6, 1998

In May and June 1997, Germany's commitment to Economic and Monetaty Union (EMU) underwent its most serious test ever when the Bundesbank and the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl dashed openly over the government's plans to revalue the country's gold reserves. Faced with a budget short-fall and strong political opposition to either tax increases or spending cuts, Finance Minister Waigel attempted to introduce a modest change in the Bundesbank's bookkeeping procedures to bring them in line with the standard practices at other European central banks. The Bundesbank resisted, arguing that the changes would infringe upon its closely guarded independence. This paper analyzes how the politics of coalition interacted with Germany's political institutions to cause this conflict.

The Politics of Budget Consolidation in Britain and Germany: the Impact of Blame-Avoidance Opportunities. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.2, 2005

According to parts of the literature, blame avoidance opportunities, i.e. the necessity and applicability of blame avoidance strategies, may differ among countries according to the respective institutional set-ups and between governing parties according to their programmatic orientation. In countries with many veto actors, a strategy of "Institutional Cooperation" among these actors is expected to diffuse blame sufficiently to render other blame avoidance strategies obsolete. In contrast, governments in Westminster democracies should resort to the more unilateral strategies of presentation, policy design and timing. At the same time, parties of the left are expected to have an easier time implementing spending cuts while right parties are less vulnerable when proposing tax increases. Evidence from the politics of budget consolidation in Britain and Germany does not corroborate these hypotheses. Instead, it seems that party competition conditions the effects institutions and the partisan complexion of governments have on the politics of blame avoidance.

An essay on the right of a state to tax a body corporate : considered in relation to the present bank tax in Rhode-Island /

Mode of access: Internet.