Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Uncertainty during organizational change: Types, consequences, and management strategies

This research tested a model that classifies change uncertainty into three interrelated types: strategic, structural, and job-related. We predicted that control would mediate the effects of job-related uncertainty upon psychological strain, and that management communication and participation in decision-making (PDM) would reduce uncertainty and increase feelings of control. The model was tested in a public sector organization and the results supported it. Control was found to mediate the effects of job-related uncertainty upon psychological strain. Management communication was negatively related to strategic uncertainty, whereas PDM was negatively related to structural and job-related uncertainty, suggesting different mechanisms to deal with the types of uncertainty during change. Finally, PDM was positively associated with feelings of control and negatively associated with psychological strain. These results suggest that PDM can short-circuit the damaging effects of uncertainty by allowing employees to have a say in change related organizational affairs, thereby instilling a sense of control over their circumstances.

Investment coordination failures and the confidence channel of fiscal policy

Este trabalho desenvolve um novo "canal de Confiança" da política fiscal e caracteriza a política ótima quando esse canal é levado em consideração. Para esse objetivo, utilizamos um modelo estático com (i) concorrência monopolística, (ii) custos de ajustamento fixos para investir, (iii) complementaridade estratégica devido a informação imperfeita com respeito a produtividade agregada, e (iv) bens privados como substitutos imperfeitos de bens privados. Este arcabouço acomoda a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação nos investimentos, mas apresenta um equilíbrio único. Mostramos que a política fiscal tem efeitos importantes na coordenação. Um aumento dos gastos do governo leva a uma maior demanda por bens privados. Mais importante, este também afeta as expectativas de ordem superior com relação a demanda das demais firmas, que amplifica os efeitos do aumento inicial da demanda devido a complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de investimento. Como as demais firmas estão se deparam com uma demanda maior, espera-se que estas invistam mais, que por sua vez, aumenta a demanda individual de cada firma, que aumenta os incentivos a investir. Denominamos isto como o "canal de confiança" da política fiscal. Sob a ameaça de falhas de coordenação, a política fiscal ótima prescreve produzir além do ponto em que o benefício marginal resultante do consumo de bens públicos é igual ao custo marginal desses bens. Este benefício adicional vem do fato de que a política fiscal pode ampliar a coordenação dos investimentos.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

Strategic trade policy under uncertainty: Sufficient conditions for the optimality of ad valorem, specific and quadratic trade taxes

In most previous work on strategic trade policy the form of government intervention has been prescribed in advance. In this paper, we apply a solution concept discussed by Klemperer and Meyer for games in which the strategy space consists of the class of all (non state-contingent) price quantity schedules. We examine a series of specific assumptions on demand and supply conditions and derive the associated equilibrium trade policies. We derive welfare implications for all cases examined.

Employment Protection, Flexibility and Firms’ Strategic Location Decisions under Uncertainty

We construct a model in which oligopolistic firms decide between locating in a country where employment protection implies costly output adjustments and in one without employment protection. Using a two-period three-stage game with uncertainty, we demonstrate that location is influenced by both flexibility and strategic concerns. The strategic effects under Cournot work towards domestic anchorage in the country with employment protection while those under Bertrand do not. Strategic agglomeration can occur in the inflexible country under Cournot and even under Bertrand, provided uncertainty and foreign direct investment costs are low.

How health organizations can apply scenario based planning and analytic technologies to make strategic consequential decisions in a time of uncertainty

The magnitude of the cervical cancer problem, coupled with the potential for prevention with recent technological advances, made it imperative to step back and reassess strategic options for dealing with cervical cancer screening in Kenya. The purpose of this qualitative study was: 1) to explore the extent to which the Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology and the Scenario Based Planning (SBP) method, with the application of analytics, could enable strategic, consequential, informed decision making, and 2) to determine how influential Kenyan decision makers could apply SBP with analytic tools and techniques to make strategic, consequential decisions regarding the implementation of a Cervical Self Sampling Program (CSSP) in both urban and rural settings. The theoretical paradigm for this study was action research; it was experiential, practical, and action oriented, and resulted in co-created knowledge that influenced study participants’ decision making. Action Africa Help International (AAHI) and Brock University collaborated with Local Decision Influencing Participants (LDIP’s) to develop innovative strategies on how to implement the CSSP. SBP tools, along with traditional approaches to data collection and analysis, were applied to collect, visualize and analyze predominately qualitative data. Outputs from the study included: a) a generic implementation scenario for a CSSP (along with scenarios unique to urban and rural settings), and b) 10 strategic directions and 22 supporting implementation strategies that address the variables of: 1) technical viability, 2) political support, 3) affordability, 4) logistical feasibility, 5) social acceptability, and 6) transformation/sustainability. In addition, study participants’ capacity to effectively engage in predictive/prescriptive strategic decision making was strengthened.

Robust scenario formulations for strategic supply chain optimization under uncertainty

Strategic supply chain optimization (SCO) problems are often modelled as a two-stage optimization problem, in which the first-stage variables represent decisions on the development of the supply chain and the second-stage variables represent decisions on the operations of the supply chain. When uncertainty is explicitly considered, the problem becomes an intractable infinite-dimensional optimization problem, which is usually solved approximately via a scenario or a robust approach. This paper proposes a novel synergy of the scenario and robust approaches for strategic SCO under uncertainty. Two formulations are developed, namely, naïve robust scenario formulation and affinely adjustable robust scenario formulation. It is shown that both formulations can be reformulated into tractable deterministic optimization problems if the uncertainty is bounded with the infinity-norm, and the uncertain equality constraints can be reformulated into deterministic constraints without assumption of the uncertainty region. Case studies of a classical farm planning problem and an energy and bioproduct SCO problem demonstrate the advantages of the proposed formulations over the classical scenario formulation. The proposed formulations not only can generate solutions with guaranteed feasibility or indicate infeasibility of a problem, but also can achieve optimal expected economic performance with smaller numbers of scenarios.

Novel Formulation and Efficient Solution Strategy for Strategic Optimization of an Industrial Chemical Supply Chain Under Demand Uncertainty

This paper is concerned with strategic optimization of a typical industrial chemical supply chain, which involves a material purchase and transportation network, several manufacturing plants with on-site material and product inventories, a product transportation network and several regional markets. In order to address large uncertainties in customer demands at the different regional markets, a novel robust scenario formulation, which has been developed by the authors recently, is tailored and applied for the strategic optimization. Case study results show that the robust scenario formulation works well for this real industrial supply chain system, and it outperforms the deterministic formulation and the classical scenario-based stochastic programming formulation by generating better expected economic performance and solutions that are guaranteed to be feasible for all uncertainty realizations. The robust scenario problem exhibits a decomposable structure that can be taken advantage of by Benders decomposition for efficient solution, so the application of Benders decomposition to the solution of the strategic optimization is also discussed. The case study results show that Benders decomposition can reduce the solution time by almost an order of magnitude when the number of scenarios in the problem is large.

Electoral Uncertainty and the Deficit Bias in a New Keynesian Economy

Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly

A fuzzy-based decision model application on strategic management

In this article, the objective is to demonstrate the effects of different decision styles on strategic decisions and likewise, on an organization. The technique that was presented in the study is based on the transformation of linguistic variables to numerical value intervals. In this model, the study benefits from fuzzy logic methodology and fuzzy numbers. This fuzzy methodology approach allows us to examine the relations between decision making styles and strategic management processes when there is uncertainty. The purpose is to provide results to companies that may help them to exercise the most appropriate decision making style for its different strategic management processes. The study is leaving more research topics for further studies that may be applied to other decision making areas within the strategic management process.

Strategic investment appraisal; extended real options approach

Tutkielma keskittyy lisäämään investointiarviointiprosessien rationaalisuutta strategisten investointien arvioinnissa duopoli- / oligopolimarkkinoilla. Tutkielman päätavoitteena on selvittää kuinka peliteorialla laajennettu reaalioptioperusteinen investointien arviointimenetelmä, laajennettu reaalioptiokehikko, voisi mahdollisesti parantaa analyysien tarkkuutta. Tutkimus lähestyy ongelmaa investoinnin ajoituksen sekä todellisten investoinnin arvoattribuuttien riippuvuuksien kautta. Laajennettu reaalioptiokehikko on investointien analysointi- ja johtamistyökalu, joka tarjoaa osittain rajoitetun (sisältää tällä hetkellä ainoastaan parametrisen ja peliteoreettisen epävarmuuden) optimaalisen arvovälin investoinnin todellisesta arvosta. Kehikossa, ROA kartoittaa mahdolliset strategiset hyödyt tunnistamalla investointiinliittyvät eri optiot ja epävarmuudet, peliteoria korostaa ympäristön luomia paineita investointiin liittyvän epävarmuuden hallitsemisessa. Laajennettu reaalioptiokehikko tarjoaa rationaalisemman arvion strategisen investoinnin arvosta, koska se yhdistää johdonmukaisemmin option toteutuksen ja siten myös optioiden aika-arvon, yrityksen todellisiin rajoitettuihin (rajoituksena muiden markkinatoimijoiden toimet) polkuriippuvaisiin kyvykkyyksiin.