Sentencing and dispositions of youth DUI and other alcohol offenses: a guide for judges and prosecutors.

Mode of access: Internet.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

The New EU Criminal Law Competence in Action: The Proposal for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse the proposed Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (COM(2011)654 final), which represents the first exercise of the European Union competence provided for by Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposal aims at harmonising the sanctioning regimes provided by the Member States for market abuse, imposing the introduction of criminal sanctions and providing an opportunity to critically reflect on the position taken by the Commission towards the use of criminal law. The paper will discuss briefly the evolution of the EU’s criminal law competence, focusing on the Lisbon Treaty. It will analyse the ‘essentiality standard’ for the harmonisation of criminal law included in Article 83(2) TFEU, concluding that this standard encompasses both the subsidiarity and the ultima ratio principles and implies important practical consequences for the Union’s legislator. The research will then focus on the proposed Directive, trying to assess if the Union’s legislator, notwithstanding the ‘symbolic’ function of this proposal in the financial crisis, provides consistent arguments on the respect of the ‘essentiality standard’. The paper will note that the proposal raises some concerns, because of the lack of a clear reliance on empirical data regarding the essential need for the introduction of criminal law provisions. It will be stressed that only the assessment of the essential need of an EU action, according to the standard set in Article 83(2) TFEU, can guarantee a coherent choice of the areas interested by the harmonisation process, preventing the legislator to choose on the basis of other grounds.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

DWI sanctions: the law and the practice.

Mode of access: Internet.

Traffic law sanctions. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Traffic law sanctions. Executive summary. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington, D.C.

Mandatory traffic law sanctions.

Mode of access: Internet.

Immigration reform : status of employer sanctions after second year and plans for third year : statement of Arnold P. Jones, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division, before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives /

"May 17,1989."

Order supported by law : the enforcement of norms in virtual communities

As online social spaces continue to grow in importance, the complex relationship between users and the private providers of the platforms continues to raise increasingly difficult questions about legitimacy in online governance. This article examines two issues that go to the core of egitimate governance in online communities: how are rules enforced and punishments imposed, and how should the law support legitimate governance and protect participants from the illegitimate exercise of power? Because the rules of online communities are generally ultimately backed by contractual terms of service, the imposition of punishment for the breach of internal rules exists in a difficult conceptual gap between criminal law and the predominantly compensatory remedies of contractual doctrine. When theorists have addressed the need for the rules of virtual communities to be enforced, a dichotomy has generally emerged between the appropriate role of criminal law for 'real' crimes, and the private, internal resolution of 'virtual' or 'fantasy' crimes. In this structure, the punitive effect of internal measures is downplayed and the harm that can be caused to participants by internal sanctions is systemically undervalued.

Removing barriers to protection at the exported border : visas, carrier sanctions, and international obligation

Asylum is being gradually denuded of the national institutional mechanisms (judicial, legislative and administrative) that provide the framework for a fair and effective asylum hearing. In this sense, there is an ongoing ‘denationalization’ or ‘deformalization’ of the asylum process. This chapter critically examines one of the linchpins of this trend: the erection of pre-entry measures at ports of embarkation in order to prevent asylum seekers from physically accessing the territory of the state. Pre-entry measures comprise the core requirement that foreigners possess an entry visa granting permission to enter the state of destination. Visa requirements are increasingly implemented by immigration officials posted abroad or by officials of transit countries pursuant to bilateral agreements (so-called ‘juxtaposed’ immigration controls). Private carriers, which are subject to sanctions if they bring persons to a country who do not have permission to enter, also engage in a form of de facto immigration control on behalf of states. These measures constitute a type of ‘externalized’ or ‘exported’ border that pushes the immigration boundaries of the state as far from its physical boundaries as possible. Pre-entry measures have a crippling impact on the ability of asylum seekers to access the territory of states to claim asylum. In effect, states have ‘externalized’ asylum by replacing the legal obligation on states to protect refugees arriving at ports of entry with what are perceived to be no more than moral obligations towards asylum seekers arriving at the external border of the state.

The legitimacy of graduated response schemes in copyright law

In an attempt to curb online copyright infringement, copyright owners are increasingly seeking to enlist the assistance of Internet Service Providers (‘ISPs’) to enforce copyright and impose sanctions on their users.1 Commonly termed ‘graduated response’ schemes, these measures generally require that the ISP take some action against users suspected of infringing copyright, ranging from issuing warnings, to collating allegations made against subscribers and reporting to copyright owners, to suspension and eventual termination of service.

Chinese driver perceptions about speeding and traffic law enforcement

The World Health Organisation has highlighted the urgent need to address the escalating global public health crisis associated with road trauma. Low-income and middle-income countries bear the brunt of this, and rapid increases in private vehicle ownership in these nations present new challenges to authorities, citizens, and researchers alike. The role of human factors in the road safety equation is high. In China, human factors have been implicated in more than 90% of road crashes, with speeding identified as the primary cause (Wang, 2003). However, research investigating the factors that influence driving speeds in China is lacking (WHO, 2004). To help address this gap, we present qualitative findings from group interviews conducted with 35 Beijing car drivers in 2008. Some themes arising from data analysis showed strong similarities with findings from highly-motorised nations (e.g., UK, USA, and Australia) and include issues such as driver definitions of ‘speeding’ that appear to be aligned with legislative enforcement tolerances, factors relating to ease/difficulty of speed limit compliance, and the modifying influence of speed cameras. However, unique differences were evident, some of which, to our knowledge, are previously unreported in research literature. Themes included issues relating to an expressed lack of understanding about why speed limits are necessary and a perceived lack of transparency in traffic law enforcement and use of associated revenue. The perception of an unfair system seemed related to issues such as differential treatment of certain drivers and the large amount of individual discretion available to traffic police when administering sanctions. Additionally, a wide range of strategies to overtly avoid detection for speeding and/or the associated sanctions were reported. These strategies included the use of in-vehicle speed camera detectors, covering or removing vehicle licence number plates, and using personal networks of influential people to reduce or cancel a sanction. These findings have implications for traffic law, law enforcement, driver training, and public education in China. While not representative of all Beijing drivers, we believe that these research findings offer unique insights into driver behaviour in China.