Certificateless ignatures: New schemes and security models

We present a study of security in certificateless signatures. We divide potential adversaries according to their attack power, and for the first time, three new kinds of adversaries are introduced into certificateless signatures. They are Normal Adversary, Strong Adversary and Super Adversary (ordered by their attack power). Combined with the known Type I Adversary and Type II Adversary in certificateless cryptography, we then define the security of certificateless signatures in different attack scenarios. Our new security models, together with others in the literature, provide a clear definition of the security in certificateless signatures. Two concrete schemes with different security levels are also proposed in this paper. The first scheme, which is proven secure (in the random oracle model) against Normal Type I and Super Type II adversaries, has the shortest signature length among all known certificateless signature schemes. The second scheme is secure (in the random oracle model) against Super Type I and Type II adversaries. Compared with another scheme that has a similar security level, our second scheme requires less operational cost but a little longer signature length. Two server-aided verification protocols are also proposed to reduce the verification cost on the verifier.

Computer Networks Security Models - A New Approach for Denial-of-Services Attacks Mitigation

Computer networks are a critical factor for the performance of a modern company. Managing networks is as important as managing any other aspect of the company’s performance and security. There are many tools and appliances for monitoring the traffic and analyzing the network flow security. They use different approaches and rely on a variety of characteristics of the network flows. Network researchers are still working on a common approach for security baselining that might enable early watch alerts. This research focuses on the network security models, particularly the Denial-of-Services (DoS) attacks mitigation, based on a network flow analysis using the flows measurements and the theory of Markov models. The content of the paper comprises the essentials of the author’s doctoral thesis.

Efficient Secure Computation for Real-world Settings and Security Models

Secure computation involves multiple parties computing a common function while keeping their inputs private, and is a growing field of cryptography due to its potential for maintaining privacy guarantees in real-world applications. However, current secure computation protocols are not yet efficient enough to be used in practice. We argue that this is due to much of the research effort being focused on generality rather than specificity. Namely, current research tends to focus on constructing and improving protocols for the strongest notions of security or for an arbitrary number of parties. However, in real-world deployments, these security notions are often too strong, or the number of parties running a protocol would be smaller. In this thesis we make several steps towards bridging the efficiency gap of secure computation by focusing on constructing efficient protocols for specific real-world settings and security models. In particular, we make the following four contributions: - We show an efficient (when amortized over multiple runs) maliciously secure two-party secure computation (2PC) protocol in the multiple-execution setting, where the same function is computed multiple times by the same pair of parties. - We improve the efficiency of 2PC protocols in the publicly verifiable covert security model, where a party can cheat with some probability but if it gets caught then the honest party obtains a certificate proving that the given party cheated. - We show how to optimize existing 2PC protocols when the function to be computed includes predicate checks on its inputs. - We demonstrate an efficient maliciously secure protocol in the three-party setting.

ASICS : authenticated key exchange security incorporating certification systems

Most security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority (CA) and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems (ASICS). We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting.

On the security of TLS renegotiation

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the most widely used security protocol on the Internet. It supports negotiation of a wide variety of cryptographic primitives through different cipher suites, various modes of client authentication, and additional features such as renegotiation. Despite its widespread use, only recently has the full TLS protocol been proven secure, and only the core cryptographic protocol with no additional features. These additional features have been the cause of several practical attacks on TLS. In 2009, Ray and Dispensa demonstrated how TLS renegotiation allows an attacker to splice together its own session with that of a victim, resulting in a man-in-the-middle attack on TLS-reliant applications such as HTTP. TLS was subsequently patched with two defence mechanisms for protection against this attack. We present the first formal treatment of renegotiation in secure channel establishment protocols. We add optional renegotiation to the authenticated and confidential channel establishment model of Jager et al., an adaptation of the Bellare--Rogaway authenticated key exchange model. We describe the attack of Ray and Dispensa on TLS within our model. We show generically that the proposed fixes for TLS offer good protection against renegotiation attacks, and give a simple new countermeasure that provides renegotiation security for TLS even in the face of stronger adversaries.

A framework for security analysis of key derivation functions

This paper presents a comprehensive formal security framework for key derivation functions (KDF). The major security goal for a KDF is to produce cryptographic keys from a private seed value where the derived cryptographic keys are indistinguishable from random binary strings. We form a framework of five security models for KDFs. This consists of four security models that we propose: Known Public Inputs Attack (KPM, KPS), Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack (CCM) and Adaptive Chosen Public Inputs Attack(CPM); and another security model, previously defined by Krawczyk [6], which we refer to as Adaptive Chosen Context Information Attack(CCS). These security models are simulated using an indistinguisibility game. In addition we prove the relationships between these five security models and analyse KDFs using the framework (in the random oracle model).

Dynamic global security-aware synthesis using System-C

A dynamic global security-aware synthesis flow using the SystemC language is presented. SystemC security models are first specified at the system or behavioural level using a library of SystemC behavioural descriptions which provide for the reuse and extension of security modules. At the core of the system is incorporated a global security-aware scheduling algorithm which allows for scheduling to a mixture of components of varying security level. The output from the scheduler is translated into annotated nets which are subsequently passed to allocation, optimisation and mapping tools for mapping into circuits. The synthesised circuits incorporate asynchronous secure power-balanced and fault-protected components. Results show that the approach offers robust implementations and efficient security/area trade-offs leading to significant improvements in turnover.

The nexus between cultural and mainstream perceptions of security

Mainstream security analyses and security models are discussed. The central argument is that the multi-dimensional conditions, which are considered by analysts as central to the security of all collectives, are not representative of all cultures. Therefore, mainstream models are not suitable for every security collective's cultural security requirements.

Toward a framework for cloud security

While the emergence of cloud computing has made it possible to rent information technology infrastructures on demand, it has also created new security challenges. The primary security concern is trusting data (or resources in general) on another organization’s system. This document seeks to examine the current state of security in cloud computing and presents a set of challenges to address the security needs of clouds. The end result is a framework to help the design and implementation of effective cloud security infrastructures.

Critical analysis and comparative study of security for networked RFID systems

The Radio frequency identification (RFID) system is a new technology which uses the open air to transmit information. RFID technology is one of the most promising technologies in the field of ubiquitous computing which is revolutionizing the supply chain. It has already been applied by many major retail chains such as Target, Wal-Mart, etc. The networked RFID system such as supply chain has very unique and special business needs which lead to special sets of RFID security requirements and security models. However, very little work has been done to analyze RFID security parameters in relation to networked RFID systems business needs. This paper presents a critical analysis of the networked application's security requirements in relation to their business needs. It then presents a comparative study of existing literature and the ability of various models to protect the security of the supply chain in a RFID deployment.

SecDSVL: a domain-specific visual language to support enterprise security modelling

Enterprise security management requires capturing different security and IT systems' details, analyzing and enforcing these security details, and improving employed security to meet new risks. Adopting structured models greatly helps in simplifying and organizing security specification and enforcement processes. However, existing security models are generally limited to specific security details and do not deliver a comprehensive security model. They also often do not have user-friendly notations, being complicated extensions of existing modeling languages (such as UML). In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive Security Domain Specific Visual Language (SecDSVL), which enables capturing of key security details to support enterprise systems security management process. We discuss our SecDSVL, tool support and the model-based enterprise security management approach it supports, give a usage example, and present evaluation experiments of SecDSVL.

Intelligent internet computing: applications and security systems

Intelligent Internet Computing (IIC) is emerging rapidly as an exciting new paradigm including pervasive, grid, and peer-to-peer computing to provide computing and communication services any time and anywhere. IIC paradigm foresees seamless integration of communicating and computational devices and applications embedded in all parts of our environment, from our physical selves, to our homes, our offices, our streets and so on. Although IIC presents exciting enabling opportunities, the benefits will only be realized if application and security issues can be appropriately addressed. This special issue is intended to foster the dissemination of state-of-the-art research in the area of IIC, including novel applications associated with its utilization, security systems and services, security models. We plan to publish high quality manuscripts, which cover the various practical applications and related security theories of IIC. The papers should not be submitted simultaneously for publication elsewhere. Submissions of high quality papers describing mature results or on-going work are invited. Selected high-quality papers from “the Eleventh IEEE International Conference on High Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC-09) and the Third International Conference on Information Security and Assurance (ISA-09),” will be published in this special issue of Journal of Internet Technology on "Intelligent Internet Computing".

Predicate-based key exchange

We provide the first description of and security model for authenticated key exchange protocols with predicate-based authentication. In addition to the standard goal of session key security, our security model also provides for credential privacy: a participating party learns nothing more about the other party's credentials than whether they satisfy the given predicate. Our model also encompasses attribute-based key exchange since it is a special case of predicate-based key exchange.---------- We demonstrate how to realize a secure predicate-based key exchange protocol by combining any secure predicate-based signature scheme with the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, providing an efficient and simple solution.