Sovereign Credit Rating Announcements and Equity Market Response: Evidence from the European Markets

This thesis examines the equity market reactions on credit rating announcements. The study covers 12 European countries during the period of 2000-2012. By using an event study methodology and daily collected stock market returns, the impact of the sovereign credit rating announcements to national stock indices is examined. The thesis finds evidence for the rating downgrades having a statistically significant negative effect on the stock markets. This finding is in line with earlier literature (see Brooks, 2004). The paper also discusses whether the changes in the sovereign credit ratings are contagious, anticipated by the market, and persistent. There is some evidence found for the contagion effects in case of downgrades, but not for upgrades. Markets seem to anticipate rating upgrades, but not downgrades. In addition, market´s reaction towards rating announcements seems not to be persistent.

Credit ratings and government bonds evidence before, during and after the european debt crisis

Neste projeto, investigamos se as agências de rating e as taxas de juro de longo prazo da dívida soberana tiveram uma influência recíproca antes, durante e após a crise da dívida soberana Europeia. Esta análise é realizada, estimando a relação existente entre os ratings da dívida soberana ou taxas de juro e factores macroeconomicos e estruturais, através de uma diferente aplicação de metodologias utilizadas para este efeito. Os resultados obtidos demonstram que, no período da crise soberana, os ratings e as taxas de juros tiveram um mútuo impacto, sugerindo que as descidas dos ratings podem ter conduzido a profecias auto-realizáveis, levando países relativamente estáveis a um eventual incumprimento

Effect of European Sovereign debt crisis on banks’ stock market performances: application to Portuguese data

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU

We use a panel of euro area countries to assess the determinants of long-term sovereign bond yield spreads over the period 1999.01-2010.12. We find that, unlike the period preceding the global financial crisis, European government bond yield spreads are wellexplained by macro- and fiscal fundamentals over the crisis period. We also find that the menu of macro and fiscal risks priced by markets has been significantly enriched since March 2009, including the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU member states, international risk and liquidity risk. Finally, we find that sovereign credit ratings are statistically significant in explaining spreads, yet compared to macro- and fiscal fundamentals their role is limited.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

The Informational Value of Corporate Credit Ratings

This thesis examines the quality of credit ratings issued by the three major credit rating agencies - Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. If credit ratings are informative, then prices of underlying credit instruments such as fixed-income securities and credit default insurance should change to reflect the new credit risk information. Using data on 246 different major fixed income securities issuers and spanning January 2000 to December 2011, we find that credit default swaps (CDS) spreads do not react to changes in credit ratings. Hence credit ratings for all three agencies are not price informative. CDS prices are mostly determined by historical CDS prices while ratings are mostly determined by historical ratings. We find that credit ratings are marginally more sensitive to CDS than CDS are sensitive to ratings.

The effects of corporate social performance on the cost of corporate debt and credit ratings

This study investigates the differential impact that various dimensions of corporate social performance have on the pricing of corporate debt as well as the assessment of the credit quality of specific bond issues. The empirical analysis, based on an extensive longitudinal data set, suggests that overall, good performance is rewarded and corporate social transgressions are penalized through lower and higher corporate bond yield spreads, respectively. Similar conclusions can be drawn when focusing on either the bond rating assigned to a specific debt issue or the probability of it being considered to be an asset of speculative grade.

The effect of timeliness and credit ratings on the information content of earnings announcements

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of timeliness and credit ratings on the information content of the earnings announcements of Greek listed firms from 2001 to 2008. Using the classical event study methodology and regression analysis, we find that firms tend to release good news on time and are inclined to delay the release of bad news. We also provide evidence that the level of corporate risk differentiates the information content of earnings according to the credit rating category. Specifically, firms displaying high creditworthiness enjoy positive excess returns on earnings announcement dates. In contrast, firms with low creditworthiness undergo significant share price erosions on earnings announcement days. We also observe a substitution effect between timeliness and credit ratings in relation to the information content of earnings announcements. Specifically, we find that as the credit category of earnings-announcing firms improves, the informational role of timeliness is mitigated.

The EU ban on uncovered sovereign credit default swaps: assessing impacts on liquidity, volatility and price discovery

This article addresses the effects of the prohibition against naked CDS buying implemented by the European Union in November 2012. Three aspects of market quality are analyzed: liquidity, volatility, and price informativeness. Overall, our results suggest that the ban produced negative effects on liquidity and price informativeness. First, we find that in territories within the scope of the EU regulation, the bid–ask spreads on sovereign CDS contracts rose after the ban, but fell for countries outside its bounds. Open interest declined for both groups of CDS reference entities in our sample, but significantly more in the constraint group. Price delay increased more prominently for countries affected by the ban, whereas price precision decreased for these countries while increasing for CDSs written on other sovereign reference entities. Most notably, our findings indicate that hese negative effects were more pronounced amid reference entities exhibiting lower credit risk. With respect to volatility, the evidence suggests that the ban was successful in stabilizing the CDS market in that volatility decreased, particularly for contracts written on riskier CDS entities.

Determinantes do rating soberano

Dissertação de Mestrado, Ciências Económicas e Empresariais, 28 de Maio de 2015, Universidade dos Açores.