Sistema de gestió de subhastes per a un portal Immobiliari

Desenvolupament de un sistema de gestió de subhastes per aun portal immobiliari i s¿engloba dintre de l¿àrea de Java Enterprise Edition.

Art contemporani xinès en el segle XXI : introducció a la pugna entre la creació i el mercat a través de cinc artistes destacats i les seves cotitzacions en les subhastes

En el relativament breu lapse de temps que suposen les tres darreres dècades, l'art contemporani xinès ha passat de ser pràcticament invisible i desconegut per al públic general, a ser present en un gran nombre d'escenaris a nivell internacional relacionats amb el món de l'art, sobre tot des de finals de la dècada dels noranta. El present TdR ha intentat apropar-se a qüestions com la imatge i les idees que sobre la RP Xina s'han transmès en l'última dècada a través de les obres o de les accions dels artistes xinesos contemporanis més exposats o cotitzats internacionalment i que viuen a la Xina, i a com s'ha arribat a inserir la producció artística d'aquests autors en el procés de globalització i hibridació de la cultura que estem vivint. Hem delimitat el camp de recerca, bàsicament a l'estudi de l'obra de cinc autors (Song Dong, Ai Weiwei, Zeng Fanzhi, Yue Minjun i Wang Qingsong) i a la seva presència en l'escena internacional de l'art contemporani a través de les subhastes de les dues cases més importants del món, Christie's i Sotheby's.

Disseny i implementació d'una pàgina web de subhastes

Amb la situació econòmica actual pot ser interessant poder vendre objectes que ja no s’utilitzen i també poder-ne comprar de segona mà. Amb aquesta idea sorgeix el projecte de crear una pàgina de subhastes online on la gent pugui comerciar amb les coses que ja no necessita. Tenint en compte el concepte inicial, el propietari de la pàgina no rebrà cap retribució ni percentatge de cada subhasta, tot l’import serà pel venedor. L’objectiu principal és el de poder oferir un lloc on després de registrar-se, els usuaris puguin veure i pujar per els articles que altres persones estan subhastant i també la possibilitat de crear les seves pròpies subhastes. Cada usuari disposarà d’un espai personal on veure les subhastes amb les que ha interactuat i així no perdre-les de vista i també on poder veure en cada moment l’estat de les subhastes que ha creat. La vista d’una subhasta s’actualitzarà automàticament sense haver de recarregar la pàgina i si algú puja durant l’últim minut la subhasta s’allargarà un minut més per evitar puges a l’últim moment i així maximitzar el preu final. Hi haurà un administrador que serà l’encarregat de gestionar el bon funcionament de la pàgina amb permís per afegir, editar, consultar i eliminar tota la informació disponible. Per portar a terme el projecte s’ha utilitzat PHP per la part de programació i MySQL com a sistema gestor de bases de dades.

Sistema de subhastes

Anàlisi i desenvolupament d'un sistema de subhastes per internet.

Disseny i implementació d'una pàgina web de subhastes

Amb la situació econòmica actual pot ser interessant poder vendre objectes que ja no s’utilitzen i també poder-ne comprar de segona mà. Amb aquesta idea sorgeix el projecte de crear una pàgina de subhastes online on la gent pugui comerciar amb les coses que ja no necessita. Tenint en compte el concepte inicial, el propietari de la pàgina no rebrà cap retribució ni percentatge de cada subhasta, tot l’import serà pel venedor. L’objectiu principal és el de poder oferir un lloc on després de registrar-se, els usuaris puguin veure i pujar per els articles que altres persones estan subhastant i també la possibilitat de crear les seves pròpies subhastes. Cada usuari disposarà d’un espai personal on veure les subhastes amb les que ha interactuat i així no perdre-les de vista i també on poder veure en cada moment l’estat de les subhastes que ha creat. La vista d’una subhasta s’actualitzarà automàticament sense haver de recarregar la pàgina i si algú puja durant l’últim minut la subhasta s’allargarà un minut més per evitar puges a l’últim moment i així maximitzar el preu final. Hi haurà un administrador que serà l’encarregat de gestionar el bon funcionament de la pàgina amb permís per afegir, editar, consultar i eliminar tota la informació disponible. Per portar a terme el projecte s’ha utilitzat PHP per la part de programació i MySQL com a sistema gestor de bases de dades.

Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm's minimum acceptable price and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell at this price, there exists a range of discount factors for which the monopoly outcome with equal sharing is sustainable in the uniform price auction, but not in the corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this out-come. We extend these results to the case where firms may set bids that are arbitrary step functions of price-quantity pairs with any finite number of price steps. Surprisingly, under the Maximum Accepted Price rule, firms need employ no more than two price steps to minimize the value of the discount factor

Bidding at sequential first-price auctions with(out) supply uncertainty: a laboratory analysis

We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.

Auctions for government securities: a laboratory comparison of uniform, discriminatory and spanish designs

The Bank of Spain uses a unique auction format to sell government bonds, which can be seen as a hybrid of a uniform and a discriminatory auction. For winning bids above the average winning bid, buyers are charged the average winning bid, otherwise they pay their respective bids. We report on an experiment that compares this auction format to the discriminatory format, used in most other countries, and to the uniform format. Our design is based on a common value model with multi-unit supply and two-unit demand. The results show significantly higher revenue with the Spanish and the uniform formats than with the discriminatory one, while volatility of prices over time is significantly lower in the discriminatory format than in the Spanish and uniform cases. Actual price dispersion is significantly larger in the discriminatory than in the Spanish. Our data also exhibit the use of bid-spreading strategies in all three designs.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view.

Preferred suppliers in auction markets

In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers. When the buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price in the procurement auction based on that cost.

Disseny i desenvolupament d'un sistema per la identificació de compradors en processos de subhasta mitjançant IR

Disseny i desenvolupament d’un sistema per a la identificació de compradors en processos de subhasta, integrable dins d’un sistema de subhasta automatitzada