Mental reinstatement and children's memory of a repeated event

The efficacy of mental reinstatement of context in facilitating six-year-old children's recall of one occurence of a repeated event was explored. Results demonstrated a beneficial effect of mental reinstatement of a unique contextual feature of one occurence of a repeated event on children's recall of details specific to that occurence.

Improving children's recall of an occurrence of a repeated event: is it a matter of helping them to generate options?

Three experiments were conducted to explore whether children's recall of an occurrence of a repeated event could be improved by encouraging them to consider various details that occurred across a series of events prior to making a judgement about which details were included in the target (to-be-recalled) occurrence. Experiment 1 explored whether children's recall of the target occurrence was better after the interviewer presented all the items from the series prior to the child identifying the final item. Experiment 2 explored whether having the children generate all the items facilitated their subsequent recall of the target occurrence. Finally, Experiment 3 directly compared the effectiveness of the above 2 procedures. Regardless of the children's age, the retention interval, or the type of item, children's capacity to identify which details were included in a target occurrence was enhanced when they were initially provided with all the possible details from the series of events. However, without relying on the interviewer to generate the options, the benefit of the technique was directly contingent on the children's ability to generate content details; this was a distinct source of difficulty for the children. Indeed, having children generate options had no beneficial effect on decisions about the temporal position of items unless performance was made conditional on the children's ability to remember the relevant details in the first place. The implications of the findings for the legal setting and for future research are discussed.

The effect of contextual cues on children`s ability to remember an occurence of a repeated event

Purpose. This study examined the usefulness of contextual cues in enhancing the accuracy of children's narrative accounts of an occurrence of a repeated event.

Method. Children aged 6 to 7 years took part in the same staged event four times whereby 16 target details varied in each occurrence (e.g. the colour of a cloak varied each time). Three days later, the children's free recall of the final occurrence was elicited. This occurrence was identified in one of two ways. Either it was identified via the temporal term 'last', or else the term 'last' was combined with a feature related to the environmental context or setting that was unique to the occurrence (i.e., the interviewer referred to a new object that was worn throughout the occurrence or a new person who carried out the event). For each condition, performance was compared to that of children who experienced the event only once.

Results. Children's memory of details specific to the target occurrence was better after the single than the repeated event. However for both event types, children who were given the contextual and temporal cue performed better than those who were given the temporal cue only. The benefit of using a contextual cue did not result in an increase in errors.

Conclusion. Contextual cues (generated by an interviewer) can facilitate children's recall of an occurrence of an event. However, further research needs to determine whether this finding would generalize to a more practical situation where the child (rather than the interviewer) generates the cues.

The consistency of false suggestions moderates children`s reports of a single instance of a repeated event: predicting increases and decreases in suggestibility.

Participants (6- and 7-year-olds, N = 130) participated in classroom activities four times. Children were interviewed about the final occurrence (target event) either 1 week or 4 weeks later, during which half of the event items were described inaccurately. Half of these suggestions were consistent with the theme of the detail across the occurrences (e.g., always sat on a kind of floor mat) or were inconsistent (e.g., sat on a chair). When memory for the target event was tested 1 day later, children falsely recognized fewer inconsistent suggestions than consistent suggestions, especially compared with a control group of children who experienced the event just one time. Furthermore, the longer delay reduced accuracy only for consistent suggestions. Source-monitoring ability was strongly and positively related to resistance to suggestions, and encouraging children to identify the source of false suggestions allowed them to retract a significant proportion of their reports of inconsistent suggestions but not of consistent suggestions. The results suggest that the gist consistency of suggestions determines whether event repetition increases or decreases suggestibility.

Mental context reinstatement increases resistance to false suggestions after children have experienced a repeated event

When children allege repeated abuse, they are required to provide details about specific instances. This often results in children confusing details from different instances, therefore the aim of this study was to examine whether mental context reinstatement (MCR) could be used to improve children’s accuracy. Children (N ¼ 120, 6–7-yearolds) participated in four activities over a 2-week period and were interviewed about the last (fourth) time with a standard recall or MCR interview. They were then asked questions about specific details, and some questions contained false information. When interviewed again 1 day later, children in the MCR condition resisted false suggestions that were consistent with the event more than false suggestions that were inconsistent; in contrast, children in the standard interview condition were equally suggestible for both false detail types and showed a yes bias. The results suggest a practical way of eliciting more accurate information from child witnesses.

How activation, entanglement, and searching a semantic network contribute to event memory

Free association norms indicate that words are organized into semantic/associative neighborhoods within a larger network of words and links that bind the net together. We present evidence indicating that memory for a recent word event can depend on implicitly and simultaneously activating related words in its neighborhood. Processing a word during encoding primes its network representation as a function of the density of the links in its neighborhood. Such priming increases recall and recognition and can have long lasting effects when the word is processed in working memory. Evidence for this phenomenon is reviewed in extralist cuing, primed free association, intralist cuing, and single-item recognition tasks. The findings also show that when a related word is presented to cue the recall of a studied word, the cue activates it in an array of related words that distract and reduce the probability of its selection. The activation of the semantic network produces priming benefits during encoding and search costs during retrieval. In extralist cuing recall is a negative function of cue-to-distracter strength and a positive function of neighborhood density, cue-to-target strength, and target-to cue strength. We show how four measures derived from the network can be combined and used to predict memory performance. These measures play different roles in different tasks indicating that the contribution of the semantic network varies with the context provided by the task. We evaluate spreading activation and quantum-like entanglement explanations for the priming effect produced by neighborhood density.

Event memory: A theory of memory for laboratory, autobiographical, and fictional events.

An event memory is a mental construction of a scene recalled as a single occurrence. It therefore requires the hippocampus and ventral visual stream needed for all scene construction. The construction need not come with a sense of reliving or be made by a participant in the event, and it can be a summary of occurrences from more than one encoding. The mental construction, or physical rendering, of any scene must be done from a specific location and time; this introduces a "self" located in space and time, which is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient, condition for a sense of reliving. We base our theory on scene construction rather than reliving because this allows the integration of many literatures and because there is more accumulated knowledge about scene construction's phenomenology, behavior, and neural basis. Event memory differs from episodic memory in that it does not conflate the independent dimensions of whether or not a memory is relived, is about the self, is recalled voluntarily, or is based on a single encoding with whether it is recalled as a single occurrence of a scene. Thus, we argue that event memory provides a clearer contrast to semantic memory, which also can be about the self, be recalled voluntarily, and be from a unique encoding; allows for a more comprehensive dimensional account of the structure of explicit memory; and better accounts for laboratory and real-world behavioral and neural results, including those from neuropsychology and neuroimaging, than does episodic memory.

Evidence of metacognitive awareness in young children who have experienced a repeated event

Two studies examined children's confidence judgments in the accuracy of their memories after repeated experience of an event. Children aged 5 to 6 years took part in an event once or four times, were provided with misinformation either shortly after (Study 1) or a while after (Study 2), and interviewed with yes/no recognition questions 3 months later. Children in the repeated-experience conditions were highly confident of their accurate responses to questions about items that were identical rather than variable across occurrences, and this discrimination was best at the shorter delay. The results show that children were able to metacognitively monitor the accuracy of their responses to qualitatively different kinds of details, and indicate that age is not the only determinant of metacognitive awareness after being misled. Rather, the nature of event representations must also be considered.

Retrieval of episodic versus generic information : does the order of recall affect the amount and accuracy of details reported by children about repeated events?

Children (N = 157) 4 to 8 years old participated 1 time (single) or 4 times (repeated) in an interactive event. Across each condition, half were questioned a week later about the only or a specific occurrence of the event (depth first) and then about what usually happens. Half were prompted in the reverse order (breadth first). Children with repeated experience who first were asked about what usually happens reported more eventrelated information overall than those asked about an occurrence first. All children used episodic language when describing an occurrence; however, children with repeated-event experience used episodic language less often when describing what usually happens than did those with a single experience. Accuracy rates did not differ between conditions. Implications for theories of repeated-event memory are discussed.

Children's memory of recurring events: is the first event always the best remembered?

Three experiments were conducted to examine the effect of age (4-5 and 6-8 years) and retention interval on children's ability to remember separate occurrences of a repeated event that varied in terms of content (items, dialog, etc.) Experiment 1 explored children's ability to recall the first versus last occurrence of a series of six events, at either one week or six weeks delay. Experiments 2 and 3 explored children's ability to identify the position of items in terms of their order of presentation within the series across two retention intervals. Overall, the results revealed clear age differences in children's performance. In general, the 6- to 8-year+old children performed better on all tasks than the 4- to 5-year-old children. Further, the older children showed relatively good memory of the first and last items compared to the middle items, although the last items were more likely to be forgotten or misplaced in the sequencing tasks over time that the first items. For the younger children, the patterns of results were sometimes but not always consistent with that of the older children The relevance and generalisability of these findings to the legal setting are discussed as well as directions for future research.

Developmental differences in the ability to provide temporal information about repeated events

Children (n=372) aged 4-8years participated in one or four occurrences of a similar event and were interviewed 1week later. Compared with 85% of children who participated once, less than 25% with repeated experience gave the exact number of times they participated, although all knew they participated more than once. Children with repeated experience were asked additional temporal questions, and there were clear developmental differences. Older children were more able than younger children to judge relative order and temporal position of the four occurrences. They also demonstrated improved temporal memory for the first and last relative to the middle occurrences, while younger children did so only for the first. This is the first systematic demonstration of children's memory for temporal information after a repeated event. We discuss implications for theories of temporal memory development and the practical implications of asking children to provide temporal information.

A qualitative examination of police officers' questioning of children about repeated events

For an offender to be convicted in relation to repeated child abuse, most jurisdictions require that each separate act be identified with reasonable precision with reference to time, place, or some other unique contextual detail (S v. R, 1989). The current study provided a qualitative examination of the way in which police officers assist children to identify and distinguish between occurrences of a repeated event. Field, as well as mock interviews (about an innocuous staged event) were examined, with child witnesses' ages ranging from 3 to 16 years. Overall, several problems in the questioning were highlighted. These included: over-reliance on specific questions, use of 'labels' for occurrences without inquiring as to whether these were unique, and frequent shifting of the focus between occurrences. The implications of these findings are discussed.