Development of Rouble Exchange Rate in Russia

This 45th volume deals with the development of the Russian rouble, which suffered a severe depreciation crisis in 1998. In the aftermath of this event, a strong investment boom started in Russia. The new devalued rouble exchange rate gave price competitiveness to local industry. In addition to that, increasing export prices of Russian oil and natural gas deliveries have contributed to economic growth lately. Amid this boom period, inflationary pressure has remained high. Price increases have been higher than in the EU, Russia’s main trading partner. However, rouble/euro exchange rate has remained nominally rather stable in the current decade. This means, that rouble appreciates against euro in real terms, which is weakening Russia’s international competitiveness.

Development of Rouble Exchange Rate in Russia

NORDIn julkaisu 45 käsittelee ruplan kehitystä. Vuonna 1998 rupla kärsi rajusta rahanarvon alenemisesta, minkä jälkiseuraksena investointi alkoi Venäjällä kasvaa. Uusi devalvoitu ruplan vaihtokurssi toi hintakilpailykykyä paikalliselle teollisuudelle. Tämän lisäksi Venäjän öljyn vientihintojen nousu ja maakaasujakelu ovat edesauttaneet taloudellista kasvua viime aikoina. Tämän noususuhdanteen vallitessa inflaatiopaine on pysynyt korkealla. Hinnannousut ovat olleet korkeampia kuinEU:ssa, Venäjän pääkauppakumppanilla. Kuitenkin, ruplan/euron vaihtokurssit ovat pysyneet nimellisesti melko vakaina tällä vuosikymmenellä. Tämä tarkoittaa, että todellisuudessa rupla vahvistuu euroa vastaan, mikä heikentää Venäjän kansainvälistä kilpailykykyä.

Distribution systems of the food sector in Russia: the perspective of Finnish food industry

Finnish food producers' trade with Russia has experienced profound changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the distribution systems of foodstuffs have changed remarkably. This study sheds some light into these changes and analyses the current situation in distribution systems of foodstuffs in Russia. In addition, the study discusses the possibilities of Finnish food producers to get more of their products to the shelves of Russian food retail stores. Before the 1998 financial crisis, the import of foreign foodstuffs was booming in Russia due to the overvalued rouble. As a result of the financial crisis, food import collapsed. The export of Finnish foodstuffs to Russia has been slowly recovering during the past few years, but in the most important product categories the pre-crisis levels have so far not been reached and maybe will not be reached. In certain product categories the growth has been only marginal. It seems that starting localproduction will become increasingly important in the future. This is further encouraged by the fact that Russian consumers favour domestic food products. Russian consumers are very price conscious and demand quality in food products. The perceived price-quality ratio is an important criterion in the purchase decision.The majority of foodstuff retail is still conducted via unorganised forms of trade (e.g. kiosks and marketplaces) but modern retail chains are developing at a fast pace in Russia. They are also expected to dominate the retail trade in foodstuffs over the unorganised forms of trade in the future. This will change the distribution systems as well. The retail chains are trying to shorten the distribution chain, similarly to what has been seen in the Western countries. This together with the strengthening of retail chains is likely to shrink the role of wholesalers, as the chains increasingly want to work directly with the producers. Many large retail chains are acquiring or have already acquired a distribution centre or centres in order to boost efficiency and control the flow of products. The strengthening of the retail chains also gives them power in negotiations, which the producers and distributors have to adjust to. For example store entry fees and retail chains' own private label products pose challenges to the food producers. In the food production sector the competition is fierce, as large Russianand foreign producers want to ensure their piece of the market. The largest producers utilise their size: they invest in big marketing campaigns and are willing to pay high entry fees to retail chains in order to secure a place on the store shelves and to build a strong brand in Russia. This complicates the situation from the viewpoint of small producers. Currently, the most popular type of distribution system among the interviewed Finnish food producers is based on a network of local distributors. There is, however, a strong consensus on the importanceof starting local production in order to be a serious actor in Russia in the future. Factors that hinder the starting of local production include the lack of local infrastructure and qualified staff, and the low risk tolerance of Finnish firms. Major barriers for entry in Russia are the actions of authorities, fierce competition, fragmented market and Finnish producers' heavy production costs. The suggested strategies for increasing the market share include focusing geographically or segment-wise, introducing new products, starting local production, andcooperation between Finnish producers. Smallness was one reason why Finnish producers had to cut down their operations in Russia due to the 1998 crisis. Smaller producers had fewer resources to tolerate losses during the period of crisis. Smallness is reflected also on trade negotiations with retail chains and distributors. It makes it harder to cope with the store entry fees and to differentiatefrom the mass of products propped up by expensive advertising. Finally, it makes it harder for Finnish producers to start or expand local production, as it is more difficult for a small producer to get financing and to tolerate the increased risks. Compensating for the smallness might become the crucial factor determining the future success of Finnish food producers in the Russian market.

Formation of Exchange Rates on the Russian Market: Dynamics and Modelling

Galina Kovaleva. The Formation of the Exchange Rate on the Russian Market: Dynamics and Modelling. The Russian financial market is fast becoming one of the major sectors of the Russian economy. Assets have been increasing steadily, while new market segments and new financial market instruments have emerged. Kovaleva attempted to isolate the factors influencing exchange rates, determine patterns in the dynamic changes to the rouble/dollar exchange rate, construct models of the processes, and on the basis of these activities make forecasts. She studied the significance of economic indicators influencing the rouble/dollar exchange rate at different times, and developed multi-factor econometric models. In order to reveal the inner structure of the financial indicators and to work out ex-post forecasts for different time intervals, she carried out a series of calculations with the aim of constructing trend-cyclical (TC) and harmonic models, and Box and Jenkins models. She found that: 1. The Russian financial market is dependant on the rouble/dollar exchange rate. Its dynamics are formed under the influence of the short-term state treasury notes and government bonds markets, interbank loans, the rouble/DM exchange rate, the inflation rate, and the DM/dollar exchange rate. The exchange rate is influenced by sales on the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange and the mechanism of those sales. 2. The TC model makes it possible to conduct an in-depth study of the structure of the processes and to make forecasts of the dynamic changes to currency indicators. 3. The Russian market is increasingly influenced by the world currency market and its prospects are of crucial interest for the world financial community.

On the verge of crisis? Mounting economic problems in Belarus. OSW Commentary No. 51, 2011-04-06

Belarus’s financial condition has visibly worsened since the beginning of this year. The severe falls in the country’s foreign currency reserves and its shortage of foreign currency on the international market pose an increasing threat to the stability of the Belarusian economy. Fearing an outbreak of public dissatisfaction, The government has so far been trying to avoid devaluing the rouble or structural economic reforms. Maintaining full control inside the country and the stability of the authoritarian regime are still the main concerns for President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. For this reason, the actions taken by the Belarusian government have been limited to imposing short-term administrative restrictions on the foreign currency market and obtaining external support in the form of loans. Given Belarus’s falling creditworthiness, Minsk is only able to ask Russia for financial support, thus offering the Kremlin more opportunities to realise its desire to take over strategic industrial plants in Belarus. However, the present economic problems of Belarus are so serious that no loan will be able to safeguard its government from the need of carrying out serious economic reforms.

The Russian economy under Putin: Growth factors and impediments to economic development. OSW Study 20/2005

After a dramatic economic decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial breakdown of 1998, the Russian economy has begun to emerge from its deep crisis. The years 1999-2004 were a period of dynamic development in all sectors of Russian economy, and saw a rapid growth in GDP of over 7 per cent per year. Russia owed the excellent macroeconomic results of that period to a combination of favourable factors. The key factors were: high hydrocarbon prices on the global markets; an increase in Russia's international competitiveness thanks to the "rouble devaluation effect" (following the 1998 financial crash); and the market reforms carried out within that period. In 2004, despite very high oil and gas prices on world markets, a slowdown of the GDP growth took place. Even though the economy is still developing fairly rapidly, we are able to say that Russia is exhausting those traditional mechanisms (apart from oil and gas prices) which have hitherto stimulated GDP growth. Moreover, there are no new mechanisms which could replace the old ones. In the longer term, these unsolved structural problems may seriously impede Russia's economic growth.

Is a Concordat over Ukraine now conceivable with Mishka the bear? CEPS Commentary, 21 December 2014

With the tumultuous year of ever-changing episodes in Ukraine coming to a close – from Yanukovich reneging at Vilnius last November, to the new Maidan, to Yanukovich fleeing for his life, to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursions into the eastern Donbass, the election of pro-European President Poroshenko, the war with over 4,000 dead, the election of a new pro-European parliament and now the crash of the rouble – Michael Emerson sees at last a possible the end-game in sight. In this commentary, he sketches the essential elements of a Concordat to be struck between Russia, Ukraine and the West that would allow the eastern Donbass to be drawn into more normal processes of political and economic negotiation and the badly wounded Russia to gradually return to more normal international relations.

How to get out of the crisis without reforms? The Belarusian authorities confront growing economic problems. OSW Commentary NUMBER 202/21.03.2016

2015 saw a drop in Belarus’s GDP for the first time in almost 20 years, which is primarily the result of a significant reduction in levels of production and export. As a consequence, there was also a serious depletion of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, as well as a progressive weakening of the Belarusian rouble. The macroeconomic figures from January and February 2016 show that these trends are not only continuing, but they are also becoming even more severe, which confirms that Belarus now finds itself in a prolonged economic crisis. On one hand, the reason for this state of affairs is the protracted economic recession in Russia, which is Belarus’s main economic partner, together with the drastic global decline in prices for fuel, which is a key Belarusian export. On the other hand, meanwhile, an equally important reason for the current crisis is the failure of the Belarusian economic model. President Aleksandr Lukashenko, out of fear that his authoritarian system of government will be dismantled and that public discontent will rise, has categorically rejected the proposals for even partial reforms put forward by some of his entourage, who are aware of the need for the immediate transformation of the country’s anachronistic and very costly economic model, based as it still is on quasi-Soviet management policies.