Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Fiscal adjustments and sovereign default in different government systems

This paper extends the model of Spolaore (2004) about adjustments in di erent government systems for the context of scal adjustments and sovereign default. We introduce asymmetry between groups in income and preferences towards scal reforms. Default a ects di erently each group and becomes a possibility if reforms are not enacted after public nance solvency shocks, in uencing the political game according to its likelihood. With the extensions, new situations which were not possible with the previous framework arise. After the exposition of the model, the Argentine default in 2001 provides an example of the political con icts addressed by the model.

Sovereign default, domestic banks and financial institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaultsare costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutionsallow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should belarger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds.In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we findevidence consistent with these predictions.

Valuing Sovereign Default Risk - A Pricing Formula and its Empirical Results for the Mexican External Debt.

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Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.

Reflexivity in sovereign debt markets

Finanssi-instrumentin hinta määräytyy sen fundamenttitekijöiden perusteella, eikä päinvastoin. Tämä tutkimus osoittaa, että myös instrumentin hinta voi vaikuttaa fundamenttitekijöihin. Yhteys havainnollistetaan tapaustukimuksella Kreikan velkakriisistä. Hinnan ja fundamenttien välistä yhteyttä arvioidaan ja käänteisen kausaliteetin olemassaolo testataan. Tulokset tukevat ajatusta, jonka mukaan tarvitsemme dynaamisempia valuaatiomenetelmiä, jotka ottavat huomioon myös mahdolliset itseään vahvistavat hintakierteet.

A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.

US real interest rates and default risk in emerging economies

This paper empirically investigates the impact of changes in US real interest rates on sovereign default risk in emerging economies using the method of identification through heteroskedasticity. Policy-induced increases in US interest rates starkly raise default risk in emerging market economies. However, the overall correlation between US real interest rates and the risk of default is negative, demonstrating that the effects of other variables dominate the anterior relationship

Estudo sobre o efeito de variáveis macro econômico e do spread de credit default swap no risco de evento de crédito soberano

Este trabalho explora a realização de default soberano em função da estrutura de spreads de CDS (Credit Default Swap). Pode-se dizer que os spreads revelam a probabilidade de default de um país. Aplicamos a metodologia proposta neste trabalho para Argentina, Coreia, Equador, Indonésia, México, Peru, Turquia, Ucrânia, Venezuela e Rússia. Nós mostramos que um modelo de um único fator seguindo um processo lognormal captura a probabilidade de default. Também mostramos que as variáveis macro econômicas inflação, desemprego e crescimento não explicam a variável dependente do estudo (probabilidade de default). Cada país reage de maneira diferente a crise econômica que a leva a não honrar seus compromissos com as dívidas contraídas.

Co-ordination failure, moral hazard and sovereign bankruptcy procedures

We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor coordination and debtor moral hazard. Solving the sovereign debtor's incentives leads to excessive 'rollover failure' by creditors when sovereign default occurs. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures and relate this to the current debate on revising international financial architecture. Paper prepared for Bank of England Conference on "The Role of the Official and Private Sectors in Resolving International Financial Crises", London, and for the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Sao Paolo, Brazil. (Preliminary draft circulated for comments, please do not cite without reference to the authors).

Monetary policy, default risk and the exchange rate

In a country with high probability of default, higher interest rates may render the currency less attractive if sovereign default is costly. This paper develops that intuition in a simple model and estimates the effect of changes in interest rates on the exchange rate in Brazil using data from the dates surrounding the monetary policy committee meetings and the methodology of identification through heteroskedasticity. Indeed, we find that unexpected increases in interest rates tend to lead the Brazilian currency to depreciate. It follows that granting more independence to a central bank that focus solely on inflation is not always a free-lunch.

Three essays in international finance

Executive Summary The first essay of this dissertation investigates whether greater exchange rate uncertainty (i.e., variation over time in the exchange rate) fosters or depresses the foreign investment of multinational firms. In addition to the direct capital financing it supplies, foreign investment can be a source of valuable technology and know-how, which can have substantial positive effects on a host country's economic growth. Thus, it is critically important for policy makers and central bankers, among others, to understand how multinationals base their investment decisions on the characteristics of foreign exchange markets. In this essay, I first develop a theoretical framework to improve our knowledge regarding how the aggregate level of foreign investment responds to exchange rate uncertainty when an economy consists of many firms, each of which is making decisions. The analysis predicts a U-shaped effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the total level of foreign investment of the economy. That is, the effect is negative for low levels of uncertainty and positive for higher levels of uncertainty. This pattern emerges because the relationship between exchange rate volatility and 'the probability of investment is negative for firms with low productivity at home (i.e., firms that find it profitable to invest abroad) and the relationship is positive for firms with high productivity at home (i.e., firms that prefer exporting their product). This finding stands in sharp contrast to predictions in the existing literature that consider a single firm's decision to invest in a unique project. The main contribution of this research is to show that the aggregation over many firms produces a U-shaped pattern between exchange rate uncertainty and the probability of investment. Using data from industrialized countries for the period of 1982-2002, this essay offers a comprehensive empirical analysis that provides evidence in support of the theoretical prediction. In the second essay, I aim to explain the time variation in sovereign credit risk, which captures the risk that a government may be unable to repay its debt. The importance of correctly evaluating such a risk is illustrated by the central role of sovereign debt in previous international lending crises. In addition, sovereign debt is the largest asset class in emerging markets. In this essay, I provide a pricing formula for the evaluation of sovereign credit risk in which the decision to default on sovereign debt is made by the government. The pricing formula explains the variation across time in daily credit spreads - a widely used measure of credit risk - to a degree not offered by existing theoretical and empirical models. I use information on a country's stock market to compute the prevailing sovereign credit spread in that country. The pricing formula explains a substantial fraction of the time variation in daily credit spread changes for Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Russia for the 1998-2008 period, particularly during the recent subprime crisis. I also show that when a government incentive to default is allowed to depend on current economic conditions, one can best explain the level of credit spreads, especially during the recent period of financial distress. In the third essay, I show that the risk of sovereign default abroad can produce adverse consequences for the U.S. equity market through a decrease in returns and an increase in volatility. The risk of sovereign default, which is no longer limited to emerging economies, has recently become a major concern for financial markets. While sovereign debt plays an increasing role in today's financial environment, the effects of sovereign credit risk on the U.S. financial markets have been largely ignored in the literature. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework that explores how the risk of sovereign default abroad helps explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns. The intuition for this effect is that negative economic shocks deteriorate the fiscal situation of foreign governments, thereby increasing the risk of a sovereign default that would trigger a local contraction in economic growth. The increased risk of an economic slowdown abroad amplifies the direct effect of these shocks on the level and the volatility of equity returns in the U.S. through two channels. The first channel involves a decrease in the future earnings of U.S. exporters resulting from unfavorable adjustments to the exchange rate. The second channel involves investors' incentives to rebalance their portfolios toward safer assets, which depresses U.S. equity prices. An empirical estimation of the model with monthly data for the 1994-2008 period provides evidence that the risk of sovereign default abroad generates a strong leverage effect during economic downturns, which helps to substantially explain the level and the volatility of U.S. equity returns.

Inadimplência de dívida soberana em modelo de equilíbrio geral com credores heterogêneos

Este artigo propõe um modelo de equilíbrio geral com inadimplência de dívida soberana (default soberano), sem setor bancário ou setor externo, em que há heterogeneidade dos agentes da economia. Essa heterogeneidade surge a partir da existência de dois tipos de consumidores com choques de riqueza distintos (mas idênticos em outros aspectos) e o governo, que toma decisão de default, pondera esses agentes de maneira distinta na função de bem-estar. O principal motivador dessa ideia vem da intuição de que a decisão de um país não cumprir com as suas obrigações de dívida pode estar ligada não somente ao valor de face dos títulos emitidos ou à situação econômica, mas também a quem detêm esses títulos (sua distribuição entre agentes). Essa abordagem permitiu que se reproduzissem comportamentos já identificados em estudos empíricos presentes na literatura, os quais encontraram uma relação negativa, porém surpreendentemente fraca, entre moratória da dívida e atividade econômica e lança luz sobre aspectos importantes que podem influenciar a decisão de default, como funcionamento de mercados secundários de títulos públicos.