Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment, and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other's agendas.

Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.

Stakeholder activism, managerial entrenchment and the congruence of interests between shareholders and stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntaryinitiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressuregroups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs.Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporategovernance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. Weshow that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in thefirm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful socialactivists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value.These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known socialactivists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders likeCalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.

Boosting Future Prospects or Softening Promises of Success? The Use of Emphatics and Hedging in the Letter to Shareholders Sections of Annual Reports

Tämä pro gradu -tutkielma käsittelee yritysten vuosikertomusten Toimitusjohtajan katsaus -osioissa esiintyvää metatekstiä. Erityisenä tutkimuskohteena ovat yrityksen tulevaisuutta käsittelevät lauseet ja niissä käytetty interpersonaalinen metateksti, jonka avulla kirjoittaja pyrkii joko vahvistamaan (emphatics-keinoin) tai heikentämään (hedging-keinoin) ilmaisujensa vahvuutta ja lukijalle niiden kautta välittyvää kuvaa viestin varmuudesta ja vakuuttavuudesta. Sijoittajille suunnattu Toimitusjohtajan katsaus käsittelee yleensä yrityksen edellisen vuoden tulosta, taloudellista asemaa sekä tulevaisuudennäkymiä. Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena oli selvittää, vaikuttaako yrityksen taloudellinen menestys vuosikertomuksen tässä osiossa käytetyn metatekstin määrään ja laatuun. Tutkimuksen teoriaosuudessa käsitellään ensiksi lyhyesti vuosikertomuksia ja niiden parissa tehtyä aiempaa kielitieteellistä tutkimusta, minkä jälkeen perehdytään tarkemmin metatekstin sekä hedging- ja emphatics-keinojen määrittelyyn. Näissä osioissa apuna toimivat muunmuassa Hylandin (1998) ja Cromptonin (1997) tutkimukset. Tutkimusaineistossa esiintyvien metatekstilajien määrittelyssä ja tunnistamisessa käytettiin apuna pääosin Crismore & Farnsworthin (1990) ja Grabe & Kaplanin (1997) tutkimuksia. Tutkimuksen aineistona oli yhteensä 23 yhdentoista amerikkalaisen yrityksen vuosikertomusta. Ne käsittivät esimerkkejä kunkin yhtiön talouden kannalta sekä erityisen hyviltä että huonoilta vuosilta. Aineistosta löydetty interpersonaalinen metateksti luokiteltiin viiteen eri ryhmään: modaaliverbit, hedging-verbit, muut hedging-keinot, emphatics-keinot ja evaluatives-keinot (eli kirjoittajan tekstistään tekemät subjektiiviset huomiot ja arviot). Tulokset osoittivat, että metatekstin käytössä ilmeni melkoista vaihtelua yksittäisten yritysten ja niiden hyvien ja huonojen vuosien välillä. Nämä eroavuudet eivät kuitenkaan vaikuttaneet merkittävästi koko aineiston kattaviin keskivertolukuihin, joiden avulla pyrittiin selvittämään hyvien ja huonojen vuosien välisiä yleisiä eroja. Tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että Toimitusjohtajan katsaus –osioiden viittaukset yhtiön tulevaisuuteen heijastavat tavallisesti kirjoittajan varmuutta yrityksen menestyksekkäästä tulevaisuudesta riippumatta siitä, minkälainen vuosikertomuksessa käsitelty vuosi on ollut yhtiölle taloudellisesti. Yleisesti ottaen yhtiön taloudellisen tilan ei siis havaittu vaikuttavan Toimitusjohtajan katsauksessa käytetyn metadiskurssin määrään tai laatuun.

Earnings Management Shareholders point of view

This paper studies the relationship of earnings management and investors. Analysis of incentives reveals that most of them are opportunistic in nature. Unfortunately the investor would need insider information to distinguish between different forms of earnings management. Investors in some countries seem to devalue earnings when government body has signaled that earnings management might be involved, unfortunately without a clear signal the behavior seems reverse among non-institutional investors.

Report of Directors to the Shareholders, 1966

A report of the Directors to the shareholders, it reads "The year 1965 showed a continued trend of decrease in sales. The opening of new wineries in Moose Jaw, Calgary, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick has resulted in a change in wine marketing across Canada and are contributing factors. The Company's sales both retail and wholesale have continued to drop in Ontario, notwithstanding the advertising program undertaken by the Company. This decline is a matter of great concern to the Directors of the Company. Our new package introduced in the late fall of 1965 is now available across Canada which should improve our sales picture during the present year. Net profit is down $19, 000 from 1964, due to increases in the cost of raw materials and supplies and to reduced sales." The directors listed are: John M. Woodbridge, William R. Barnes, A.H. Kidder, P.G.D. Armour, H.M. Pawling, Miss Florence A. Goffin, William D. McLean.

Report of Directors to the Shareholders, 1970

The report reads: "The year 1970 saw many significant changes in our Company. Sales were higher than in any previous year showing an increase in gallons of 8.8% and in dollar volume of 9.7%. The new offices and warehouse are fully operational, the fermenters installed prior to vintage assisted in holding our labour costs to a reasonable level, and the use of liquid sugar proved very successful. We added two representatives to our sales staff during the year and direct contact with our customers will be intensified. Product development is continuing and the addition of new lines and better distribution will be receiving priority. Our venture in the product supply for Valley Rouge Wines of Manitoba will, we trust, increase our sales volume and assist in lowering our fixed overhead. Capital expenses in 1971 will continue at a high level. Our co-operation with the various Government departments in respect to pollution, will obligate our Company to install facilities to satisfy the strict requirements in this regard. Preparations must be made now to handle bulk harvested grapes, the addition of storage and fermenting capacity and the replacement of production equipment, will be under constant review, thus enabling us to maintain production and efficiency. With the continued dedicated service of our personnel and the support of all our Shareholders, we are confident the challenge will be met in 1971."

Long Point Company explanatory memorandum for shareholders

Long Point Company explanatory memorandum for shareholders. This is a 2 page printed flyer put out by J.I. Mackenzie, secretary-treasurer, March 21, 1878.

Meeting of shareholders, yeas and nays

Meeting of shareholders, yeas and nays (1 page, printed), Nov. 18, 1881.

Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 regarding shares

Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 regarding shares (copy of 1 handwritten page). The board of directors also met and new directors were named. This is signed by Louis N. Hayne, secretary, June 7, 1886.

Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 in which amendments and field rules and regulations were made

Report from the annual meeting of the shareholders held on June 1, 1886 in which amendments and field rules and regulations were made (copy of 1 handwritten page). This is signed by Louis N. Hayne, secretary, June 7, 1886.

Notice regarding bonds and shareholders and the rights of the directors of the Long Point Compan

Notice regarding bonds and shareholders and the rights of the directors of the Long Point Company, n.d.

Multiple large shareholders in corporate governance

Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.