The Socratic classroom : reflective thinking through collaborative inquiry

This book was written to serve two functions. First it is an exploration of what I have called Socratic pedagogy, a collaborative inquiry-based approach to teaching and learning suitable not only to formal educational settings such as the school classroom but to all educational settings. The term is intended to capture a variety of philosophical approaches to classroom practice that could broadly be described Socratic in form. The term ‘philosophy in schools’ is ambiguous and could refer to teaching university style philosophy to high school students or to the teaching of philosophy and logic or critical reasoning in senior years of high school. It is also used to describe the teaching of philosophy in schools generally. In the early and middle phases of schooling the term philosophy for children is often used. But this too is ambiguous as the name was adopted from Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children curriculum that he and his colleagues at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children developed. In Britain the term ‘philosophy with children’ is sometimes employed to mark two methods of teaching that have Socratic roots but have distinct differences, namely Philosophy for Children and Socratic Dialogue developed by Leonard Nelson. The use of the term Socratic pedagogy and its companion term Socratic classroom (to refer to the kind of classroom that employs Socratic teaching) avoids the problem of distinguishing between various approaches to philosophical inquiry in the Socratic tradition but also separates it from the ‘study of philosophy’, such as university style philosophy or other approaches which place little or no emphasis on collaborative inquiry based teaching and learning. The second function builds from the first. It is to develop an effective framework for understanding the relationship between what I call the generative, evaluative and connective aspects of communal dialogue, which I think are necessary to the Socratic notion of inquiry. In doing so it is hoped that this book offers some way to show how philosophy as inquiry can contribute to educational theory and practice, while also demonstrating how it can be an effective way to approach teaching and learning. This has meant striking a balance between speaking to philosophers and to teachers and educators together, with the view that both see the virtues of such a project. In the strictest sense this book is not philosophy of education, insofar as its chief focus is not on the analysis of concepts or formulation of definitions specific to education with the aim of formulating directives that guide educational practice. It relinquishes the role of philosopher as ‘spectator’, to one of philosopher ‘immersed in matter’ – in this case philosophical issues in education, specifically those related to philosophical inquiry, pedagogy and classroom practice. Put another way, it is a book about philosophical education.

Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology

The dissertation consists of four essays and a comprehensive introduction that discusses the topics, methods, and most prominent theories of philosophical moral psychology. I distinguish three main questions: What are the essential features of moral thinking? What are the psychological conditions of moral responsibility? And finally, what are the consequences of empirical facts about human nature to normative ethics? Each of the three last articles focuses on one of these issues. The first essay and part of the introduction are dedicated to methodological questions, in particular the relationship between empirical (social) psychology and philosophy. I reject recent attempts to understand the nature of morality on the basis of empirical research. One characteristic feature of moral thinking is its practical clout: if we regard an action as morally wrong, we either refrain from doing it even against our desires and interests, or else feel shame or guilt. Moral views seem to have a conceptual connection to motivation and emotions – roughly speaking, we can’t conceive of someone genuinely disapproving an action, but nonetheless doing it without any inner motivational conflict or regret. This conceptual thesis in moral psychology is called (judgment) internalism. It implies, among other things, that psychopaths cannot make moral judgments to the extent that they are incapable of corresponding motivation and emotion, even if they might say largely the words we would expect. Is internalism true? Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in so-called experimental philosophy, which is a methodological view according to which claims about conceptual truths that appeal to our intuitions should be tested by way of surveys presented to ordinary language users. One experimental result is that the majority of people are willing to grant that psychopaths make moral judgments, which challenges internalism. In the first article, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, I argue that these results pose no real threat to internalism, since experimental philosophy is based on a too simple conception of the relationship between language use and concepts. Only the reactions of competent users in pragmatically neutral and otherwise conducive circumstances yield evidence about conceptual truths, and such robust intuitions remain inaccessible to surveys for reasons of principle. The epistemology of folk concepts must still be based on Socratic dialogue and critical reflection, whose character and authority I discuss at the end of the paper. The internal connection between moral judgment and motivation led many metaethicists in the past century to believe along Humean lines that judgment itself consists in a pro-attitude rather than a belief. This expressivist view, as it is called these days, has far-reaching consequences in metaethics. In the second essay I argue that perhaps the most sophisticated form of contemporary expressivism, Allan Gibbard’s norm-expressivism, according to which moral judgments are decisions or contingency plans, is implausible from the perspective of the theory of action. In certain circumstances it is possible to think that something is morally required of one without deciding to do so. Morality is not a matter of the will. Instead, I sketch on the basis of Robert Brandom’s inferentialist semantics a weak form of judgment internalism, according to which the content of moral judgment is determined by a commitment to a particular kind of practical reasoning. The last two essays in the dissertation emphasize the role of mutual recognition in the development and maintenance of responsible and autonomous moral agency. I defend a compatibilist view of autonomy, according to which agents who are unable to recognize right and wrong or act accordingly are not responsible for their actions – it is not fair to praise or blame them, since they lacked the relevant capacity to do otherwise. Conversely, autonomy demands an ability to recognize reasons and act on them. But as a long tradition in German moral philosophy whose best-known contemporary representative is Axel Honneth has it, both being aware of reasons and acting on them requires also the right sort of higher-order attitudes toward the self. Without self-respect and self-confidence we remain at the mercy of external pressures, even if we have the necessary normative competence. These attitudes toward the self, in turn, are formed through mutual recognition – we value ourselves when those who we value value us. Thus, standing in the right sort of relations of recognition is indirectly necessary for autonomy and moral responsibility. Recognition and valuing are concretely manifest in actions and institutions, whose practices make possible participation on an equal footing. Seeing this opens the way for a kind of normative social criticism that is grounded in the value of freedom and automomy, but is not limited to defending negative rights. It thus offers a new way to bridge the gap between liberalism and communitarianism.

Diálogo no limiar e diatribe: mecanismos de construção da autoconsciência do sujeito

Este artigo tem o objetivo de refletir sobre o diálogo no limiar, um gênero nascido do diálogo socrático, e a diatribe, um gênero retórico interno dialogado, compreendidos ambos os fenômenos, neste estudo, como instrumentos privilegiados para a construção da autoconsciência do protagonista de Uma criatura dócil, novela de Dostoiévski. Tencionamos examinar, na materialidade do texto, o partejar das ideias desenvolvido pelo diálogo no limiar no momento da crise existencial vivida pela personagem-narrador e os expedientes da diatribe que provocam a experimentação filosófico-dialógica que esse sujeito assume ao constituir a sua voz.

THE EFFECTS OF MODELING INSTRUCTION ON STUDENT LEARNING OF A NEWTONIAN FORCE CONCEPT

This study explores the effects of modeling instruction on student learning in physics. Multiple representations grounded in physical contexts were employed by students to analyze the results of inquiry lab investigations. Class whiteboard discussions geared toward a class consensus following Socratic dialogue were implemented throughout the modeling cycle. Lab investigations designed to address student preconceptions related to Newton’s Third Law were implemented. Student achievement was measured based on normalized gains on the Force Concept Inventory. Normalized FCI gains achieved by students in this study were comparable to those achieved by students of other novice modelers. Physics students who had taken a modeling Intro to Physics course scored significantly higher on the FCI posttest than those who had not. The FCI results also provided insight into deeply rooted student preconceptions related to Newton’s Third Law. Implications for instruction and the design of lab investigations related to Newton’s Third Law are discussed.

Socratic flipped classroom : What types of questions and tasks promote learning?

Socratic questioning stresses the importance of questioning for learning. Flipped Classroom pedagogy generates a need for effective questions and tasks in order to promote active learning. This paper describes a project aimed at finding out how different kinds of questions and tasks support students’ learning in a flipped classroom context. In this study, during the flipped courses, both the questions and tasks were distributed together with video recordings. Answers and solutions were presented and discussed in seminars, with approximately 10 participating students in each seminar. Information Systems students from three flipped classroom courses at three different levels were interviewed in focus groups about their perceptions of how different kinds of questions and tasks supported their learning process. The selected courses were organized differently, with various kinds of questions and tasks. Course one included open questions that were answered and presented at the seminar. Students also solved a task and presented the solution to the group. Course two included open questions and a task. Answers and solutions were discussed at the seminars where students also reviewed each other’s answers and solutions. Course three included online single- and multiple choice questions with real-time feedback. Answers were discussed at the seminar, with the focus on any misconceptions. In this paper we categorized the questions in accordance with Wilson (2016) as factual, convergent, divergent, evaluative, or a combination of these. In all, we found that any comprehensible question that initiates a dialogue, preferably with a set of Socratic questions, is perceived as promoting learning. This is why seminars that allow such questions and discussion are effective. We found no differences between the different kinds of Socratic questions. They were seen to promote learning so long as they made students reflect and problematize the questions. To conclude, we found that questions and tasks promote learning when they are answered and solved in a process that is characterized by comprehensibility, variation, repetition and activity.

The need for dialogue between the vocational psychological and organisational perspectives on career

As editors of the recently published Vocational psychological and organisational perspectives on career: Towards a multidisciplinary dialogue (Collin & Patton, 2009), we have considerable interest in this particular issue of the Australian Journal of Career Development. This short piece will first present the purpose and thesis of that book and, in the light of them, will then comment on the four papers. The book suggests that to understand the multidimensional and multilayered nature of career, “it has to be studied in a similarly multilayered and multi-perspectival way, and, indeed, it has been” (p. 3). Scholars have pointed out that there is a wide array of disciplines including economics, sociology, anthropology, geography, political science, various branches of psychology (e.g. industrial/organisational (I/O), vocational, counselling), psychiatry, education, organisation studies, organisational behaviour, personnel/human resource management, industrial relations, and more, all of which have something to say about career. Of these, the most influential, according to Peiperl and Arthur (2000), have been psychology, sociology, education and management. These many disciplinary perspectives on career constitute the rich field of career studies.

Vocational psychological and organisational perspectives on career : towards a multidisciplinary dialogue

It has long been lamented that, although several disciplines contribute to career scholarship, they work in isolation from one another, thus denying career theory, research, and practice the benefits that multidisciplinary collaboration would bring. This constitutes a lost opportunity at a time when new understandings and approaches are needed in order to respond effectively to global changes in society and work. This book takes a major step towards remedying this situation by bringing together two key perspectives on career, the vocational psychological and the organisational (interpreted broadly to include organisation behaviour and human resource management). Written by international experts, the book opens by identifying some of the “tributaries” that flow into the “great delta of careers scholarship”, and noting the need to link what are at present separate “islands” of scholarship. It is structured to allow comparison between the ways in which the two perspectives address career development and career management theory, research and interventions. It concludes by pointing to the possibilities for dialogue, and even collaboration, between these perspectives, and suggesting ways in which these could be brought about. The book will be essential reading for career scholars because, with its potential to stimulate new thinking and developments in theory and research and also, importantly, in practice (with beneficial spin-offs for policy-makers), this dialogue could open a new phase in career scholarship. With its overviews of the history, theory, research and practice of both perspectives, the book will also be a valuable resource for students of both perspectives.

Who's at risk: Answerability and the critical possibilities of classroom discourse

Our aim in this article is twofold. First, we challenge the essentialized notion of adolescents and young people as perpetually driven to resist the authority of adults. At the same time, we disrupt linguistic conceptions of adolescent discourse, along with the discourse of youth at risk, by analyzing a transcript of classroom discourse that reflects an exchange between a highly regarded and well liked preservice teacher and his students. This representative transcript highlights the preservice teacher's ability to query, without a concomitant ability to listen, respond, and build a classroom dialogue with his students; what we call here a Socratic monologue. Second, we link the notions of dialogue and responsiveness to Bakhtin's concept of answerability, emphasizing the joint construction of classroom discourse as an ethically answerable relation between teacher and students.

Mediating cultural politics : a dialogue with Georgina Born

The following dialogue is based on an interview conducted as part of Professor Born’s visit to Brisbane in 2006, which included three public seminars at the University of Queensland (UQ) and Queensland University of Technology (QUT). The following dialogue provides a counterpoint to these events and to Born’s work as a whole, drawing together and extending key themes in the cultural politics of both public service broadcasting and new media technologies. It begins by discussing the possibilities of public sphere theory to provide useful models of institutional design. The discussion moves from there to SBS Television – an example of Public Service Broadcasting that provides an interesting contrast to the BBC, especially by virtue of SBS’s relationship with the politics of multiculturalism in Australia. The second half of the interview draws out the issues around cultural value, cultural power and the politics of technology in relation to new media, and concludes by focusing especially on the problems and potentialities of ‘user-generated content’.