What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew : Julius Mader and the Western secret services during the Cold War

Maddrell, John, 'What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: Julius Mader and Western Espionage during the Cold War', Cold War History (2005) 5(2) pp.235-258 RAE2008

Moneys received and paid for secret services of Charles II. and James II. from 30th March, 1679, to 25th December, 1688.

Mode of access: Internet.

National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 78/January 2015

This study provides a comparative analysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use of intelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notably how national security can be invoked to determine the classification of information and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings and whether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of law-compliant. The study finds that, in the majority of Member States under investigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectively adjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in ‘national security’ cases. The research also illustrates that the very term ‘national security’ is nebulously defined across the Member States analysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and “in accordance with the law” standards and a clear risk that the executive and secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that national and transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation need to be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountability and be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards.

The Scientist Who Came in from the Cold: Heinz Barwich's Flight from the GDR

Maddrell, John, 'The Scientist Who Came in from the Cold: Heinz Barwich's Flight from the GDR', Intelligence and National Security (2005) 20(4) pp.608-630 RAE2008

Lernende Organisationen - die Nachrichtendienste

Herausgeberwerk (Litzcke & Schuh): 1. Modewellen des Managements 2. Wohin die Reise geht - Folgen des Wertewandels für die Führungskräfteentwicklung 3. Umgang mit Veränderungen - Psychologie für ein erfolgreiches Changemanagement 4. Weiterentwicklung des öffentlichen Dienstes durch Evaluation 5. Qualiätsmanagement im Bundesnachrichtendienst 6. Unternehmen BfV - Realität oder Trugschluss?

Surveillance and data retention in Poland

The object of analysis in the present text is the issue of operational control and data retention in Poland. The analysis of this issue follows from a critical stance taken by NGOs and state institutions on the scope of operational control wielded by the Polish police and special services – it concerns, in particular, the employment of “itemized phone bills and the so-called phone tapping.” Besides the quantitative analysis of operational control and the scope of data retention, the text features the conclusions of the Human Rights Defender referred to the Constitutional Tribunal in 2011. It must be noted that the main problems concerned with the employment of operational control and data retention are caused by: (1) a lack of specification of technical means which can be used by individual services; (2) a lack of specification of what kind of information and evidence is in question; (3) an open catalogue of information and evidence which can be clandestinely acquired in an operational mode. Furthermore, with regard to the access granted to teleinformation data by the Telecommunications Act, attention should be drawn to a wide array of data submitted to particular services. Also, the text draws on the so-called open interviews conducted mainly with former police officers with a view to pointing to some non-formal reasons for “phone tapping” in Poland. This comes in the form of a summary.

Privacy in the Post-NSA Era: Time for a Fundamental Revision?

Big Brother Watch and others have filed a complaint against the United Kingdom under the European Convention on Human Rights about a violation of Article 8, the right to privacy. It regards the NSA affair and UK-based surveillance activities operated by secret services. The question is whether it will be declared admissible and, if so, whether the European Court of Human Rights will find a violation. This article discusses three possible challenges for these types of complaints and analyses whether the current privacy paradigm is still adequate in view of the development known as Big Data.

The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study. OSW Point of View Number 42, May 2014

The Crimean operation has served as an occasion for Russia to demonstrate to the entire world the capabilities and the potential of information warfare. Its goal is to use difficult to detect methods to subordinate the elites and societies in other countries by making use of various kinds of secret and overt channels (secret services, diplomacy and the media), psychological impact, and ideological and political sabotage. Russian politicians and journalists have argued that information battles are necessary for “the Russian/Eurasian civilisation” to counteract “informational aggression from the Atlantic civilisation led by the USA”. This argument from the arsenal of applied geopolitics has been used for years. This text is an attempt to provide an interpretation of information warfare with the background of Russian geopolitical theory and practice.

The Kharkiv oblast: a fragile stability. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 172/03.06.2015

Kharkiv oblast, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the Donbas region, and which shares a 315-km stretch of Ukraine’s border with Russia, was one of the regions where attempts were made to kindle separatist sentiments during the spring of last year. Some central government buildings were briefly occupied by pro-Russian demonstrators who declared a ‘Kharkov People’s Republic’, but efficient countermeasures by the Ukrainian institutions of force quickly calmed the situation in the region. However, the oblast still remains a target for acts of sabotage, which are probably directed by Russian secret services. Nevertheless, the situation in the region is now stable, both in terms of public sentiment and local politics. The main competitors in the arena of local politics are Hennadiy Kernes, the mayor of Kharkiv, and Arsen Avakov, the current head of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry. Despite many years of hostility, neither of the politicians appears to have initiated a power struggle as yet – Kernes retains his influence on the city council, and Avakov controls the local security services.

Prevention of information harvesting in a cloud services environment

We consider a cloud data storage involving three entities, the cloud customer, the cloud business centre which provides services, and the cloud data storage centre. Data stored in the data storage centre comes from a variety of customers and some of these customers may compete with each other in the market place or may own data which comprises confidential information about their own clients. Cloud staff have access to data in the data storage centre which could be used to steal identities or to compromise cloud customers. In this paper, we provide an efficient method of data storage which prevents staff from accessing data which can be abused as described above. We also suggest a method of securing access to data which requires more than one staff member to access it at any given time. This ensures that, in case of a dispute, a staff member always has a witness to the fact that she accessed data.

Brother secret, sister silence: Sibling conspiracies against managerial integrity

I offer a new cartography of ethical resistance. I argue that there is an uncharted interaction between managerial secrecy and organizational silence, which may exponentially increase the incidence of corruption in ways not yet understood. Current methods used to raise levels of moral conduct in business and government practice appear blind to this powerful duo. Extensive literature reviews of secrecy and silence scholarships form the background for an early stage conceptual layout of the co-production of secrecy and silence.

Technical Services vs. Public Service

Regarding this issue, it seems appropriate to quote Gorman who says: And it came to pass that when Kutta, assistant God made the first library, she noted that it was good. So he called together all librarians and divided as a shepherd divides the sheep and goats. The first group spoke to him saying: you will dwell in the clarity and serve the readers and their glory will be great. Then he turned to the second group and spoke to him saying: you will dwell in the darkness. Secret must be hidden effort and work. You do not know the reader nor shall you know them. Go away and sort ... and has been up to these days (1979, p. 435).

Espionage against Poland in the Documents and Analyses of the Polish Special Services (1944 - 1989) - as Illustrated by the Intelligence Activities of the USA

The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security Service and the Citizens’ Militia. The text tackles the following issues: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination?, (2) what was the level of interest of the foreign intelligence services in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland? 1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946-1956 witnessed a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin’s system, which only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespective of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist authorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fighting with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-political reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied assessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This excessive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provisions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin’s period the judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through intensive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Penal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction (the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of the State’s recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code. 2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became focused on science and technology of the People’s Republic of Poland. The acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing significance of the “Solidarity” social movement. 3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Poland was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for espionage in the years 1944-1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary diplomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned with “secret service methods of the intelligence activity” as well as in the documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occupied the second place (the so-called Group “B”) on the three-point scale. The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases took place in the 1950s). The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based on selected sources, which has limited the research scope - however, it was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted for espionage in the period 1944-1989, as the available quantitative data, mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have been pointed out in the text.