Escaping the flybottle: solipsism and method in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks

The paper supports a dialectical interpretation of Wittgenstein's method focusing on the analysis of the conditions of experience presented in his Philosophical Remarks. By means of a close reading of some key passages dealing with solipsism I will try to lay bare their self-subverting character: the fact that they amount to miniature dialectical exercises offering specific directions to pass from particular pieces of disguised nonsense to corresponding pieces of patent nonsense. Yet, in order to follow those directions one needs to allow oneself to become simultaneously tempted by and suspicious of their all-too-evident "metaphysical tone" - a tone which, as we shall see, is particularly manifest in those claims purporting to state what can or cannot be the case, and, still more particularly, those purporting to state what can or cannot be done in language or thought, thus leading to the view that there are some (determinate) things which are ineffable or unthinkable. I conclude by suggesting that in writing those remarks Wittgenstein was still moved by an ethical project, which gets conspicuously displayed in these reiterations of his attempts to cure the readers (and himself) from some of the temptations expressed by solipsism.

Logificação da Psicologia o itinerário intelectual de Edmundo Curvelo sobre a Mente, a Lógica e a Filosofia

Tese de Doutoramento em Filosofia - Especialidade de Filosofia da Mente

The Life-World and Its Multiple Realities: Alfred Schütz's Contribution to the Understanding of the Experience of Illness

Alfred Schütz original contribution to the social sciences refers to his analysis of the structure of the "life-world". This article aims to invigorate interest in the work of this author, little known in the field of health psychology. Key concepts of Schütz' approach will be presented in relation to their potential interest to the understanding of the experience of illness. In particular, we develop the main characteristics of the everyday life and its cognitive style, that is, its finite province of meaning. We propose to adopt this notion to define the experience of chronic or serious illness when the individual is confronted to the medical world. By articulating this analysis with literature in health psychology, we argue that Schütz's perspective brings useful insight to the field, namely because of its ability to study meaning constructions by overcoming the trap of solipsism by embracing intersubjectivity. The article concludes by outlining both, the limitations and research perspectives brought by this phenomenological analysis of the experiences of health and illness.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Progress report from the strategic sanctuary for the destruction of free will

Progress Report from the Strategic Sanctuary for the Destruction of Free Will presents a new work combining film, music and installation that juxtaposes the setting of the institution with the aesthetics of psychedelia.Progress Report from the Strategic Sanctuary for the Destruction of Free Will is an installation, film and sound work that takes over the gallery. Using plain white card, it distorts the structure of the gallery’s architecture, producing a paranoid shrunken space. Inside this space, performers in cardboard costumes re-enact abstracted, broken gestures drawn from video documentation of acid trips, psychedelic dancing, rehab sessions and radical psychotherapy workshops. Progress Report from the Strategic Sanctuary for the Destruction of Free Will has been formed through Pil and Galia Kollectiv’s research into the anti-psychiatry movement, their interests in counter cultural movements and their studies around biopolitics and the proliferation of societal medication. In 1958, having had a life changing experience with LSD, former alcoholic Charles Dederich founded Synanon, a drug rehabilitation program based on residential care and an aggressive form of group therapy called ‘The Game’. The organisation gradually evolved into a controversial alternative community, described in a critical pamphlet as creating Strategic Sanctuaries for the Destruction of Free Will, “a subversive program for mixing delinquents and lefties”. In 1984, anti-psychiatrist R. D. Laing described tranquillizers as chemical straight jackets. With our growing understanding of the plasticity of the brain and the potential to shape it, the tension between liberation and control in the struggle over the mind continues to define our relationship to labour, culture and production. Interrogating these ideas, the exhibition poses the question of whether a collective body can overcome the solipsism of the incommunicable experience of the individual mind.

Acordo, reflexão e filosofia - uma análise a partir de Wittgenstein

Within the Wittgensteinian approach, the ideal of exactness, disconnected from concrete situations of language use, does not make any sense. Such an approach takes into account every and any kind of intersubjective communication, inasmuch as it is based on a previous agreement concerning the use of language and the interpretation of the world linked to it. This paper, throughout its three parts, seeks to understand this agreement, and evaluates whether or not philosophy plays a role in relation to it. To start with, the obstacles to such an agreement will be considered, namely, solipsism and private, subjective language. In the following stage, the intention is to indicate that the rupture from the subjectivist conception of language allows Wittgenstein to visualize another subject, the one incorporated by the community. From then on, the question is to verify whether reflectivity is possible in the ambit of a linguistic community or not, since the objectivity of concepts is not sought within knowledge, but within forms of life. In the third and last part, we will point to the language game metaphor correlative to the meaning emerging from the flow of life, of thought, and of culture and see how philosophy can represent a significant activity in the search for understanding that flow.

Humanism; philosophical essays,

The ethical basis of metaphysics.--'Useless' knowledge.--Truth.--Lotze's monism.--Non-Euclidean geometry and the Kantian a priori.--The metaphysics ofthe time-process.--Reality and 'idealism.'--Darwinism and design.--The place of pessimism in philosophy.--Concerning Mephistopheles.--On preserving appearances.--Activity and substance.--Humism and humanism.--Solipsism.--Infallibility and toleration.--Freedom and responsibility.--The desire for immortality.--The ethical significance of immortality.--Philosophy and the scientific investigation of a future life.

The World in Singing Made: David Markson's "Wittgenstein's Mistress"

In line with Wittgenstein's axiom that "what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest," this thesis aims to demonstrate how the gulf between analytic and continental philosophy can best be bridged through the mediation of art. The present thesis brings attention to Markson's work, lauded in the tradition of Faulkner, Joyce, and Lowry, as exemplary of the shift from modernity to postmodernity, wherein the human heart is not only in conflict with itself, but with the language out of which it is necessarily constituted. Markson limns the paradoxical condition of the subject severed from intersubjectivity, and affected not only by the grief of bereavement, which can be defined in Heideggarian terms as anxiety for the ontic negation of a being (i.e., death), but by loss, which I assert is the ontological ground for how Dasein encounters the nothing in anxiety proper.

Dialectique des regards - l’autre et la construction du récit de soi dans l’auto-filmage pathographique

Le présent mémoire entend analyser la pratique de l’auto-filmage dans deux films : La Pudeur ou l’impudeur (Hervé Guibert) et Tarnation (Jonathan Caouette). Nous regroupons ces long-métrages sous l’étiquette « auto-filmage pathographique ». Le malade, s’émancipant de l’imagerie médicale et des pratiques cinématographiques institutionnelles, reprend l’image filmique à son compte, aidé en cela par une technologie toujours plus ergonomique. Cette résurgence de l’image du corps malade dans le champ social ne se fait pas sans heurt ; l’exposition de corps décharnés et agoniques convoque un imaginaire catastrophiste et contredit les rituels d’effacement du corps auxquels procède la société occidentale. La forme que prend le récit de soi dans l’auto-filmage pathographique dépend de la maladie qui affecte chaque créateur. Nous observons une redéfinition de la sincérité, en lien avec l’exercice autobiographique. Il s’agit d’utiliser, dans l’auto-filmage pathographique, certains procédés fictionnels pour créer un discours sur soi-même dont la véracité repose sur d’autres critères que ceux communément admis. L’auto-filmage pathographique suppose en ce sens un véritable changement d’attitude et la mise en place de techniques de soi. Il induit une forme de réconciliation avec sa propre identité physique et psychique. En cela, l’écriture filmique de soi est un agent transformateur de la vie et un exercice spirituel. Les réalisateurs ne sont cependant pas uniquement tournés vers eux-mêmes. Chacun inclut quelques privilégiés au coeur de sa démarche. Le soin de soi, dans l’auto-filmage pathographique, ne se désolidarise pas du soin des autres. Auto-filmage et caméra subjective entretiennent un lien dialectique qui donne son sens à l’auto-filmage pathographique et voit leur antagonisme éclater. L’individu s’auto-filmant n’est pas seul ; sa démarche n’est pas qu’un solipsisme. Elle se voit dépassée par l’émergence de l’autre dans le champ ou parfois même, sa prise en main de la caméra.

A auto-interpretação de Husserl em 1930-31: o Nachwort às Ideen como escrito polémico

This essay seeks to expose Husserl’s defensive attitude towards what he calls “the mistaken views” found in the new ways of conducting phenomenology, in the Epilogue to his Ideas. While the polemic side of Husserl’s project, basically but tacitly against Heidegger, is underlined, it is also sustained that this auto-interpretive piece is a fundamental key within Husserl’s corpus in that it defines the direction of the phenomenological project. At the centre of the controversy are the answer to the objections of intellectualism and solipsism, and the disavowal of all forms of anthropologism in the conception of subjectivity.