International real business cycles : a re-visit

It is well known that several quantitative properties of international real business cycle models with are at odds with the data. First, the cross-country correlations are much higher for consumption than for output, while in the data the opposite is true (the BKK puzzle). Second, cross-country correlations of employment and investment are negative, while in the data they are positive. This paper quantitatively shows that preferences with a zero income effect on labor supply help generate a correct cross-country correlation in employment even without any restrictions on financial markets. In a bond economy, a zero income effect in labor supply, combined with time-to-build investment, can generate a positive cross-country correlation in investment, and the BKK puzzle is also resolved when the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply is low.

Business Cycles, Unemployment Insurance, and the Calibration of Matching Models

This paper points out an empirical puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, both sticky wages and match-specific productivity shocks help the model reproduce the stylized facts: both make the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, thus making hiring more procyclical too.

Business cycles, unemployment insurance and the calibration of matching models

This paper theoretically and empirically documents a puzzle that arises when an RBC economy with a job matching function is used to model unemployment. The standard model can generate sufficiently large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment, or a sufficiently small response of unemployment to labor market policies, but it cannot do both. Variable search and separation, finite UI benefit duration, efficiency wages, and capital all fail to resolve this puzzle. However, either sticky wages or match-specific productivity shocks can improve the model's performance by making the firm's flow of surplus more procyclical, which makes hiring more procyclical too.

Asymmetries in Business Cycles

Esta disertación busca estudiar los mecanismos de transmisión que vinculan el comportamiento de agentes y firmas con las asimetrías presentes en los ciclos económicos. Para lograr esto, se construyeron tres modelos DSGE. El en primer capítulo, el supuesto de función cuadrática simétrica de ajuste de la inversión fue removido, y el modelo canónico RBC fue reformulado suponiendo que des-invertir es más costoso que invertir una unidad de capital físico. En el segundo capítulo, la contribución más importante de esta disertación es presentada: la construcción de una función de utilidad general que anida aversión a la pérdida, aversión al riesgo y formación de hábitos, por medio de una función de transición suave. La razón para hacerlo así es el hecho de que los individuos son aversos a la pérdidad en recesiones, y son aversos al riesgo en auges. En el tercer capítulo, las asimetrías en los ciclos económicos son analizadas junto con ajuste asimétrico en precios y salarios en un contexto neokeynesiano, con el fin de encontrar una explicación teórica de la bien documentada asimetría presente en la Curva de Phillips.

Liquidity, business cycles and monetary policy: A simulation

A Masters Thesis, presented as part of the requirements for the award of a Research Masters Degree in Economics from NOVA – School of Business and Economics

International business cycles, financial markets and household production

This paper investigates the properties of an international real business cycle model with household production. We show that a model with disturbances to both market and household technologies reproduces the main regularities of the data and improves existing models in matching international consumption, investment and output correlations without irrealistic assumptions on the structure of international financial markets. Sensitivity analysis shows the robustness of the results to alternative specifications of the stochastic processes for the disturbances and to variations of unmeasured parameters within a reasonable range.

Does money matter in shaping domestic business cycles? An international investigation (with appendices)

We study the contribution of money to business cycle fluctuations in the US,the UK, Japan, and the Euro area using a small scale structural monetary business cycle model. Constrained likelihood-based estimates of the parameters areprovided and time instabilities analyzed. Real balances are statistically importantfor output and inflation fluctuations. Their contribution changes over time. Models giving money no role provide a distorted representation of the sources of cyclicalfluctuations, of the transmission of shocks and of the events of the last 40 years.

A DSGE model with loss aversion in consumption and leisure: an explanation for business cycles asymmetries

In this chapter, an asymmetric DSGE model is built in order to account for asymmetries in business cycles. One of the most important contributions of this work is the construction of a general utility function which nests loss aversion, risk aversion and habits formation by means of a smooth transition function. The main idea behind this asymmetric utility function is that under recession the agents over-smooth consumption and leisure choices in order to prevent a huge deviation of them from the reference level of the utility; while under boom, the agents simply smooth consumption and leisure, but trying to be as far as possible from the reference level of utility. The simulations of this model by means of Perturbations Method show that it is possible to reproduce asymmetrical business cycles where recession (on shock) are stronger than booms and booms are more long-lasting than recession. One additional and unexpected result is a downward stickiness displayed by real wages. As a consequence of this, there is a more persistent fall in employment in recession than in boom. Thus, the model reproduces not only asymmetrical business cycles but also real stickiness and hysteresis.

Endogenous business cycles with frictional labour markets

We present a neoclassical model of capital accumulation with frictional labour markets. Under standard parameter values the equilibrium of the model is indeterminate and consequently displays expectations-driven business cycles – so-called endogenous business cycles. We study the properties of such cycles, and find that the model predicts the high autocorrelation in output growth and the hump-shaped impulse response of output found in US data – important features that existing endogenous real business cycle models fail to explain. The indeterminacy of the equilibrium stems from job search externalities and does not rely on increasing returns to scale as in most models.

Special interests and political business cycles

In this paper we bridge the gap between special interest politics and political business cycle literature. We build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange rates.

Konjunktúraingadozások az Egyesült Államokban 1970-2010 - Értelmezési nehézségek = Business cycles and recession patterns in the US economy and in the G7

Lehet-e beszélni a 2011-ig felgyülemlett empirikus tapasztalatok tükrében egy egységes válságlefolyásról, amely a fejlett ipari országok egészére általában jellemző, és a meghatározó országok esetében is megragadható? Megállapíthatók-e olyan univerzális változások a kibocsátás, a munkapiacok, a fogyasztás, valamint a beruházás tekintetében, amelyek jól illeszkednek a korábbi tapasztalatokhoz, nem kevésbé az ismert makromodellek predikcióihoz? A válasz – legalábbis jelen sorok írásakor – nemleges: sem a válság lefolyásának jellegzetességeiben és a makrogazdasági teljesítmények romlásának ütemében, sem a visszacsúszás mértékében és időbeli kiterjedésében sincsenek jól azonosítható közös jegyek, olyanok, amelyek a meglévő elméleti keretekbe jól beilleszthetők. A tanulmány áttekinti a válsággal és a makrogazdasági sokkokkal foglalkozó empirikus irodalom – a pénzügyi globalizáció értelmezései nyomán – relevánsnak tartott munkáit. Ezt követően egy 60 év távlatát átfogó vizsgálatban próbáljuk megítélni a recessziós időszakokban az amerikai gazdaság teljesítményét azzal a célkitűzéssel, hogy az elmúlt válság súlyosságának megítélése kellően objektív lehessen, legalább a fontosabb makrováltozók elmozdulásának nagyságrendje tekintetében. / === / Based on the empirical evidence accumulated until 2011, using official statistics from the OECD data bank and the US Commerce Department, the article addresses the question whether one can, or cannot, speak about generally observable recession/crisis patterns, such that were to be universally recognized in all major industrial countries (the G7). The answer to this question is a firm no. Changes and volatility in most major macroeconomic indicators such as output-gap, labor market distortions and large deviations from trend in consumption and in investment did all, respectively, exhibit wide differences in depth and width across the G7 countries. The large deviations in output-gaps and especially strong distortions in labor market inputs and hours per capita worked over the crisis months can hardly be explained by the existing model classes of DSGE and those of the real business cycle. Especially bothering are the difficulties in fitting the data into any established model whether business cycle or some other types, in which financial distress reduces economic activity. It is argued that standard business cycle models with financial market imperfections have no mechanism for generating deviation from standard theory, thus they do not shed light on the key factors underlying the 2007–2009 recession. That does not imply that the financial crisis is unimportant in understanding the recession, but it does indicate however, that we do not fully understand the channels through which financial distress reduced labor input. Long historical trends on the privately held portion of the federal debt in the US economy indicate that the standard macro proposition of public debt crowding out private investment and thus inhibiting growth, can be strongly challenged in so far as this ratio is neither a direct indicator of growth slowing down, nor for recession.

Correlation of business cycles in the euro zone

In this short article we use a simple differences-in-clifferences technique to investigate whether bilateral correlation of business cycles increased more amongst members of the European Monetary Union (EMU) after the implementation of the Euro than amidst other OECD economies. We present evidence suggesting this to be the case. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Understanding sources of the change in international business cycles

Macroeconomic activity has become less volatile over the past three decades in most G7 economies. Current literature focuses on the characterization of the volatility reduction and explanations for this so called "moderation" in each G7 economy separately. In opposed to individual country analysis and individual variable analysis, this paper focuses on common characteristics of the reduction and common explanations for the moderation in G7 countries. In particular, we study three explanations: structural changes in the economy, changes in common international shocks and changes in domestic shocks. We study these explanations in a unified model structure. To this end, we propose a Bayesian factor structural vector autoregressive model. Using the proposed model, we investigate whether we can find common explanations for all G7 economies when information is pooled from multiple domestic and international sources. Our empirical analysis suggests that volatility reductions can largely be attributed to the decline in the magnitudes of the shocks in most G7 countries while only for the U.K., the U.S. and Italy they can partially be attributed to structural changes in the economy. Analyzing the components of the volatility, we also find that domestic shocks rather than common international shocks can account for a large part of the volatility reduction in most of the G7 countries. Finally, we find that after mid-1980s the structure of the economy changes substantially in five of the G7 countries: Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S..