Cross-Industry Product Diversification and Contagion in Risk and Return: The Case of Bank-Insurance and Insurance-Bank Takeovers

We investigate the impact of domestic/international bancassurance deals on the risk-return profiles of announcing and non-announcing banks and insurers within a GARCH model. Bank-insurance deals produce intra- and inter-industry contagion in both risk and return, with larger deals producing greater contagion. Bidder banks and peers experience positive abnormal returns, with the effects on insurer peers being stronger than those on bank peers. Insurance-bank deals produce insignificant excess returns for bidder and peer insurers and positive valuations for peer banks. Following the deal, the bank bidders’ idiosyncratic (systematic) risk falls (increases), while insurance bidders exhibit a lower systematic risk and maintain their idiosyncratic risk.

Segment reporting and corporate takeovers : user needs

The nature of a corporate takeover often leads to the contraction in the number of companies operating in a given industry classification, along with the contraction in the amount of formal financial statements produced by the companies in that industry. Since 1985 Australian diversified companies are required to break their operations down into industry and geographical segments, so it would be expected that companies which diversify their operations through a corporate takeover would be forerunners in the adoption of this relatively new accounting standard on segment reporting. While previous studies have both declared the benefits of segment reporting to report users, and exposed some preconceived problems of its application in practice, there has not been any work on the 'usefulness1 of segment reporting as a form of reporting that will compensate shareholder users for the information loss suffered during a corporate takeover. This study endeavours to determine this, by questioning shareholders of companies that have been involved in takeovers in a period subsequent to the application date of the segment reporting standard, and obtaining their views on the usefulness of the post-takeover segment reports produced by their companies. A link is discovered to exist between shareholder dissatisfaction with segment reporting and the non-practice of creating a new segment in the post-takeover annual report for the target acquired. The underlying assumption that the practice of new segment creation after a takeover is influenced by the type of takeover undertaken is supported by the study. Regardless of whether or not a company is diversified before the takeover, the findings show that a corporate acquirer in a takeover is less likely to create a new industry or geographical segment for the target acquired if they are involved in horizontal or vertical takeovers than if they are involved in diversified takeovers. In these situations, segment reporting is found to not compensate shareholders for the loss of information incurred by them in these types of takeovers.

What factors drive takeovers in Australia?

We examine the relationships between the wealth changes associated with a takeover announcement to distinguish between three major competing motives—synergy, hubris, and agency. Empirical tests indicate that the synergy motive is the predominant explanation for the majority of takeovers in Australia; however, the evidence is consistent with the simultaneous presence of hubris in value-creating takeovers. The evidence also suggests agency, not hubris, is the primary motivation for the takeovers which result in value destruction.

The diversification discount and takeovers : some Australian evidence

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the existence of a diversification discount in the Australian takeover market. A sample of 446 Australian publicly-listed firms involved in the market for corporate control was observed between 2000 and 2007. The authors examined two pre-announcement and four post-announcement periods, predominantly around the immediate event date, but also examined activity out to one year following the announcement.
Design/methodology/approach – An event study, in this case, is used to examine abnormal returns around the announcement of a merger or acquisition. The timeframe this study intends to focus on is the period from announcement date to a time one year down the track which, although some studies may deem it “long-term”, is still a relatively short-term measure of performance.While many variables in acquisitions have been looked at in depth over the years, such as outcome, nature, payment method and size of deal, one area which has had considerably less attention is the area of specialisation and diversification. That is, do focus increasing (or non-diversification) deals have different return patterns relative to focus decreasing (or diversification) deals?
Findings – The overall findings of this paper are fairly mixed, barring a few exceptions, and there does not appear to be a great deal of variation in return patterns based purely on whether the announced acquisition is non-diversifying or diversifying in nature.
Originality/value – The paper is of particular value in Australia. Most of the research of diversification to date has taken place in the USA. Australia is similar to the USA in that it has a well-developed economy based on common law principles and an active equity market, however, the existence of institutional and regulatory differences suggests that US results may not hold in Australia.