An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms

In this paper, we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we describe two well-known mechanisms for sponsored search auction-Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). We then derive a new mechanism for sponsored search auction which we call optimal (OPT) mechanism. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue, while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We then undertake a detailed comparative study of the mechanisms GSP, VCG, and OPT. We compute and compare the expected revenue earned by the search engine under the three mechanisms when the advertisers are symmetric and some special conditions are satisfied. We also compare the three mechanisms in terms of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and computational complexity. Note to Practitioners-The advertiser-supported web site is one of the successful business models in the emerging web landscape. When an Internet user enters a keyword (i.e., a search phrase) into a search engine, the user gets back a page with results, containing the links most relevant to the query and also sponsored links, (also called paid advertisement links). When a sponsored link is clicked, the user is directed to the corresponding advertiser's web page. The advertiser pays the search engine in some appropriate manner for sending the user to its web page. Against every search performed by any user on any keyword, the search engine faces the problem of matching a set of advertisers to the sponsored slots. In addition, the search engine also needs to decide on a price to be charged to each advertiser. Due to increasing demands for Internet advertising space, most search engines currently use auction mechanisms for this purpose. These are called sponsored search auctions. A significant percentage of the revenue of Internet giants such as Google, Yahoo!, MSN, etc., comes from sponsored search auctions. In this paper, we study two auction mechanisms, GSP and VCG, which are quite popular in the sponsored auction context, and pursue the objective of designing a mechanism that is superior to these two mechanisms. In particular, we propose a new mechanism which we call the OPT mechanism. This mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue subject to achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Bayesian incentive compatibility guarantees that it is optimal for each advertiser to bid his/her true value provided that all other agents also bid their respective true values. Individual rationality ensures that the agents participate voluntarily in the auction since they are assured of gaining a non-negative payoff by doing so.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

A Nash Bargaining Approach to Retention Enhancing Bid Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions with Discrete Bids

Bid optimization is now becoming quite popular in sponsored search auctions on the Web. Given a keyword and the maximum willingness to pay of each advertiser interested in the keyword, the bid optimizer generates a profile of bids for the advertisers with the objective of maximizing customer retention without compromising the revenue of the search engine. In this paper, we present a bid optimization algorithm that is based on a Nash bargaining model where the first player is the search engine and the second player is a virtual agent representing all the bidders. We make the realistic assumption that each bidder specifies a maximum willingness to pay values and a discrete, finite set of bid values. We show that the Nash bargaining solution for this problem always lies on a certain edge of the convex hull such that one end point of the edge is the vector of maximum willingness to pay of all the bidders. We show that the other endpoint of this edge can be computed as a solution of a linear programming problem. We also show how the solution can be transformed to a bid profile of the advertisers.

Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web

In this paper, we address a key problem faced by advertisers in sponsored search auctions on the web: how much to bid, given the bids of the other advertisers, so as to maximize individual payoffs? Assuming the generalized second price auction as the auction mechanism, we formulate this problem in the framework of an infinite horizon alternative-move game of advertiser bidding behavior. For a sponsored search auction involving two advertisers, we characterize all the pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We also prove that the bid prices will lead to a Nash equilibrium, if the advertisers follow a myopic best response bidding strategy. Following this, we investigate the bidding behavior of the advertisers if they use Q-learning. We discover empirically an interesting trend that the Q-values converge even if both the advertisers learn simultaneously.

Truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions

In pay-per-click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their advertisements (ads for short). A sponsored search auction for a keyword is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu(ij) associated with each agent slot pair (agent i and slot j). The search engine would like to maximize the social welfare of the advertisers, that is, the sum of values of the advertisers for the keyword. However, the search engine does not know the true values advertisers have for a click to their respective advertisements and also does not know the click probabilities. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these click probabilities during the initial rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced. These mechanisms, due to their connection to the multi-armed bandit problem, are aptly referred to as multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1, exact characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature. Recent work has focused on the more realistic but non-trivial general case when m > 1 and a few promising results have started appearing. In this article, we consider this general case when m > 1 and prove several interesting results. Our contributions include: (1) When, mu(ij)s are unconstrained, we prove that any truthful mechanism must satisfy strong pointwise monotonicity and show that the regret will be Theta T7) for such mechanisms. (2) When the clicks on the ads follow a certain click precedence property, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity is necessary for MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (3) If the search engine has a certain coarse pre-estimate of mu(ij) values and wishes to update them during the course of the T rounds, we show that weak pointwise monotonicity and type-I separatedness are necessary while weak pointwise monotonicity and type-II separatedness are sufficient conditions for the MAB mechanisms to be truthful. (4) If the click probabilities are separable into agent-specific and slot-specific terms, we provide a characterization of MAB mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.

Keyword Competition and Determinants of Ad Position in Sponsored Search Advertising

Given the significant growth of the Internet in recent years, marketers have been striving for new techniques and strategies to prosper in the online world. Statistically, search engines have been the most dominant channels of Internet marketing in recent years. However, the mechanics of advertising in such a market place has created a challenging environment for marketers to position their ads among their competitors. This study uses a unique cross-sectional dataset of the top 500 Internet retailers in North America and hierarchical multiple regression analysis to empirically investigate the effect of keyword competition on the relationship between ad position and its determinants in the sponsored search market. To this end, the study utilizes the literature in consumer search behavior, keyword auction mechanism design, and search advertising performance as the theoretical foundation. This study is the first of its kind to examine the sponsored search market characteristics in a cross-sectional setting where the level of keyword competition is explicitly captured in terms of the number of Internet retailers competing for similar keywords. Internet retailing provides an appropriate setting for this study given the high-stake battle for market share and intense competition for keywords in the sponsored search market place. The findings of this study indicate that bid values and ad relevancy metrics as well as their interaction affect the position of ads on the search engine result pages (SERPs). These results confirm some of the findings from previous studies that examined sponsored search advertising performance at a keyword level. Furthermore, the study finds that the position of ads for web-only retailers is dependent on bid values and ad relevancy metrics, whereas, multi-channel retailers are more reliant on their bid values. This difference between web-only and multi-channel retailers is also observed in the moderating effect of keyword competition on the relationships between ad position and its key determinants. Specifically, this study finds that keyword competition has significant moderating effects only for multi-channel retailers.

Investigating customer click through behaviour with integrated sponsored and nonsponsored results

This paper reports findings from a study investigating the effect of integrating sponsored and nonsponsored search engine links into a single web listing. The premise underlying this research is that web searchers are chiefly interested in relevant results. Given the reported negative bias that web searchers have concerning sponsored links, separate listings may be a disservice to web searchers as it might not direct them to relevant websites. Some web meta-search engines integrate sponsored and nonsponsored links into a single listing. Using a web search engine log of over 7 million interactions from hundreds of thousands of users from a major web meta-search engine, we analysed the click-through patterns for both sponsored and nonsponsored links. We also classified web queries as informational, navigational and transactional based on the expected type of content and analysed the click-through patterns of each classification. The findings show that for more than 35% of queries, there are no clicks on any result. More than 80% of web queries are informational in nature and approximately 10% are transactional, and 10% navigational. Sponsored links account for approximately 15% of all clicks. Integrating sponsored and nonsponsored links does not appear to increase the clicks on sponsored listings. We discuss how these research results could enhance future sponsored search platforms.

Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Searth Auctions

In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This auction is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu_ij associated with agent-slot pairs. The search engine's goal is to maximize social welfare, for example, the sum of values of the advertisers. The search engine does not know the true value of an advertiser for a click to her ad and also does not know the click probabilities mu_ij s. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these during the T rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced and would be referred to as multi-armed-bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1,characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature and it has been shown that the regret for such mechanisms will be O(T^{2/3}). In this paper, we seek to derive a characterization in the realistic but nontrivial general case when m > 1 and obtain several interesting results.

Search engine advertising in web retailing : an efficiency analysis

This study examines the efficiency of search engine advertising strategies employed by firms. The research setting is the online retailing industry, which is characterized by extensive use of Web technologies and high competition for market share and profitability. For Internet retailers, search engines are increasingly serving as an information gateway for many decision-making tasks. In particular, Search engine advertising (SEA) has opened a new marketing channel for retailers to attract new customers and improve their performance. In addition to natural (organic) search marketing strategies, search engine advertisers compete for top advertisement slots provided by search brokers such as Google and Yahoo! through keyword auctions. The rationale being that greater visibility on a search engine during a keyword search will capture customers' interest in a business and its product or service offerings. Search engines account for most online activities today. Compared with the slow growth of traditional marketing channels, online search volumes continue to grow at a steady rate. According to the Search Engine Marketing Professional Organization, spending on search engine marketing by North American firms in 2008 was estimated at $13.5 billion. Despite the significant role SEA plays in Web retailing, scholarly research on the topic is limited. Prior studies in SEA have focused on search engine auction mechanism design. In contrast, research on the business value of SEA has been limited by the lack of empirical data on search advertising practices. Recent advances in search and retail technologies have created datarich environments that enable new research opportunities at the interface of marketing and information technology. This research uses extensive data from Web retailing and Google-based search advertising and evaluates Web retailers' use of resources, search advertising techniques, and other relevant factors that contribute to business performance across different metrics. The methods used include Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), data mining, and multivariate statistics. This research contributes to empirical research by analyzing several Web retail firms in different industry sectors and product categories. One of the key findings is that the dynamics of sponsored search advertising vary between multi-channel and Web-only retailers. While the key performance metrics for multi-channel retailers include measures such as online sales, conversion rate (CR), c1ick-through-rate (CTR), and impressions, the key performance metrics for Web-only retailers focus on organic and sponsored ad ranks. These results provide a useful contribution to our organizational level understanding of search engine advertising strategies, both for multi-channel and Web-only retailers. These results also contribute to current knowledge in technology-driven marketing strategies and provide managers with a better understanding of sponsored search advertising and its impact on various performance metrics in Web retailing.

The von Neumann Minimax Theorem and its relatives and a study of externality in on-line auctions

This work consists of a theoretical part and an experimental one. The first part provides a simple treatment of the celebrated von Neumann minimax theorem as formulated by Nikaid6 and Sion. It also discusses its relationships with fundamental theorems of convex analysis. The second part is about externality in sponsored search auctions. It shows that in these auctions, advertisers have externality effects on each other which influence their bidding behavior. It proposes Hal R.Varian model and shows how adding externality to this model will affect its properties. In order to have a better understanding of the interaction among advertisers in on-line auctions, it studies the structure of the Google advertisements networ.k and shows that it is a small-world scale-free network.

Meccanismi d'asta per on-line advertising: modelli, equilibri ed efficienza

Il seguente lavoro di tesi tratta l'argomento delle aste in modo tecnico, ovvero cerca di descriverne i modelli e le caratteristiche principali, spesso ignorate dagli stessi fruitori. Nel capitolo 1 si introduce brevemente il concetto di asta, descrivendone i principali elementi costitutivi. Si ripercorrono poi le origini di questa procedura ed alcuni suoi utilizzi. Nel capitolo 2 si presentano inizialmente le principali tipologie di aste conosciute e si accenna al processo di valutazione dell'oggetto d'asta. Si introduce poi il concetto di Private Value, analizzandolo per ogni tipo di asta e confrontando queste sotto l'aspetto della rendita. Si enuncia in seguito un principio fondamentale, quale quello dell'equivalenza delle rendite, rilassandone alcuni assunti basilari. Infine si passa al concetto di valori interdipendenti all'interno delle aste, valutandone equilibri, rendite ed efficienza, accennando nel contempo al problema denominato Winner's curse. Nel capitolo 3 si parla dei meccanismi di asta online, ponendo l'attenzione su un loro aspetto importante, ovvero la veridicità, ed analizzandoli attraverso l'analisi del caso peggiore e del caso medio in alcuni esempi costruiti ad-hoc. Nel capitolo 4 si descrivono in particolare le sponsored search auctions, narrandone inizialmente la storia, e successivamente passando all'analisi di equilibri, rendite ed efficienza; si presenta, infine, un modello di tali aste mettendone in rapporto la computabilità con quella dei meccanismi offline conosciuti.

Time series analysis of a Web search engine transaction log

In this paper, we use time series analysis to evaluate predictive scenarios using search engine transactional logs. Our goal is to develop models for the analysis of searchers’ behaviors over time and investigate if time series analysis is a valid method for predicting relationships between searcher actions. Time series analysis is a method often used to understand the underlying characteristics of temporal data in order to make forecasts. In this study, we used a Web search engine transactional log and time series analysis to investigate users’ actions. We conducted our analysis in two phases. In the initial phase, we employed a basic analysis and found that 10% of searchers clicked on sponsored links. However, from 22:00 to 24:00, searchers almost exclusively clicked on the organic links, with almost no clicks on sponsored links. In the second and more extensive phase, we used a one-step prediction time series analysis method along with a transfer function method. The period rarely affects navigational and transactional queries, while rates for transactional queries vary during different periods. Our results show that the average length of a searcher session is approximately 2.9 interactions and that this average is consistent across time periods. Most importantly, our findings shows that searchers who submit the shortest queries (i.e., in number of terms) click on highest ranked results. We discuss implications, including predictive value, and future research.

In search of best practices in responsible gambling ( RG ) : a report on a comparative study of RG among Macau, Las Vegas, and Melbourne, presented to the MSAR Bureau of Gaming Inspection and Coordination (DICJ).

This is a project sponsored by the Asia Pacific Association for Gambling Studies (APAGS) and supported by funds from the MSAR’s Bureau of Gambling Inspection and Coordination (DICJ). The research team comprises as Chief Investigators: Prof. Zhidong Hao of the University of Macau; Prof. Linda Hancock of Deakin University, Australia, and Prof. William Thompson, University of Las Vegas (UNLV). The project research was conducted between the end of December 2012 and July 2013.
The starting point for the research was to select four out of the six casino companies licensed to operate in Macau that also operate transnationally, that is, either in Las Vegas or Melbourne. Hence, the Venetian, Wynn, MGM, and the Melco-Crown Entertainment are the focus of research. The main objectives of the project are to explore how responsible gambling is framed in each of the three jurisdictions (Macau, Las Vegas and Melbourne); how it is approached cross-jurisdictionally by each of the companies; and to assess current approaches within a broader comparative context against international best practice. The research explores Responsible Gambling measures taken by a range of stakeholders including the government/regulators in each of the three jurisdictions, casino managements, problem gambling counselling services, unions and community organizations. The research emphasizes what problems prevail, and the implications of this research for enhancing Responsible Gambling in Macau.

What Business Reference Librarians Need to Know about Intellectual Property: Presentations sponsored by the Patent and Trademark Depository Library Association (PTDLA) at the American Library Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, June 25, 2006

Presentations sponsored by the Patent and Trademark Depository Library Association (PTDLA) at the American Library Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, June 25, 2006 Speaker #1: Nan Myers Associate Professor; Government Documents, Patents and Trademarks Librarian Wichita State University, Wichita, KS Title: Intellectual Property Roundup: Copyright, Trademarks, Trade Secrets, and Patents Abstract: This presentation provides a capsule overview of the distinctive coverage of the four types of intellectual property – What they are, why they are important, how to get them, what they cost, how long they last. Emphasis will be on what questions patrons ask most, along with the answers! Includes coverage of the mission of Patent & Trademark Depository Libraries (PTDLs) and other sources of business information outside of libraries, such as Small Business Development Centers. Speaker #2: Jan Comfort Government Information Reference Librarian Clemson University, Clemson, SC Title: Patents as a Source of Competitive Intelligence Information Abstract: Large corporations often have R&D departments, or large numbers of staff whose jobs are to monitor the activities of their competitors. This presentation will review strategies that small business owners can employ to do their own competitive intelligence analysis. The focus will be on features of the patent database that is available free of charge on the USPTO website, as well as commercial databases available at many public and academic libraries across the country. Speaker #3: Virginia Baldwin Professor; Engineering Librarian University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE Title: Mining Online Patent Data for Business Information Abstract: The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) website and websites of international databases contains information about granted patents and patent applications and the technologies they represent. Statistical information about patents, their technologies, geographical information, and patenting entities are compiled and available as reports on the USPTO website. Other valuable information from these websites can be obtained using data mining techniques. This presentation will provide the keys to opening these resources and obtaining valuable data. Speaker #4: Donna Hopkins Engineering Librarian Renssalaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY Title: Searching the USPTO Trademark Database for Wordmarks and Logos Abstract: This presentation provides an overview of wordmark searching in www.uspto.gov, followed by a review of the techniques of searching for non-word US trademarks using codes from the Design Search Code Manual. These codes are used in an electronic search, either on the uspto website or on CASSIS DVDs. The search is sometimes supplemented by consulting the Official Gazette. A specific example of using a section of the codes for searching is included. Similar searches on the Madrid Express database of WIPO, using the Vienna Classification, will also be briefly described.

Defining Moments: A Cuban Exile's Story about Discovery and the Search for a Better Future, Lecture by José I. Ramírez

This flyer promotes the event "Defining Moments: A Cuban Exile's Story about Discovery and the Search for a Better Future, Lecture by José I. Ramírez",sponsored by the FlU Libraries and the Cuban Research Institute.