Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

Revealed Preference and Choice under Uncertainty

We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable choices from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some underlying decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific theory of choice, our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover the various decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild dominance property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to rationalizability per se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability in the presence of dominance.

Revealed cardinal preference

I prove that as long as we allow the marginal utility for money (lambda) to vary between purchases (similarly to the budget) then the quasi-linear and the ordinal budget-constrained models rationalize the same data. However, we know that lambda is approximately constant. I provide a simple constructive proof for the necessary and sufficient condition for the constant lambda rationalization, which I argue should replace the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference in empirical studies of consumer behavior. 'Go Cardinals!' It is the minimal requirement of any scientifi c theory that it is consistent with the data it is trying to explain. In the case of (Hicksian) consumer theory it was revealed preference -introduced by Samuelson (1938,1948) - that provided an empirical test to satisfy this need. At that time most of economic reasoning was done in terms of a competitive general equilibrium, a concept abstract enough so that it can be built on the ordinal preferences over baskets of goods - even if the extremely specialized ones of Arrow and Debreu. However, starting in the sixties, economics has moved beyond the 'invisible hand' explanation of how -even competitive- markets operate. A seemingly unavoidable step of this 'revolution' was that ever since, most economic research has been carried out in a partial equilibrium context. Now, the partial equilibrium approach does not mean that the rest of the markets are ignored, rather that they are held constant. In other words, there is a special commodity -call it money - that reflects the trade-offs of moving purchasing power across markets. As a result, the basic building block of consumer behavior in partial equilibrium is no longer the consumer's preferences over goods, rather her valuation of them, in terms of money. This new paradigm necessitates a new theory of revealed preference.

Optimal choice of electoral preference data

Electoral researchers are so much accustomed to analyzing the choice of the single most preferred party as the left-hand side variable of their models of electoral behavior that they often ignore revealed preference data. Drawing on random utility theory, their models predict electoral behavior at the extensive margin of choice. Since the seminal work of Luce and others on individual choice behavior, however, many social science disciplines (consumer research, labor market research, travel demand, etc.) have extended their inventory of observed preference data with, for instance, multiple paired comparisons, complete or incomplete rankings, and multiple ratings. Eliciting (voter) preferences using these procedures and applying appropriate choice models is known to considerably increase the efficiency of estimates of causal factors in models of (electoral) behavior. In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency gain when adding additional preference information to first preferences, up to full ranking data. We do so for multi-party systems of different sizes. We use simulation studies as well as empirical data from the 1972 German election study. Comparing the practical considerations for using ranking and single preference data results in suggestions for choice of measurement instruments in different multi-candidate and multi-party settings.

Linking policies for biodiversity conservation with advances in behavioural economics

Global biodiversity loss and its consequences for human welfare and sustainable development have become major concerns. Economists have, therefore, given increasing attention to the policy issues involved in the management of genetic resources. To do so, they often apply empirical methods developed in behavioral and experimental economics to estimate economic values placed on genetic resources. This trend away from almost exclusive dependence on axiomatic methods is welcomed. However, major valuation methods used in behavioral economics raise new scientific challenges. Possibly the most important of these include deficiencies in the knowledge of the public (and researchers) about genetic resources, implications for the formation of values of supplying information to focal individuals, and limits to rationality. These issues are explored for stated-preference techniques of valuation (e.g., contingent valuation) as well as revealed preference techniques, especially the travel cost method. They are illustrated by Australian and Asian examples. Taking into account behavioral and psychological models and empirical evidence, particular attention is given to how elicitation of preferences, and supply of information to individuals, influences their preferences about biodiversity. Policy consequences are outlined.

Choosing on Influence

Interaction, the act of mutual influence between two or more individuals, is an essential part of daily life and economic decisions. Yet, micro-foundations of interaction are unexplored. This paper presents a first attempt to this purpose. We study a decision procedure for interacting agents. According to our model, interaction occurs since individuals seek influence for those issues that they cannot solve on their own. Following a choice-theoretic approach, we provide simple properties that aid to detect interacting individuals. In this case, revealed preference analysis not only grants the underlying preferences but also the influence acquired. Our baseline model is based on two interacting individuals, though we extend the analysis to multi-individual environments.

A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

On the complexity of rationalizing behavior

We study the complexity of rationalizing choice behavior. We do so by analyzing two polar cases, and a number of intermediate ones. In our most structured case, that is where choice behavior is defined in universal choice domains and satisfies the "weak axiom of revealed preference," finding the complete preorder rationalizing choice behavior is a simple matter. In the polar case, where no restriction whatsoever is imposed, either on choice behavior or on choice domain, finding the complete preordersthat rationalize behavior turns out to be intractable. We show that the task of finding the rationalizing complete preorders is equivalent to a graph problem. This allows the search for existing algorithms in the graph theory literature, for the rationalization of choice.

Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

Single-basined choice

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of single-basinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequenes of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent. Journal of Economic Literature.

Analyse en identification partielle de la décision d'émigrer des étudiants africains

La migration internationale d’étudiants est un investissement couteux pour les familles dans beaucoup de pays en voie de développement. Cependant, cet investissement est susceptible de générer des bénéfices financiers et sociaux relativement importants aux investisseurs, tout autant que des externalités pour d’autres membres de la famille. Cette thèse s’intéresse à deux aspects importants de la migration des étudiants internationaux : (i) Qui part? Quels sont les déterminants de la probabilité de migration? (ii) Qui paie? Comment la famille s’organise-t-elle pour couvrir les frais de la migration? (iii) Qui y gagne? Ce flux migratoire est-il au bénéfice du pays d’origine? Entreprendre une telle étude met le chercheur en face de défis importants, notamment, l’absence de données complètes et fiables; la dispersion géographique des étudiants migrants en étant la cause première. La première contribution importante de ce travail est le développement d’une méthode de sondage en « boule de neige » pour des populations difficiles à atteindre, ainsi que d’estimateurs corrigeant les possibles biais de sélection. A partir de cette méthodologie, j’ai collecté des données incluant simultanément des étudiants migrants et non-migrants du Cameroun en utilisant une plateforme internet. Un second défi relativement bien documenté est la présence d’endogénéité du choix d’éducation. Nous tirons avantage des récents développements théoriques dans le traitement des problèmes d’identification dans les modèles de choix discrets pour résoudre cette difficulté, tout en conservant la simplicité des hypothèses nécessaires. Ce travail constitue l’une des premières applications de cette méthodologie à des questions de développement. Le premier chapitre de la thèse étudie la décision prise par la famille d’investir dans la migration étudiante. Il propose un modèle structurel empirique de choix discret qui reflète à la fois le rendement brut de la migration et la contrainte budgétaire liée au problème de choix des agents. Nos résultats démontrent que le choix du niveau final d’éducation, les résultats académiques et l’aide de la famille sont des déterminants importants de la probabilité d’émigrer, au contraire du genre qui ne semble pas affecter très significativement la décision familiale. Le second chapitre s’efforce de comprendre comment les agents décident de leur participation à la décision de migration et comment la famille partage les profits et décourage le phénomène de « passagers clandestins ». D’autres résultats dans la littérature sur l’identification partielle nous permettent de considérer des comportements stratégiques au sein de l’unité familiale. Les premières estimations suggèrent que le modèle « unitaire », où un agent représentatif maximise l’utilité familiale ne convient qu’aux familles composées des parents et de l’enfant. Les aidants extérieurs subissent un cout strictement positif pour leur participation, ce qui décourage leur implication. Les obligations familiales et sociales semblent expliquer les cas de participation d’un aidant, mieux qu’un possible altruisme de ces derniers. Finalement, le troisième chapitre présente le cadre théorique plus général dans lequel s’imbriquent les modèles développés dans les précédents chapitres. Les méthodes d’identification et d’inférence présentées sont spécialisées aux jeux finis avec information complète. Avec mes co-auteurs, nous proposons notamment une procédure combinatoire pour une implémentation efficace du bootstrap aux fins d’inférences dans les modèles cités ci-dessus. Nous en faisons une application sur les déterminants du choix familial de soins à long terme pour des parents âgés.

A simple model of two-stage choice

I provide choice-theoretic foundations for a simple two-stage model, called transitive shortlist methods, where choices are made by sequentially by applying a pair of transitive preferences (or rationales) to eliminate inferior alternatives. Despite its simplicity, the model accommodates a wide range of choice phenomena including the status quo bias, framing, homophily, compromise, and limited willpower. I establish that the model can be succinctly characterized in terms of some well-documented context effects in choice. I also show that the underlying rationales are straightforward to determine from readily observable reversals in choice. Finally, I highlight the usefulness of these results in a variety of applications.

Estudiar economía y racionalidad: un experimento

En este documento se lleva a cabo el mismo experimento realizado por Harbaugh et al. (2001) usando como sujetos en el experimento a estudiantes de economía, ciencias políticas y medicina, quienes tienen una fuerte, mediana y nula formación en economía. El objetivo es encontrar violaciones al axioma débil de preferencia revelada (ADPR) y medir la magnitud de las violaciones mediante el calculo del índice de Afriat. Después de la evaluación de los resultados del experimento encontramos que un entrenamiento exhaustivo y medio en economía genera básicamente los mismos resultados en términos de la violación al ADPR, y que ningún entrenamiento en economía implica un considerable numero de decisiones erróneas en términos económicos.

Bayesian estimation of willingness-to-pay where respondents mis-report their preferences

We introduce a modified conditional logit model that takes account of uncertainty associated with mis-reporting in revealed preference experiments estimating willingness-to-pay (WTP). Like Hausman et al. [Journal of Econometrics (1988) Vol. 87, pp. 239-269], our model captures the extent and direction of uncertainty by respondents. Using a Bayesian methodology, we apply our model to a choice modelling (CM) data set examining UK consumer preferences for non-pesticide food. We compare the results of our model with the Hausman model. WTP estimates are produced for different groups of consumers and we find that modified estimates of WTP, that take account of mis-reporting, are substantially revised downwards. We find a significant proportion of respondents mis-reporting in favour of the non-pesticide option. Finally, with this data set, Bayes factors suggest that our model is preferred to the Hausman model.