Are Shirking and Leisure Substitutable? An Empirical Test of Efficiency Wages Based on Urban Economic Theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.

Shirking, Commuting and Labor Market Outcomes

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade-off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the metropolitan sample of the American Housing Survey. No evidence is found to suggest a consistent impact of efficiency wages on the spatial pattern of unemployment or earnings.

Shirking and Motivation in Firms: Survey Evidence on Worker Attitudes

In an extensive national survey, 82.7% of the respondents report that they are very likely to keep an agreement to work hard if they agreed to, even if it was almost impossible for their employer to monitor them. Based on mean responses, the rank order of motivations in descending importance is: moral, intrinsic, peer-pressure, and positive incentives. Respondents also report that fairness considerations are important and that they are especially likely to keep agreements to do a good job with honest employers. Logit analysis indicates that increases in moral and intrinsic motivations increase the likelihood of keeping agreements to provide effort. The evidence suggests that we need to re-examine a foundational assumption underlying the theory of the firm.

The cords of vanity; a comedy of shirking.

Mode of access: Internet.

"I take care of my own" : a field study on how leadership handles conflict between individual and collective incentives

From the early literature on the role of firm managers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) to the industrial organisation on contracts and mechanism design (Laont and Martimort 2009), economists have given a lot of attention to find solutions to the imperfect alignment between individuals' incentives and an organisation's collective goals (Prendergast 1999). In that literature a key role of managers is to monitor individuals to reward behaviour aligned with the collective goals and reduce sub- optimal behaviour, such as shirking. How- ever, another strand of literature, since Akerlof (1982), has put forward a vision of reciprocal behaviour between an organisation's leadership and its members: gifts (high wages, recognition) from the organisation are reciprocated by high effort from the members of the organisation. By rewarding individual members (rather than strictly monitoring them), organisations may benefit from greater effort and cohesion. Experimental research in organizational economics has provided mixed results suggesting that agents do react to personal incentives but also that reciprocal behaviour can play a substantial role (Camerer and Weber 2012).

Disinflation with labor market frictions

This paper studies disinflationary shocks in a non-linear New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and moral hazard in the labor markets. Our focus is on understanding the wage formation process as well as welfare costs of disinflations in the presence of such labor market frictions.

The presence of imperfect information in labor markets imposes a lower bound on worker surplus that varies endogenously. Consequently equilibrium can take two forms depending on whether the no shirking condition is binding or not. We also evaluate both regimes from a welfare perspective when the economy is subject to a perfectly credible disinflationary shock.

Salarios de eficiencia en un modelo de crecimiento económico

En este artÌculo se introducen los salarios de eÖciencia como microfundamento para explicar la existencia de desempleo involuntario permanente y la rigidez de los salarios a la baja. Los salarios de eÖciencia se incorporan en un modelo de crecimiento econÛmico de generaciones traslapadas, en el cual se puede alcanzar un equilibrio de largo plazo en el que existe desempleo involuntario permanente, explicado por la rigidez de los salarios.

Spatio-temporal credit assignment in population learning

Learning by reinforcement is important in shaping animal behavior, and in particular in behavioral decision making. Such decision making is likely to involve the integration of many synaptic events in space and time. However, using a single reinforcement signal to modulate synaptic plasticity, as suggested in classical reinforcement learning algorithms, a twofold problem arises. Different synapses will have contributed differently to the behavioral decision, and even for one and the same synapse, releases at different times may have had different effects. Here we present a plasticity rule which solves this spatio-temporal credit assignment problem in a population of spiking neurons. The learning rule is spike-time dependent and maximizes the expected reward by following its stochastic gradient. Synaptic plasticity is modulated not only by the reward, but also by a population feedback signal. While this additional signal solves the spatial component of the problem, the temporal one is solved by means of synaptic eligibility traces. In contrast to temporal difference (TD) based approaches to reinforcement learning, our rule is explicit with regard to the assumed biophysical mechanisms. Neurotransmitter concentrations determine plasticity and learning occurs fully online. Further, it works even if the task to be learned is non-Markovian, i.e. when reinforcement is not determined by the current state of the system but may also depend on past events. The performance of the model is assessed by studying three non-Markovian tasks. In the first task, the reward is delayed beyond the last action with non-related stimuli and actions appearing in between. The second task involves an action sequence which is itself extended in time and reward is only delivered at the last action, as it is the case in any type of board-game. The third task is the inspection game that has been studied in neuroeconomics, where an inspector tries to prevent a worker from shirking. Applying our algorithm to this game yields a learning behavior which is consistent with behavioral data from humans and monkeys, revealing themselves properties of a mixed Nash equilibrium. The examples show that our neuronal implementation of reward based learning copes with delayed and stochastic reward delivery, and also with the learning of mixed strategies in two-opponent games.

On Voters' Attitudes Towards Unemployment Insurance Subsidies across Regions: A Canadian Simulation

The Canadian unemployment insurance program is designed to reflect the varying risk of joblessness across regions. Regions that are considered low-risk areas subsidize higher risk ones. A region's risk is typically proxied by its relative unemployment rate. We use a dynamic, heterogeneous-agent model calibrated to Canada to analyze voters preferences between a uniformly generous unemployment insurance and the current system with asymmetric generosity. We find that Canada's unusual unemployment insurance system is surprisingly close to what voters would choose in spite of the possibilities of moral hazard and self-insurance through asset build-up.

Managing Moral Motivations

Firms confront three problems: (1) shirking (sub-optimal provision of effort), (2) smooth transfer of knowledge, and (3) eliciting new knowledge. The motivations possessed by firm members are four: (a) instrumental rationality (i.e., self-interest), (b) moral motivations and integrity, (c) intrinsic motivations, and (d) fairness motivations. The trick for the firm is to manage motivations in a way that solves its particular problems. The purpose of this paper is to provide the foundations for moral motivations and moral integrity, and to discuss the kinds of problems that they can and cannot solve, particularly in context of the complex motivational mix.