Bundling and competition for slots: Sequential pricing

In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

Bayesian ratemaking procedure of crop insurance contracts with skewed distribution

Over the years, crop insurance programs became the focus of agricultural policy in the USA, Spain, Mexico, and more recently in Brazil. Given the increasing interest in insurance, accurate calculation of the premium rate is of great importance. We address the crop-yield distribution issue and its implications in pricing an insurance contract considering the dynamic structure of the data and incorporating the spatial correlation in the Hierarchical Bayesian framework. Results show that empirical (insurers) rates are higher in low risk areas and lower in high risk areas. Such methodological improvement is primarily important in situations of limited data.

Spatio-temporal modeling of agricultural yield data with an application to pricing crop insurance contracts

This article presents a statistical model of agricultural yield data based on a set of hierarchical Bayesian models that allows joint modeling of temporal and spatial autocorrelation. This method captures a comprehensive range of the various uncertainties involved in predicting crop insurance premium rates as opposed to the more traditional ad hoc, two-stage methods that are typically based on independent estimation and prediction. A panel data set of county-average yield data was analyzed for 290 counties in the State of Parana (Brazil) for the period of 1990 through 2002. Posterior predictive criteria are used to evaluate different model specifications. This article provides substantial improvements in the statistical and actuarial methods often applied to the calculation of insurance premium rates. These improvements are especially relevant to situations where data are limited.

Parametric and nonparametric statistical modelling of crop yield: implications for pricing crop insurance contracts

This article considers alternative methods to calculate the fair premium rate of crop insurance contracts based on county yields. The premium rate was calculated using parametric and nonparametric approaches to estimate the conditional agricultural yield density. These methods were applied to a data set of county yield provided by the Statistical and Geography Brazilian Institute (IBGE), for the period of 1990 through 2002, for soybean, corn and wheat, in the State of Paran. In this article, we propose methodological alternatives to pricing crop insurance contracts resulting in more accurate premium rates in a situation of limited data.

On compliance of business processes with business contracts

This paper addresses the problem of ensuring compliance of business processes, implemented within and across organisational boundaries, with the constraints stated in related business contracts. In order to deal with the complexity of this problem we propose two solutions that allow for a systematic and increasingly automated support for addressing two specific compliance issues. One solution provides a set of guidelines for progressively transforming contract conditions into business processes that are consistent with contract conditions thus avoiding violation of the rules in contract. Another solution compares rules in business contracts and rules in business processes to check for possible inconsistencies. Both approaches rely on a computer interpretable representation of contract conditions that embodies contract semantics. This semantics is described in terms of a logic based formalism allowing for the description of obligations, prohibitions, permissions and violations conditions in contracts. This semantics was based on an analysis of typical building blocks of many commercial, financial and government contracts. The study proved that our contract formalism provides a good foundation for describing key types of conditions in contracts, and has also given several insights into valuable transformation techniques and formalisms needed to establish better alignment between these two, traditionally separate areas of research and endeavour. The study also revealed a number of new areas of research, some of which we intend to address in near future.

A trader portfolio optimization of bilateral contracts in electricity retail markets

Electricity markets are systems for effecting the purchase and sale of electricity using supply and demand to set energy prices. Two major market models are often distinguished: pools and bilateral contracts. Pool prices tend to change quickly and variations are usually highly unpredictable. In this way, market participants often enter into bilateral contracts to hedge against pool price volatility. This article addresses the challenge of optimizing the portfolio of clients managed by trader agents. Typically, traders buy energy in day-ahead markets and sell it to a set of target clients, by negotiating bilateral contracts involving three-rate tariffs. Traders sell energy by considering the prices of a reference week and five different types of clients. They analyze several tariffs and determine the best share of customers, i.e., the share that maximizes profit. © 2014 IEEE.

The role of implicit contracts: Building public works in the 1840s in Portugal

Business History, Vol 50 No 2, p147-162