Societal cleavages and institutional change in Canada : retention, reform and removal of nominee councils

En concevant que toute société a deux clivages dominants, l’un social et l’autre partisan, cette thèse développe une théorie sur le changement institutionnel. L’hypothèse initiale, selon laquelle les groupes sociaux créés par le premier clivage agiront pour restreindre le changement institutionnel et que le changement aura lieu lors de l’émergence d’un groupe partisan capable de croiser le clivage social, fut testée par les processus traçant les changements qui furent proposés et qui ont eu lieu au sein des conseils nominés en Amérique du Nord britannique. Ces conseils furent modifiés un bon nombre de fois, devenant les chambres secondaires de législatures provinciales avant d’être éventuellement abolies. La preuve supporte l’hypothèse, bien qu’il ne soit pas suffisant d’avoir un groupe partisan qui puisse croiser le clivage qui mène le changement : un débat partisan sur le changement est nécessaire. Ceci remet aussi en cause la théorie prédominante selon laquelle les clivages sociaux mènent à la formation de partis politiques, suggérant qu’il est plus bénéfique d’utiliser ces deux clivages pour l’étude des institutions.

An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks.

Do Words Matter? The Impact of Communication on the PIIGS' CDS and Bond Yield Spreads during Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis

The paper aims to shed light on the role of communication in the European debt crisis. It examines the effects of public statements by ECB Governing Council members, EU officials and national representatives on the PIIGS' CDS and bond yield spreads. The focus lies on dovish statements that signal strong determination in the rescue of indebted countries, and hawkish statements that indicate limited commitment to support the PIIGS and protect its creditors. The analysis of daily data for the period between January 1, 2009 and August 12, 2011 in an EGARCH framework suggests that communication by representatives of Germany, France, and the EU as well as ECB Governing Council members had an immediate impact on both types of securities. No effects.

Pool it, share it, use it: the European Council on defence. Security Policy Brief No. 44, March 2013

Three major geopolitical events are putting the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean at risk. Most of the region is in a deep monetary and economic crisis. The Arab Spring is causing turmoil in the Levant and the Maghreb. Gas and oil discoveries, if not well managed, could further destabilise the region. At the same time, Russia and Turkey are staging a comeback. In the face of these challenges, the EU approaches the Greek sovereign debt crisis nearly exclusively from a financial and economic viewpoint. This brief argues that the EU has to develop a comprehensive strategy for the region, complementing its existing multilateral regional framework with bilateral agreements in order to secure its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Making Autonomies Matter: Sub-State Actor Accommodation in the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers - An Analysis of the Institutional Framework for Accommodating the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland within ‘Norden’. EDAP Paper 03/2014

Sovereign powers are not absolute but exercised in varying areas and to varying degrees by sub-state, state and supra-state entities. The upward dispersion of power to international organisations carries implications for the sub-state level, while sub-state governance poses demands as to the conduct of governance at the international level. It is well recognised that sub-state entities, such as federal states and autonomies, may have the (restricted) capacity to enter into international relations. But what capacities do international organisations have to accommodate autonomies in their institutional frameworks? This paper shall present a case study of one such framework, namely Nordic co-operation and the accommodation of the Nordic autonomies, the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Åland, within its institutional framework. Within ‘Norden’, the position of autonomies has been scrutinised and adapted on several occasions, in the late 1960s, early 1980s and in the mid-2000s. The accommodation of the autonomies has been discussed in light of evident implications of statehood and international legal personality and the institutional arrangements eventually carved serve well to illustrate the challenges and opportunities international organisations face in the attempt to accommodate multi-level systems.

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign`s willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.