Inequality, state ownership and the European Union: How economic context and economic ideology shape support for the European Union

This article investigates the extent to which economic ideology affects people's support for European Union integration and how this is conditioned by economic context. We argue that people on the economic left who live in a country with conditions of high income inequality and little state ownership will support European integration, because more integration would move public policy in a left-wing direction. By contrast, people on the left who live in a country with conditions of low income inequality and widespread public ownership are likely to be eurosceptic, as further integration would result in a more right-wing public policy. We empirically confirm our hypotheses and discuss the implications for European Union democracy.

Determinants of public support for European Enlargement : a comparative analysis of public attitudes toward the accession of Turkey and Poland

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

The role of European Union integration in post-communist democratization in Bulgaria and Macedonia

Cette recherche porte sur la dimension interprétative de l'intégration européenne et sur son rôle dans la démocratisation au sein des pays postcommunistes. Je focalise mon attention sur la signification pour les gens desdits pays que revêtent la participation politique, la compétence politique, et l’action collective. Cette signification prend forme selon des circonstances spécifiques, agencées par les relations de pouvoir asymétriques avec l’Union européenne (UE). J’examine la littérature sur le rôle de l'intégration européenne dans la démocratisation des pays postcommunistes et je distingue deux paradigmes théoriques principaux : un premier qui met l'accent sur le processus institutionnel, l’autre sur le processus instrumental stratégique. Au sein de ces deux approches, je présente différents auteurs qui voient l'UE soit comme un facteur pro-démocratique, soit comme un facteur antidémocratique dans le contexte postcommuniste de transition politique. Cette recherche ne suit pas théoriquement et méthodologiquement les études contenues dans la revue de la littérature. Plutôt, elle s’appuie sur un modèle théorique inspiré des recherches de McFalls sur la réunification culturelle allemande après 1989. Ce modèle, sans négliger les approches institutionnelles et stratégiques, met l’accent sur d'autres écoles théoriques, interprétatives et constructivistes. Mes conclusions se basent sur les résultats de séjours d'étude dans deux pays postcommunistes : la Bulgarie, membre de l'UE depuis 2007, et la Macédoine, pays-candidat. J’ai recours à des méthodes qualitatives et à des techniques ethnographiques qui triangulent des résultats puisés à des sources multiples et variées pour exposer des trajectoires dynamiques de changement culturel influencées par l'intégration européenne. Les conclusions montrent sous quelles conditions les idéaux-types de changement politique conventionnels, soit institutionnel ou stratégique, représentent des modèles utiles. Je présente aussi leurs limitations. Ma conclusion principale est que l'intégration européenne représente un phénomène complexe dans le monde des significations. C’est un facteur qui est simultanément un amplificateur et un inhibiteur de la culture politique démocratique. Les gens créent des sous-cultures différentes où des interprétations multiples du processus d'intégration européenne mènent à des effets dissemblables sur la participation politique, la compétence et l’action collective. La conversation discursive entre les gens qui composent de telles sous-cultures distinctes peut produire des effets divergents au niveau national. Cette recherche n’est pas une analyse de l’UE comme mécanisme institutionnel ; elle ne pose ainsi pas l’UE comme une institution qui détermine directement le processus de démocratisation postcommuniste. Plutôt, elle s’intéresse au processus d’intégration européenne en tant qu’interaction qui affecte la culture politique au sein des pays postcommunistes, et à la manière dont cette dernière peut agir sur le processus de démocratisation. Mon point d’intérêt central n’est donc pas l’européanisation ou le processus de devenir « comme l’Europe », à moins que l’européanisation ne devienne une composante de la culture politique avec des conséquences sur le comportement politique des acteurs.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

The European Power Hierarchy, Member State Trust, and Public Support for the Common Security and Defense Policy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 15 No. 2, August 2015

Existing studies focus on overall support for European integration while less work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific policy areas, such as the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). We hypothesize that the probability of supporting a CSDP increases with greater levels of trust in the European Union member states, most notably the more powerful members. This variable is critical since integration’s development is influenced strongly by, and dependent on, the resources of the relatively more powerful European member states. Binary logistic regression analyses using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted from 1992 to 1997 among individuals of 11 member states largely support these claims.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens’ support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state’s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union’s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country’s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens’ attitude towards their country’s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called “devolution”, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice’s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

Images of Europeans: In-Group Trust and Support for European Integration. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 3, March 2014

Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper fills this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I claim that the probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in fellow Europeans, which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in eastern European Union nationalities has the highest impact on the probability for support, followed by trust in the southern nationalities, and then northern nationalities due to the eastern and southern nationalities relatively lower economic development. Controlling for various factors, the ordered logistic regression analysis of the European Election Study (2004) data support these claims.

Summary of the United States and European Union Seminar on the Social Dimension of Economic Integration.

"April 2000."

The social dimension of economic integration : papers submitted for discussion at a United States and European Union Seminar /

"June 2000."

Promoting the European Union : Attitudinal stance adjectives in three genres of EU communication to the public

Målet för Pro Gradu-avhandlingen är att undersöka hur Europeiska unionen (EU) marknadsförs genom användningen av värderande adjektiv i tre genrer av skriftlig kommunikation från EU till medlemsstaternas medborgare. Undersökningen är inriktad på tre forskningsfrågor: hur marknadsföringen av EU syns i användningen av värderande adjektiv i de tre genrerna, vilka de centrala skillnaderna mellan de tre genrerna är gällande användningen av värderande adjektiv, samt på vilket sätt texterna uppfyller sitt kommunikativa syfte, nämligen att informera allmänheten om EU:s verksamhet och marknadsföra EU som en giltig och handlingskraftig union. Den teoretiska ramen för undersökningen grundar sig på genreanalys, kommunikationsteori och teorier om hur författarens värdering (stance) syns i texter. Skillnaden mellan genre, texttyp och register diskuteras, och teoridelen redogör även för begreppet diskurssamfund, dvs. den grupp personer som i ett yrkesmässigt eller institutionellt sammanhang producerar och använder sig av en genre enligt dess kommunikativa konventioner. Materialet behandlas även utgående från Egon Werlichs indelning av texttyper i deskriptiva, narrativa, expositära, argumentativa och instruktiva texter. Materialet består av tre delar som representerar var sin genre: informationsbroschyrer, pressmeddelanden och den Allmänna rapporten om Europeiska unionens verksamhet, som utges av EU varje år. Storleken på varje del av materialet varierar mellan 20 000 - 30 000 ord. Materialet har valts på basis av de teman texterna behandlar, och kriterierna för urvalet är bl.a. att texterna behandlar ämnen som har anknytning till medborgarnas vardag, att de är riktade till allmänheten, och att de finns tillgängliga på Internet. Undersökningen är genomförd som en kvalitativ genreanalys. Materialet analyseras först utgående från kontexten och det samhälleliga sammanhanget enligt Vijay K. Bhatias metodik för analys av obekanta genrer. Det kommunikativa syftet, författaren och den tilltänkta läsarkretsen, dvs. målgruppen för kommunikationen, fastställs. Värderande adjektiv som uttrycker författarens hållning har plockats ur texten manuellt och med hjälp av konkordansprogrammet AntConc, och placerats i 16 kategorier enligt de värden de uttrycker. Varje genre analyseras sedan språkligt med utgångspunkt i adjektivlistorna, varefter resultaten jämförs med varandra. Undersökningen visar att pressmeddelandena innehåller det största antalet värderande adjektiv, medan informationsbroschyrerna innehåller det minsta antalet värderande adjektiv. Den Allmänna rapporten om Europeiska unionens verksamhet innehåller delar med tätt förekommande värderande adjektiv, i synnerhet i stycken som behandlar mer kontroversiella ämnen. I alla tre genrer sammanfaller ett högt antal värderande adjektiv med argumentativ text, och argumentativ text förekommer främst då ämnet som diskuteras rör sig på en mer abstrakt nivå, t.ex. om EU:s värderingar och grundläggande principer, eller då texten behandlar sådan politik som delar allmänhetens uppfattning. För EU utgör alla tre genrer viktiga kanaler för kommunikationen till medlemsstaternas medborgare, och EU kan genom sitt informationsmaterial och sina officiella publikationer informera om, förklara och marknadsföra sin verksamhet på ett sätt som avser att upprätthålla och förbättra EU:s image. Utarbetandet av lämpliga texter är ändå krävande på grund av den heterogena målgruppen, och det är en utmaning i sig att få fram rätt budskap bland det stora utbudet information som finns tillgängligt på Internet.

Fiscal Integration in the European Union : assessment of different proposals

This paper explores the fiscal situation of the European Union as well as the different approaches proposed for achieving fiscal policy coordination among the member states. Furthermore, it works through the need of fiscal integration as a pressing matter in order for the European Union to achieve its aim of functioning as an efficient single market and economic unit. In order to do so, it analyzes the theoretical lines of the Modern Money Theory as a possible framework for further integration, and it evaluates the different proposals made for fiscal integration so that it can give an assessment regarding their compatibility with this theory.