Pricing inefficiencies in private real estate markets using total return swaps

Efficient markets should guarantee the existence of zero spreads for total return swaps. However, real estate markets have recorded values that are significantly different from zero in both directions. Possible explanations might suggest non-rational behaviour by inexperienced market players or unusual features of the underlying asset market. We find that institutional characteristics in the underlying market lead to market inefficiencies and, hence, to the creation of a rational trading window with upper and lower bounds within which transactions do not offer arbitrage opportunities. Given the existence of this rational trading window, we also argue that the observed spreads can substantially be explained by trading imbalances due to the limited liquidity of a newly formed market and/or to the effect of market sentiment, complementing explanations based on the lag between underlying market returns and index returns.

Housing supply in Australia : the impact of the availability of development finance

Before the Global Financial Crisis many providers of finance had growth mandates and actively pursued development finance deals as a way of gaining higher returns on funds with regular capital turnover and re-investment possible. This was able to be achieved through high gearing and low presales in a strong market. As asset prices fell, loan covenants breached and memories of the 1990’s returned, banks rapidly adjusted their risk appetite via retraction of gearing and expansion of presale requirements. Early signs of loosening in bank credit policy are emerging, however parties seeking development finance are faced with a severely reduced number of institutions from which to source funding. The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only the best credit risks by way of constrictive credit conditions including: low loan to value ratios, the corresponding requirement to contribute high levels of equity, lack of support in non-prime locations and the requirement for only borrowers with well established track records. In this risk averse and capital constrained environment, the ability of developers to proceed with real estate developments is still being constrained by their inability to obtain project finance. This paper will examine the pre and post GFC development finance environment. It will identify the key lending criteria relevant to real estate development finance and will detail the related changes to credit policies over this period. The associated impact to real estate development projects will be presented, highlighting the significant constraint to supply that the inability to obtain finance poses.

Corporate governance, accounting and finance: a review

We review accounting and finance research on corporate governance (CG). In the course of our review, we focus on a particularly vexing issue, namely endogeneity in the relationships between CG and other matters of concern to accounting and finance scholars, and suggest ways to deal with it. Given the advent of large commercial CG databases, we also stress the importance of how CG is measured and in particular, the construction of CG indices, which should be sensitive to local institutional arrangements, and the need to capture both internal and external aspects of governance. The ‘stickiness’ of CG characteristics provides an additional challenge to CG scholars. Better theory is required, for example, to explain whether various CG practices substitute for each other or are complements. While a multidisciplinary approach to developing better theory is never without its difficulties, it could enrich the current body of knowledge in CG. Despite the vastness of the existing CG literature, these issues do suggest a number of avenues for future research.

Opportunities for forest finance under the International climate change regime

The international climate change regime has the potential to increase revenue available for forest restoration projects in Commonwealth nations. There are three mechanisms which could be used to fund forest projects aimed at forest conservation, forest restoration and sustainable forest management. The first forest funding opportunity arises under the clean development mechanism, a flexibility mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. The clean development mechanism allows Annex I parties (industrialised nations) to invest in emission reduction activities in non-Annex 1 (developing countries) and the establishment of forest sinks is an eligible clean development mechanism activity. Secondly, parties to the Kyoto Protocol are able to include sustainable forest management activities in their national carbon accounting. The international rules concerning this are called the Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Guidelines. Thirdly, it is anticipated that at the upcoming Copenhagen negotiations that a Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) instrument will be created. This will provide a direct funding mechanism for those developing countries with tropical forests. Payments made under a REDD arrangement will be based upon the developing country with tropical forest cover agreeing to protect and conserve a designated forest estate. These three funding options available under the international climate change regime demonstrate that there is potential for forest finance within the regime. These opportunities are however hindered by a number of technical and policy barriers which prevent the ability of the regime to significantly increase funding for forest projects. There are two types of carbon markets, compliance carbon markets (Kyoto based) and voluntary carbon markets. Voluntary carbon markets are more flexible then compliance markets and as such offer potential to increase revenue available for sustainable forest projects.

The consequences of not taking reasonable steps to obtain finance

In Hauff v Miller [2013] QCA 48 the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an issue that has not previously arisen at appellate level. The case concerned the interaction of the well-known subject to finance clause and other standard contractual provisions...

Industry policy, finance and the AIDC : Australia from the 1950s to the 1970s

This thesis, conceived within a Marxist framework, addresses key conceptual issues in the writing and theorising on industry policy in post second world- war Australia. Broadly, the thesis challenges the way that industry policy on the left of politics (reflected in the social democratic and Keynesian positions) has been constructed as a practical, progressive policy agenda. Specifically, the thesis poses a direct challenge to the primacy of the ‘national’ in interpreting the history of industry policy. The challenge is to the proposition that conflicts between national industry and international finance arose only from the mid 1980s. On the contrary, as will be seen, this is a 1960s issue and any interpretation of the debates and the agendas surrounding industry policy in the 1980s must be predicated on an understanding of how the issue was played out two decades earlier. As was the case in the 1960s, industry policy in the 1980s has been isolated from two key areas of interrogation: the role of the nation state in regulating accumulation and the role of finance in industry policy. In the 1950s and more so in the 1960s and early 1970s there was a reconfiguration of financing internationally but it is one that did not enter into industry policy analysis. The central concern therefore is to simultaneously sketch the historical political economy on industry policy from the 1950s through to the early 1970s in Australia and to analytically and empirically insert the role of finance into that history. In so doing the thesis addresses the economic and social factors that shaped the approach to industry finance in Australia during this critical period. The analysis is supported by a detailed examination of political and industry debates surrounding the proposal for, and institution of, a key national intervention in the form of the Australian Industry Development Corporation (AIDC).