Let's talk: how communication affects contract design

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.

How does contract design affect the uptake of microcredit among the ultra-poor? : experimental evidence from the river islands of Northern Bangladesh

Despite the professed claims of microcredit alleviating poverty, little is known about what kind of credit contract is suitable for extremely poor households, also called the ultra-poor. To fill this knowledge gap, we initiated a field experiment in the river islands of northern Bangladesh, where a substantial portion of dwellers could be categorized as ultra-poor due to cyclic floods. We randomly offered four types of loans to such dwellers: regular small cash loans with one-year maturity, large cash loans with three-year maturity both with and without a one-year grace period, and in-kind livestock loans with three-year maturity and a one-year grace period. We compared uptake rates as well as the determinants of uptake and found that the uptake rate is the lowest for the regular contract, followed by the in-kind contract. Contrary to prior belief, we also found that the microcredit demand by the ultra-poor is not necessarily small, and in particular the ultra-poor are significantly more likely to join a microcredit program than the moderately poor if a grace period with longer maturity is attached to a large amount of credit, irrespective of whether the credit is provided in cash or in kind. This paper provides evidence that a typical microcredit contract with one-year maturity and without a grace period is not attractive to the ultra-poor. Microfinance institutions may need to design better credit contracts to address the poor's needs.

Assessment of irrigators’ preferences for different water supply risk management tools: option contract and insurance.

Irrigators face the risk of not having enough water to meet their crops’ demand. There are different mechanisms to cope with this risk, including water markets (option contracts) or insurance. A farmer will purchase them when the expected utility change derived from the tool is positive. This paper presents a theoretical assessment of the farmer’s expected utility under two different option contracts, a drought insurance and a combination of an option contract and the insurance. We analyze the conditions that determine farmer’s reference for one instrument or the other and perform a numerical application that is relevant for a Spanish region.

Option valuation as an expectation in the complex domain: The Black-Scholes case

It is very well known that the first succesful valuation of a stock option was done by solving a deterministic partial differential equation (PDE) of the parabolic type with some complementary conditions specific for the option. In this approach, the randomness in the option value process is eliminated through a no-arbitrage argument. An alternative approach is to construct a replicating portfolio for the option. From this viewpoint the payoff function for the option is a random process which, under a new probabilistic measure, turns out to be of a special type, a martingale. Accordingly, the value of the replicating portfolio (equivalently, of the option) is calculated as an expectation, with respect to this new measure, of the discounted value of the payoff function. Since the expectation is, by definition, an integral, its calculation can be made simpler by resorting to powerful methods already available in the theory of analytic functions. In this paper we use precisely two of those techniques to find the well-known value of a European call

Option valuation as an expectation in the complex domain: The Black-Scholes case

It is very well known that the first succesful valuation of a stock option was done by solving a deterministic partial differential equation (PDE) of the parabolic type with some complementary conditions specific for the option. In this approach, the randomness in the option value process is eliminated through a no-arbitrage argument. An alternative approach is to construct a replicating portfolio for the option. From this viewpoint the payoff function for the option is a random process which, under a new probabilistic measure, turns out to be of a special type, a martingale. Accordingly, the value of the replicating portfolio (equivalently, of the option) is calculated as an expectation, with respect to this new measure, of the discounted value of the payoff function. Since the expectation is, by definition, an integral, its calculation can be made simpler by resorting to powerful methods already available in the theory of analytic functions. In this paper we use precisely two of those techniques to find the well-known value of a European call

Essays on economic regulation

It is known that stock prices of public listed regulated companies react to price revisions by the regulator, and that the information conveyed by this price reaction might be used by the regulator on the contract design. This paper builds on Laffont and Tirole's (1986) regulation model with observable costs to better understand the effects the inclusion of the stock market can have on the regulator-regulated firm relationship. Our numerical simulations show that the inclusion of the market induce more powerful incentive schemes, with higher cost-reducing efforts, smaller informational rent by the firms and higher overall social welfare. In particular, we find that when the regulator is committed, the presence of short-term investors can make the first-best contract feasible, and that in the non-commitment case the market affects the firm's strategy by making it reveal more information about its cost than it normally would.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

Comparative cost-effectiveness of Option B+ for prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in Malawi.

OBJECTIVE To estimate the cost-effectiveness of prevention of mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of HIV with lifelong antiretroviral therapy (ART) for pregnant and breastfeeding women ('Option B+') compared with ART during pregnancy or breastfeeding only unless clinically indicated ('Option B'). DESIGN Mathematical modelling study of first and second pregnancy, informed by data from the Malawi Option B+ programme. METHODS Individual-based simulation model. We simulated cohorts of 10 000 women and their infants during two subsequent pregnancies, including the breastfeeding period, with either Option B+ or B. We parameterized the model with data from the literature and by analysing programmatic data. We compared total costs of antenatal and postnatal care, and lifetime costs and disability-adjusted life-years of the infected infants between Option B+ and Option B. RESULTS During the first pregnancy, 15% of the infants born to HIV-infected mothers acquired the infection. With Option B+, 39% of the women were on ART at the beginning of the second pregnancy, compared with 18% with Option B. For second pregnancies, the rates MTCT were 11.3% with Option B+ and 12.3% with Option B. The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio comparing the two options ranged between about US$ 500 and US$ 1300 per DALY averted. CONCLUSION Option B+ prevents more vertical transmissions of HIV than Option B, mainly because more women are already on ART at the beginning of the next pregnancy. Option B+ is a cost-effective strategy for PMTCT if the total future costs and lost lifetime of the infected infants are taken into account.

The Acceleration of Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123 (R)

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the expensing of stock options with FAS 123 (R). As of March 2006, 749 companies had accelerated the vesting of their employee stock options and avoided a reduction in their reported profits that otherwise would have occurred under the new standard. There are many different motives for the acceleration strategy, and the focus of this study is to determine whether shareholders viewed these motives as either positive or negative. A favorable return subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder's viewed management's motives as positive. An unfavorable return subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder's viewed management's motives as negative. The evidence from this study suggests that shareholders reacted favorably, on average, to acceleration announcements. However, these results lack statistical significance and are based on a small sample, thus, they should be interpreted with caution.

Water option contracts for reducing water supply risks: an application to the Tagus-Segura Transfer

El agua es un recurso cada vez más escaso y valioso. Por ello, los recursos hídricos disponibles deben asignarse de una forma eficiente entre los diferentes usos. El cambio climático aumentará la frecuencia y severidad de los eventos extremos, y podría incrementar la demanda de agua de los cultivos. El empleo de mecanismos flexibles de asignación de agua puede ser imprescindible para hacer frente a este aumento en la variabilidad del balance hídrico y para asegurar que los riesgos de suministro, y no solo los recursos, son compartidos de manera eficiente entre los usuarios. Los mercados de agua permiten la reasignación de los recursos hídricos, favoreciendo su transferencia desde los usos de menor a los de mayor valor. Diferentes tipos de mercados de agua se han establecido en diferentes partes del mundo, ayudando a los participantes a afrontar los problemas de escasez de agua en esas zonas. En España, los intercambios de agua están permitidos desde 1999, aunque la participación de los usuarios en el mercado ha sido limitada. Hay varios aspectos de los mercados de agua en España que deben mejorarse. Esta tesis, además de proponer una serie de cambios en el marco regulatorio, propone la introducción de contratos de opción de agua como una posible mejora. La principal ventaja de este tipo de contratos es la estabilidad legal e institucional que éstos proporcionan tanto a compradores como vendedores. Para apoyar esta propuesta, se han llevado a cabo diferentes análisis que muestran el potencial de los contratos de opción como herramienta de reducción del riesgo asociado a una oferta de agua inestable. La Cuenca del Segura (Sureste de España), la Cuenca del Tajo y el Acueducto Tajo- Segura han sido seleccionados como casos de estudio. Tres análisis distintos aplicados a dicha región se presentan en esta tesis: a) una evaluación de los contratos de opción como mecanismo para reducir los riesgos de disponibilidad de agua sufridos por los regantes en la Cuenca del Segura; b) un marco teórico para analizar las preferencias de los regantes por diferentes mecanismos de gestión del riesgo de disponibilidad de agua, su disposición a pagar por ellos y los precios aproximados de estos instrumentos (seguro de sequía y contratos de opción de agua); y c) una evaluación del papel de los contratos de opción en las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua de una comunidad de regantes ante una oferta de agua incierta. Los resultados muestran el potencial de reducción del riesgo de los contratos de opción para regantes en España, pero pueden ser extrapolados a otros sectores o regiones. Las principales conclusiones de esta tesis son: a) la agricultura será uno de los sectores más afectados por el cambio climático. Si los precios del agua aumentan, la rentabilidad de los cultivos puede caer hasta niveles negativos, lo que podría dar lugar al abandono de cultivos de regadío en algunas zonas de España. Las políticas de cambio climático y de agua deben estar estrechamente coordinadas para asegurar un uso de agua eficiente y la rentabilidad de la agricultura; b) aunque los mercados de agua han ayudado a algunos usuarios a afrontar problemas de disponibilidad del recurso en momentos de escasez, hay varios aspectos que deben mejorarse; c) es necesario desarrollar mercados de agua más flexibles y estables para garantizar una asignación eficiente de los recursos entre los usuarios de agua; d) los resultados muestran los beneficios derivados del establecimiento de un contrato de opción entre usuarios de agua del Tajo y del Segura para reducir el riesgo de disponibilidad de agua en la cuenca receptora; e) la disposición a pagar de los regantes por un contrato de opción de agua o un seguro de sequía hidrológica, que representa el valor que tienen estos mecanismos para aquellos usuarios de agua que se enfrentan a riesgos relacionados con la disponibilidad del recurso, es consistente con los resultados obtenidos en estudios previos y superior al precio de mercado de estos instrumentos, lo que favorece la viabilidad de estos mecanismos de gestión del riesgo ; y f) los contratos de opción podrían ayudar a optimizar las decisiones de aprovisionamiento de agua bajo incertidumbre, proporcionando más estabilidad y flexibilidad que los mercados temporales de agua. ABSTRACT Water is becoming increasingly scarce and valuable. Thus, existing water resources need to be efficiently allocated among users. Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of extreme events, and it may also increase irrigated crops' water demand. The implementation of flexible allocation mechanisms could be essential to cope with this increased variability of the water balance and ensure that supply risks, and not only water resources, are also efficiently shared and managed. Water markets allow for the reallocation of water resources from low to high value uses. Different water trading mechanisms have been created in different parts of the world and have helped users to alleviate water scarcity problems in those areas. In Spain, water trading is allowed since 1999, although market activity has been limited. There are several issues in the Spanish water market that should be improved. This thesis, besides proposing several changes in the legislative framework, proposes the introduction of water option contracts as a potential improvement. The main advantage for both buyer and seller derived from an option contract is the institutional and legal stability it provides. To support this proposal, different analyses have been carried out that show the potential of option contracts as a risk reduction tool to manage water supply instability. The Segura Basin (Southeast Spain), the Tagus Basin and the Tagus-Segura inter-basin Transfer have been selected as the case study. Three different analyses applied to this region are presented in this thesis: a) an evaluation of option contracts as a mechanisms to reduce water supply availability risks in the Segura Basin; b) a theoretical framework for analyzing farmer’s preferences for different water supply risk management tools and farmers’ willingness to pay for them, together with the assessment of the prices of these mechanisms (drought insurance and water option contracts); and c) an evaluation of the role of option contracts in water procurement decisions under uncertainty. Results show the risk-reduction potential of option contracts for the agricultural sector in Spain, but these results can be extrapolated to other sectors or regions. The main conclusions of the thesis are: a) agriculture would be one of the most affected sectors by climate change. With higher water tariffs, crop’s profitability can drop to negative levels, which may result in the abandoning of the crop in many areas. Climate change and water policies must be closely coordinated to ensure efficient water use and crops’ profitability; b) although Spanish water markets have alleviated water availability problems for some users during water scarcity periods, there are several issues that should be improved; c) more flexible and stable water market mechanisms are needed to allocate water resources and water supply risks among competing users; d) results show the benefits derived from the establishment of an inter-basin option contract between water users in the Tagus and the Segura basins for reducing water supply availability risks in the recipient area; e) irrigators’ willingness to pay for option contracts or drought insurance, that represent the value that this kind of trading mechanisms has for water users facing water supply reliability problems, are consistent with results obtained in previous works and higher than the prices of this risk management tools, which shows the feasibility of these mechanisms; and f) option contracts would help to optimize water procurement decisions under uncertainty, providing more flexibility and stability than the spot market.

Option contracts for allocating water in inter-basin transfers: the case of the Tagus-Segura Basin in Spain

Users in the Mediterranean region face significant water supply risks. Water markets mechanisms can provide flexibility to water systems run in tight situations. The largest water infrastructure in the Iberian Peninsula connects the Segura and Tagus Basins. Stakeholders and politicians in the Tagus Basin have asked that water transfers between the two basins be eventually phased out. The need to increase the statutory minimum environmental flow in the middle Tagus and to meet new urban demands is going to result in a redefinition of the Transfer?s management rules, leading to a reduction in the transferable volumes. To minimise the consequences of such restrictions to irrigators in the Segura Basin who depend on the transferred volumes, we propose the establishment of water option contracts between both basins that represents an institutional innovation with respect to previous inter-basin spot market experiences. Based on the draft of the new Tagus Basin Plan, we propose both a modification of the Transfer?s management rule and an innovative inter-basin option contract. The main goal of the paper is to define this contract and evaluate it with respect to non-market scenarios. We also assess the resulting impact on environmental flows in the Tagus River and water availability for users in the Segura Basin, together with the economic impacts of such contract on both basins. Our results show that the proposed option contract would reduce the impact of a change in the transfer?s management rule, and reduce the supply risks of the recipient area.

Optimization of water procurement decisions in an irrigation district: the role of option contracts

Water supply instability is one of the main risks faced by irrigation districts and farmers. Water procurement decision optimisation is essential in order to increase supply reliability and reduce costs. Water markets, such as spot purchases or water supply option contracts, can make this decision process more flexible. We analyse the potential interest in an option contract for an irrigation district that has access to several water sources. We apply a stochastic recursive mathematical programming model to simulate the water procurement decisions of an irrigation district?s board operating in a context of water supply uncertainty in south-eastern Spain. We analyse what role different option contracts could play in securing its water supply. Results suggest that the irrigation district would be willing to accept the proposed option contract in most cases subject to realistic values of the option contract financial terms. Of nine different water sources, desalination and the option contract are the main substitutes, where the use of either depends on the contract parameters. The contract premium and optioned volume are the variables that have a greater impact on the irrigation district?s decisions. Key words: Segura Basin, stochastic recursive programming, water markets, water supply option contract, water supply risk.

The meaning of implied volatility in pricing stock options traded in options markets

Ph.D. in the Faculty of Business Administration