Les droits fondamentaux des animaux : une approche anti-spéciste

Dans cette thèse, nous partons des grands principes de justice pour démontrer la nécessité d’octroyer aux êtres sensibles nonhumains les droits moraux et légaux les plus fondamentaux. Dans un premier temps, nous nous penchons sur les principes sous-jacents aux droits fondamentaux de la personne : le principe d’égalité voulant que les cas similaires soient traités de manière similaire; la notion de droit fondamental, qui repose sur celle d’intérêt; le principe de l’égale considération des intérêts auquel mène le principe d’égalité; et, enfin, le concept d’intérêt, qui s’applique à tous les êtres sensibles. Cette première partie établit l’exigence d’accorder les droits les plus fondamentaux à tous les êtres possédant les intérêts que ces droits visent à protéger. Cela permet d’étudier trois droits particuliers et les intérêts qui les sous-tendent en examinant d’abord le droit à l'intégrité physique. Nous montrons que de nombreux animaux nonhumains sont des êtres sensibles, que tous les êtres sensibles ont, par définition, intérêt à ne pas souffrir et que, pour cette raison, ils devraient jouir du droit à l’intégrité physique. Le troisième chapitre est consacré au droit à la vie. Nous soutenons qu’il est raisonnable de supposer que tous les êtres sensibles, parce qu’ils peuvent jouir des bonnes choses de la vie, ont un certain intérêt à persévérer dans leur existence, intérêt qui, peu importe son intensité ou sa nature, doit être protégé par l’égal droit de vivre. Notre dernier chapitre se concentre sur le droit à la liberté. Nous montrons que cet intérêt est généralement interprété négativement et ne consiste qu’à pouvoir agir sans subir d’interférence. Nous soutenons que cette acception du concept de liberté nous force à reconnaître l’intérêt à être libre de tous les êtres sensibles et notre devoir de leur accorder un droit à la liberté. Nous ajoutons finalement que l’interprétation républicaine de la liberté nous incite à reconnaître à tous ces animaux un statut égal à celui des humains. Nous terminons cette réflexion en concluant que l'octroi des droits fondamentaux aux animaux sensibles implique que l’exploitation animale institutionalisée soit abandonnée et que les animaux conscients jouissent du statut de personne.

Animal welfare: from concepts to reality.

In this review, we provide a brief retrospective history of the science of animal welfare and recognize the sentience of non-human animals; however, we emphasize that crucial problems remain regarding how to define and measure animal welfare. In general, the use of physiological measures to assess welfare is discouraged. Furthermore, there is a theoretical background for measures of stress, but not for welfare states because life may not be at risk. Instead, a preference or choice-based approach, which is based on the animal decision, is recommended. To this end, welfare is discussed and then contrasted with disease, health, stress and distress. In addition, the importance of prospective capacities for the welfare of human and non-human animals is discussed.

Insights into the concept of fish welfare

Fish welfare issues are predicated on understanding whether fish are sentient beings. Therefore, we analyzed the logic of the methodologies used for studying this attribute. We conclude that empirical science is unable to prove or to disprove that fish are sentient beings. Thus, we propose a combined ethical-scientific approach for considering fish as sentient beings. The most difficult ongoing question is to determine which conditions fish prefer. Approaches to assess fish preferences should be rigorously and cautiously employed. In light of these considerations, attempts to establish physiological standards for fish welfare are discouraged, and a preference-based definition of fish welfare is proposed.

Challenges in Assessing Fish Welfare

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Um modelo cognitivo baseado na atenção para consciência em robôs inteligentes

Understanding consciousness is one of the most fascinating challenges of our time. From ancient civilizations to modern philosophers, questions have been asked on how one is conscious of his/her own existence and about the world that surrounds him/her. Although there is no precise definition for consciousness, there is an agreement that it is strongly related to human cognitive processes such as: thinking, reasoning, emotions, wishes. One of the key processes to the arising of the consciousness is the attention, a process capable of promoting a selection of a few stimuli from a huge amount of information that reaches us constantly. Machine consciousness is the field of the artificial intelligence that investigate the possibility of the production of conscious processes in artificial devices. This work presents a review about the theme of consciousness - in both natural and artificial aspects -, discussing this theme from the philosophical and computational perspectives, and investigates the feasibility of the adoption of an attentional schema as the base to the cognitive processing. A formal computational model is proposed for conscious agents that integrates: short and long term memories, reasoning, planning, emotion, decision making, learning, motivation and volition. Computer experiments in a mobile robotics domain under USARSim simulation environment, proposed by RoboCup, suggest that the agent can be able to use these elements to acquire experiences based on environment stimuli. The adoption of the cognitive architecture over the attentional model has potential to allow the emergence of behaviours usually associated to the consciousness in the simulated mobile robots. Further implementation under this model could potentially allow the agent to express sentience, selfawareness, self-consciousness, autonoetic consciousness, mineness and perspectivalness. By performing computation over an attentional space, the model also allows the ...

An Analysis of Capacities, Moral Hierarchies, and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Animal Rights Work

The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the pernicious impact that moral hierarchies have on our perception and subsequent treatment of non-human animals. Moral hierarchies in general are characterized by a dynamic in which one group is considered to be fundamentally superior to a lesser group. This thesis focuses specifically on the moral hierarchies that arise when humans are assumed to be superior to non-human animals in virtue of their advanced mental capabilities. The operative hypothesis of this thesis is essentially that moral hierarchies thwart the provision of justice to non-human animals in that they function as a justification for otherwise impermissible actions. When humans are assumed to be fundamentally superior to non-human animals then it becomes morally permissible for humans to kill non-human animals and utilize them as mere instrumentalities. This thesis is driven primarily by an in-depth analysis of the approaches to animal rights that are provided by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione. Each of these thinkers claim that they overcome anthropocentrism and provide approaches that preclude the establishment of a moral hierarchy. One of the major findings of this thesis, however, is that Singer and Regan offer approaches that remain highly anthropocentric despite the fact that each thinker claims that they have overcome anthropocentrism. The anthropocentrism persists in these respective approaches in that each thinkers gives humans Regan and Singer have different conceptions of the criteria that are required to afford a being moral worth, but they both give preference to beings that have the cognitive ability to form desires regarding the future.. As a result, a moral hierarchy emerges in which humans are regarded to be fundamentally superior. Francione, however, provides an approach that does not foster a moral hierarchy. Francione creates such an approach by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests in a consistent manner. Moreover, Francione argues that mere sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being eligible and subsequently receiving moral consideration. The upshot of this thesis is essentially that the moral treatment of animals is not compatible with the presence of a moral hierarchy. As a result, this thesis demonstrates that future approaches to animal rights must avoid the establishment of moral hierarchies. The research and analysis within this thesis demonstrates that this is not a possibility, however, unless all theories of justice that are to accommodate animals abandon the notion that cognition matters morally.

Why babies do not feel pain, or: How structure-derived functional interpretations can go wrong

The response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious perception. According to Key (2016), consciousness — and thus pain perception — depends on a neuronal correlate that has a “unique neural architecture” as realized in the human cortex. On the basis of the “bioengineering principle that structure determines function,” Key (2016) concludes that animal species such as fish, which lack the requisite cortex-like neuroanatomical structure, are unable to feel pain. This commentary argues that the relationship between brain structure and brain function is less straightforward than suggested in Key’s target article.