Optimal taxation and the skill premium

The stylized facts suggest a negative relationship between tax progressivity and the skill premium from the early 1960s until the early 1990s, and a positive one thereafter. They also generally imply rising tax progressivity, except for the 1980s. In this paper, we ask whether optimal tax policy is consistent with these observations, taking into account the demographic and technological factors that have also affected the skill premium. To this end, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the skill premium and the progressivity of the tax system are endogenously determined, with the latter being optimally chosen by a benevolent government. We find that optimal policy delivers both a progressive tax system and model predictions which are generally consistent, except for the 1980s, with the stylized facts relating to the skill premium and progressivity. To capture the patterns in the data over the 1980s requires that we adopt a government policy which is biased towards the interests of skilled agents. Thus, in addition to demographic and technological factors, changes in the preferences of policy-makers appear to be a potentially important factor in determining the evolution of the observed skill premium.

Human capital, social mobility and the skill premium

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to highlight the role of human capital accumulation of agents differentiated by skill type in the joint determination of social mobility and the skill premium. We first show that our model captures the empirical co-movement of the skill premium, the relative supply of skilled to unskilled workers and aggregate output in the U.S. data from 1970-2000. We next show that endogenous social mobility and human capital accumulation are key channels through which the effects of capital tax cuts and increases in public spending on both pre- and post-college education are transmitted. In particular, social mobility creates additional incentives for the agents which enhance the beneficial effects of policy reforms. Moreover, the dynamics of human capital accumulation imply that, post reform, the skill premium is higher in the short- to medium-run than in the long-run.

Trade Costs, Quality, and The Skill Premium

We develop a monopolistic competition model with nonhomothetic factor input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a multicountry dataset we test and confirm the findings in Schott (2004) of a positive effect of skill abundance on unit values identified with US data. We extend the core model with per unit trade costs leading to the Washington-apples effect that goods shipped over larger distance are of higher quality. The combination of high-quality goods being relatively skill intensive with the Washington-apples effect implies that countries at a larger distance from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model we find that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises the skill premium in a country by about 2.3 percent.

Tax smoothing in a business cycle model with capital-skill complementarity

This paper undertakes a normative investigation of the quantitative properties of optimal tax smoothing in a business cycle model with state contingent debt, capital-skill complementarity, endogenous skill formation and stochastic shocks to public consumption as well as total factor and capital equipment productivity. Our main finding is that an empirically relevant restriction which does not allow the relative supply of skilled labour to adjust in response to aggregate shocks, signi cantly changes the cyclical properties of optimal labour taxes. Under a restricted relative skill supply, the government fi nds it optimal to adjust labour income tax rates so that the average net returns to skilled and unskilled labour hours exhibit the same dynamic behaviour as under fl exible skill supply.

Optimal progressive taxation in a model with endogenous skill supply.

This paper examines whether efficiency considerations require that optimal labour income taxation is progressive or regressive in a model with skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector with capital-skill complementarity. We find that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation in the steady-state as well as along the transition path from the exogenous to optimal policy steady-state. We find that these results are explained by a lower labour supply elasticity for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the introduction of the skill acquisition technology.

Cyclical Skill-Biased Technological Change

Over the past two decades, technological progress has been biased towards making skilled labor more productive. The evidence for this finding is based on the persistent parallel increase in the skill premium and the supply of skilled workers. What are the implications of skill-biased technological change for the business cycle? To answer this question, we use the CPS outgoing rotation groups to construct quarterly series for the price and quantity of skill. The unconditional correlation of the skill premium with the cycle is zero. However, using a structural VAR with long run restrictions, we find that technology shocks substantially increase the premium. Investment-specific technology shocks are not skill-biased and our findings suggest that capital and skill are (mildly) substitutable in aggregate production.

The skill bias of world trade

Under plausible assumptions about preferences and technology, the model in this papersuggests that the entire volume of world trade matters for wage inequality. Therefore,trade integration, even among identical countries, is likely to increase the skill premium.Further, we argue that empirical evidence of a falling relative price of skill-intensive goods can be reconciled with the fast growth of world trade and that the intersectoral mobility of capital exacerbates the effect of trade on inequality. We provide new empirical evidence in support of our results and a quantitative assessment of the skill bias of world trade.

Skill-biased technological change and the business cycle

Over the past two decades, technological progress in the United States hasbeen biased towards skilled labor. What does this imply for business cycles?We construct a quarterly skill premium from the CPS and use it to identifyskill-biased technology shocks in a VAR with long-run restrictions. Hours fallin response to skill-biased technology shocks, indicating that at least part of thetechnology-induced fall in total hours is due to a compositional shift in labordemand. Skill-biased technology shocks have no effect on the relative price ofinvestment, suggesting that capital and skill are not complementary in aggregateproduction.

A wave of change: Labor market and social security impacts of the EU refugee inflow

The recent massive inflow of refugees to the European Union (EU) raises a number of unanswered questions on the economic impact of this phenomenon. To examine these questions, we constructed an overlapping-generations model that describes the evolution of the skill premium and of the welfare benefit level in relevant European countries, in the aftermath of an inflow of asylum-seekers. In our simulation, relative wages of skilled workers increase between 8% and 11% in the period of the inflow; their subsequent time path is dependent on the initial skill premium. The entry of migrants creates a fiscal surplus of about 8%, which can finance higher welfare benefits in the subsequent periods. These effects are weaker in a scenario where refugees do not fully integrate into the labor market.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

The Optimal Distribution of the Tax Burden over the Business Cycle

This paper analyses optimal income taxes over the business cycle under a balanced-budget restriction, for low, middle and high income households. A model incorporating capital-skill complementarity in production and differential access to capital and labour markets is developed to capture the cyclical characteristics of the US economy, as well as the empirical observations on wage (skill premium) and wealth inequality. We .nd that the tax rate for high income agents is optimally the least volatile and the tax rate for low income agents the least countercyclical. In contrast, the path of optimal taxes for the middle income group is found to be very volatile and counter-cyclical. We further find that the optimal response to output-enhancing capital equipment technology and spending cuts is to increase the progressivity of income taxes. Finally, in response to positive TFP shocks, taxation becomes more progressive after about two years.

Fiscal multipliers in a two-sector search and matching model

This paper evaluates the effects of policy interventions on sectoral labour markets and the aggregate economy in a business cycle model with search and matching frictions. We extend the canonical model by including capital-skill complementarity in production, labour markets with skilled and unskilled workers and on-the-job-learning (OJL) within and across skill types. We first find that, the model does a good job at matching the cyclical properties of sectoral employment and the wage-skill premium. We next find that vacancy subsidies for skilled and unskilled jobs lead to output multipliers which are greater than unity with OJL and less than unity without OJL. In contrast, the positive output effects from cutting skilled and unskilled income taxes are close to zero. Finally, we find that the sectoral and aggregate effects of vacancy subsidies do not depend on whether they are financed via public debt or distorting taxes.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Offshoring and directed technical change

To study the short-run and long-run implications on wage inequality, we introducedirected technical change into a Ricardian model of offshoring. A unique final good isproduced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuumof intermediates (tasks). Some of these tasks can be transferred from a skill-abundant Westto a skill-scarce East. Profit maximization determines both the extent of offshoring andtechnological progress. Offshoring induces skill-biased technical change because it increasesthe relative price of skill-intensive products and induces technical change favoring unskilledworkers because it expands the market size for technologies complementing unskilled labor.In the empirically more relevant case, starting from low levels, an increase in offshoringopportunities triggers a transition with falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West,skill-biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. However, when the extentof offshoring becomes sufficiently large, further increases in offshoring induce technicalchange now biased in favor of unskilled labor because offshoring closes the gap betweenunskilled wages in the West and the East, thus limiting the power of the price effectfueling skill-biased technical change. The unequalizing impact of offshoring is thus greatestat the beginning. Transitional dynamics reveal that offshoring and technical change aresubstitutes in the short run but complements in the long run. Finally, though offshoringimproves the welfare of workers in the East, it may benefit or harm unskilled workers inthe West depending on elasticities and the equilibrium growth rate.

Credible redistributive policies and migration across US States

Does worker mobility undermine governments ability to redistribute income? Thispaper analyzes the experience of US states in the recent decades. We build a tractablemodel where both migration decisions and redistribution policies are endogenous. Wecalibrate the model to match skill premium and worker productivity at the state level,as well as the size and skill composition of migration flows. The calibrated modelis able to reproduce the large changes in skill composition as well as key qualitativerelationships of labor flows and redistribution policies observed in the data. Our resultssuggest that regional di¤erences in labor productivity are an important determinantof interstate migration. We use the calibrated model to compare the cross-section ofredistributive policies with and without worker mobility. The main result of the paperis that interstate migration has induced substantial convergence in tax rates acrossUS states, but no race to the bottom. Skill-biased in-migration has reduced the skillpremium and the need for tax-based redistribution in the states that would have hadthe highest tax rates in the absence of mobility.