A Quinta Essência de Agustina Bessa-Luís : la saveur aigre-douce de Macao

In the narrative A Quinta Essência Agustina Bessa-Luís proposes an original reading of the Portuguese postcolonial History, by reinvesting the topics of the intercultural relation and the meeting with the Other. In fact, in the troubled context of April 1974, the character of Jose Carlos Pessanha expatriates towards the East, more precisely towards Macao, one of the last Eastern colonies of the Portuguese colonial Empire. However, the characteristic of this tour of rediscovery of the East is that it makes the destiny of a character in search of himself coincide with the questioning of a country still looking for its own identity. Thus, in this voyage backwards into the Luso-Eastern History, the Author draws the portrait of a Nation-Empire split between the desire of incarnating this “genetic superiority of the Occident” and the fascination for the culture of the Other, symbolizing an “excess of otherness” (B. of Sousa Santos) in the Portuguese identity. Macao, will be the territory of an “entre-deux” and an intercultural circulation, as well as an emblematic ground to the expression of the “ambivalent and hybrid” position (colonizing/colonized) of Portugal in the Occident. As a consequence, the uncomfortable “non-inscription” (J. Gil) and the “nomadism” (Deleuze/Guattari) which characterizes José Carlos Pessanha, would be a reflection of yesterday’s and today’s Lusitanian epopee.

RP97-43 Tax Planning When Buying or Selling a Farm

If you're like most farmers, one of your key goals is to maximize after-tax earnings. The more money left over after you've paid your farm bills land your taxes, the more you and your family will have to spend. You can increase thos enet earnings in sveral ways: by increasing production, by decreasing cost of supplies oer by finding a way to get more for your produce. But there's another way to increase your after-tax earnings. One that many farmers oculd afford to spen dmore time on: decreasing taxes. The key to avoiding unnecessary taxes is tax planning. This publication will help you do just that: plan for the future.

Corporate aging and investment decisions

Paper I: Corporate aging and internal resource allocation Abstract Various observers argue that established firms are at a disadvantage in pursuing new growth opportunities. In this paper, we provide systematic evidence that established firms allocate fewer resources to high-growth lines of business. However, we find no evidence of inefficient resource allocation in established firms. Redirecting resources from high-growth to low-growth lines of business does not result in lower profitability. Also, resource allocation towards new growth opportunities does not increase when managers of established firms are exposed to takeover and product market threats. Rather, it seems that conservative resource allocation strategies are driven by pressures to meet investors’ expectations. Our empirical evidence, thus, favors the hypothesis that established firms wisely choose to allocate fewer resources to new growth opportunities as external pressures force them to focus on efficiency rather than novelty (Holmström 1989). Paper II: Corporate aging and asset sales Abstract This paper asks whether divestitures are motivated by strategic considerations about the scope of the firm’s activities. Limited managerial capacity implies that exploiting core competences becomes comparatively more attractive than exploring new growth opportunities as firms mature. Divestitures help stablished firms free management time and increase the focus on core competences. The testable implication of this attention hypothesis is that established firms are the main sellers of assets, that their divestiture activity increases when managerial capacity is scarcer, that they sell non-core activities, and that they return the divestiture proceeds to the providers of capital instead of reinvesting them in the firm. We find strong empirical support for these predictions. Paper III: Corporate aging and lobbying expenditures Abstract Creative destruction forces constantly challenge established firms, especially in competitive markets. This paper asks whether corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to counteract the decline in rents over time. We find a statistically and economically significant positive relation between firm age and lobbying expenditures. Moreover, the documented age-effect is weaker when firms have unique products or operate in concentrated product markets. To address endogeneity, we use industry distress as an exogenous nonlegislative shock to future rents and show that established firms are relatively more likely to lobby when in distress. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corporate lobbying efforts by established firms forestall the creative destruction process. In sum, our findings suggest that corporate lobbying is a competitive weapon of established firms to retain profitability in competitive environments.