The Stability of the Roommate Problem Revisited

The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be applied to find predictable matchings. We propose the absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution, which always exists, either gives the matchings in the core or predicts some other matchings when the core is empty. Furthermore, it satisfies an interesting property of outer stability. We also characterize the absorbing sets, determine their number and, in case of multiplicity, we find that they all share a similar structure.

A new solution for the roommate problem: The Q-stable matchings

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2])and maximum stable matchings (Ta [30] [32]). We find that almost stable matchings are incompatible with the other two solutions. Hence, to solve the roommate problem we propose matchings that lie at the intersection of the maximum irreversible matchings and maximum stable matchings, which are called Q-stable matchings. These matchings are core consistent and we offer an effi cient algorithm for computing one of them. The outcome of the algorithm belongs to an absorbing set.

Essays on the Axiomatic Theory of Matching

This dissertation mimics the Turkish college admission procedure. It started with the purpose to reduce the inefficiencies in Turkish market. For this purpose, we propose a mechanism under a new market structure; as we prefer to call, semi-centralization. In chapter 1, we give a brief summary of Matching Theory. We present the first examples in Matching history with the most general papers and mechanisms. In chapter 2, we propose our mechanism. In real life application, that is in Turkish university placements, the mechanism reduces the inefficiencies of the current system. The success of the mechanism depends on the preference profile. It is easy to show that under complete information the mechanism implements the full set of stable matchings for a given profile. In chapter 3, we refine our basic mechanism. The modification on the mechanism has a crucial effect on the results. The new mechanism is, as we call, a middle mechanism. In one of the subdomain, this mechanism coincides with the original basic mechanism. But, in the other partition, it gives the same results with Gale and Shapley's algorithm. In chapter 4, we apply our basic mechanism to well known Roommate Problem. Since the roommate problem is in one-sided game patern, firstly we propose an auxiliary function to convert the game semi centralized two-sided game, because our basic mechanism is designed for this framework. We show that this process is succesful in finding a stable matching in the existence of stability. We also show that our mechanism easily and simply tells us if a profile lacks of stability by using purified orderings. Finally, we show a method to find all the stable matching in the existence of multi stability. The method is simply to run the mechanism for all of the top agents in the social preference.

An Efficient and Verifiable Solution to the Millionaire Problem

A new solution to the millionaire problem is designed on the base of two new techniques: zero test and batch equation. Zero test is a technique used to test whether one or more ciphertext contains a zero without revealing other information. Batch equation is a technique used to test equality of multiple integers. Combination of these two techniques produces the only known solution to the millionaire problem that is correct, private, publicly verifiable and efficient at the same time.

Finding order in chaos : a problem based collaborative assignment for 1300 students across 19 disciplines

The use of collaborative assignments for assessment is a risky undertaking for students and course designers. Yet the benefits, in terms of core learning outcomes, competencies, collaborative sense making and student involvement, suggest that the effort is worthwhile. Formal descriptions and rules do little to ameliorate the perception of risk and increased anxiety by students. (Ryan, 2007). BEB100 Introducing Professional Learning is a faculty-wide foundation unit with over 1300 students from 19 disciplines across the Faculty of the Built Environment and Engineering (“BEE”) at the Queensland University of Technology (“QUT”), Brisbane, Australia. Finding order in chaos outlines the approach and justification, assessment criteria, learning resources, teamwork tools, tutorial management, communication strategies, 2007-09 Student Learning Experience Survey results, annual improvements, findings and outcomes.