On the security of TLS renegotiation

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the most widely used security protocol on the Internet. It supports negotiation of a wide variety of cryptographic primitives through different cipher suites, various modes of client authentication, and additional features such as renegotiation. Despite its widespread use, only recently has the full TLS protocol been proven secure, and only the core cryptographic protocol with no additional features. These additional features have been the cause of several practical attacks on TLS. In 2009, Ray and Dispensa demonstrated how TLS renegotiation allows an attacker to splice together its own session with that of a victim, resulting in a man-in-the-middle attack on TLS-reliant applications such as HTTP. TLS was subsequently patched with two defence mechanisms for protection against this attack. We present the first formal treatment of renegotiation in secure channel establishment protocols. We add optional renegotiation to the authenticated and confidential channel establishment model of Jager et al., an adaptation of the Bellare--Rogaway authenticated key exchange model. We describe the attack of Ray and Dispensa on TLS within our model. We show generically that the proposed fixes for TLS offer good protection against renegotiation attacks, and give a simple new countermeasure that provides renegotiation security for TLS even in the face of stronger adversaries.

Distressed situation and renegotiation plan: a case study

Este trabalho apresenta um caso real de uma empresa em situação de estresse financeiro: a PlywoodCo. O objetivo deste trabalho é de entender porque a PlywoodCo. chegou na atual situação de estresse e, baseado nisso, propor um plano de renegociação de passivos compatível com esta situação com o objetivo de tornar a PlywoodCo. em uma empresa viável. Uma introdução é feita, a fim de colocar o leitor em contato com a PlywoodCo., apresentado as suas atividades, principais produtos, posição de mercado, bem como brevemente introduzindo sua atual situação. Após a introdução, a revisão bibliográfica é apresentada, descrevendo a teoria relacionada e utilizada neste trabalho. Mais adiante, a metodologia é apresentada, seguida por mais informações a respeito das operações da PlywoodCo., informações financeiras, relacionamento com stakeholders, índices operacionais, demonstrações financeiras, cronograma de pagamento da dívida e depreciação. Depois, as premissas, analises e projeções não apresentadas, consistindo de duas partes: (1) uma seção de diagnóstico endereçando a atual situação da empresa; e (2) uma seção de projeção, que será dividida em duas partes: (a) projeções financeiras da PlywoodCo. na atual situação; e (b) projeções financeiras da PlywoodCo. no novo plano proposto. Finalmente, se conclui que a empresa precisará de esforços além da renegociação de passivos a fim de superar sua situação de estresse financeiro. Após a renegociação da dívida, a empresa precisará de R$ 23 MM até o fim de 2013.

Política cambiaria y los procesos de renegociación de la deuda externa = Exchange policies and the process of renegotiation

Incluye Bibliografía

Renegotiation of Latin America's debt: an analysis of the monopoly power of private banks

Includes bibliography

Políticas de ajuste y renegociación de la deuda externa = Adjustment policies and renegotiation of the external debt

Incluye Bibliografía

The Optimal Response to Default: Renegotiation or Extended Maturity?

This paper reinforces the argument of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the observed preference of lenders for extended maturity rather than renegotiation of the principle in the case of loan default is due to the superior incentive properties of the former. Specifically, borrowers have a greater incentive to avoid default under extended maturity because it reduces the likelihood that they will be able to escape paying off the full loan balance. Thus, although extended maturity leaves open the possibility of foreclosure, it will be preferred to renegotiation as long as the dead weight loss from foreclosure is not too large.

What does the UK want from an EU renegotiation, and what terms can it expect? CEPS Commentary, 7 January 2014

In this new CEPS Commentary, John Bruton considers some likely consequences of the UK’s renegotiation of its membership of the EU, in terms of the UK’s own national interest, its relations with its European neighbours and the future effectiveness of a ‘revised’ EU.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part III: More reform than renegotiation or repatriation. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 42/December 2014. [see Abstract for I and II]

This paper, the third in a series for a CEPS project on the ‘The British Question’, is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. The reviews considered in this paper cover the following EU policies: the single market for services, financial markets, the free movement of people, cohesion, energy, agriculture, fisheries, competition, social and employment policies, and fundamental rights. The declared objective of Prime Minister Cameron is to secure a ‘new settlement’ between the UK and the EU. From political speeches in the UK one can identify three different types of possible demand: reform of EU policies, renegotiation of the UK’s specific terms of membership, and repatriation of competences from the EU back to the member states. As most of the reviews are now complete, three points are becoming increasingly clear: i) The reform agenda – past, present or future - concerns virtually every branch of EU policy, including several cases reviewed here that are central to stated UK economic interests. The argument that the EU is ‘unreformable’ is shown to be a myth. ii) The highly sensitive cases of immigration from the EU and social policies may translate into requests for renegotiation of specific conditions for the UK, but further large-scale opt-outs, as in the case of the euro and justice and home affairs, are implausible. iii) While demands for repatriation of EU competences are voiced in general terms in public debate in the UK, no specific proposals emerge from the evidence as regards competences at the level at which they are identified in the treaties, and there is no chance of achieving consensus for such ideas among member states. Michael Emerson and Steven Blockmans, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part I: ‘Competences about right, so far’”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 35, October 2013 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-i-%E2%80%98competences-about-right-so-far%E2%80%99)(http://aei.pitt.edu/45599/); Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Steve Peers and Michael Wriglesworth, “British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism”, CEPS/EPIN Working Paper No. 40, June 2014 (www.ceps.eu/book/british-balance-competence-reviews-part-ii-again-huge-contradiction-between-evidence-and-eurosc)(http://aei.pitt.edu/52452/).

The UK renegotiation from an EU perspective: the dog that hasn’t yet barked? EPC Commentary, 20 November 2015

Given the potential impact on the EU, the UK‘s in/out referendum and the associated reform agenda should be high up the Brussels agenda. But, curiously, so far there has been little obvious activity in Brussels, with few signs that it has the attention of the EU leadership. During the October Summit there was only a very short discussion of the UK referendum, with David Cameron pledging to set out the UK’s specific issues to be addressed (the EU reform agenda) in writing to President Tusk by early November, which he duly did on 10 November.

Oversight hearings on National Development Bank legislation : hearings before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session, on H.R. 7902 ... September 10, 18, and 24, 1980.

"Serial no. 96-73."

The Renegotiation extension act of 1979 : hearing before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on H.R. 2002 ... March 22, 1979.

"Serial 96-19."

Oversight hearings on the Susan B. Anthony dollar coin and mint operations : hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, sixty-sixth Congress, first session, September 25 and 26, 1979.

"Serial 96-30."