Private-public alliances for export development: the Korean case

Incluye bibliografía

CEFACT: an international private/public sector partnership

The Centre for the Facilitation of Procedures and Practices in Administration, Commerce and Transport (CEFACT) constitutes a partnership between the public and private sectors for their mutual benefit. For the private sector, working with governments to improve commerce is critical to improving international competitiveness. For governments, working with the private sector to reduce procedural barriers to trade is critical to improving both their own administrative effectiveness and the economic well-being of their countries. This issue of the Bulletin presents an exposition by the Chairman of the CEFACT, Mr. Henri Martre, at the Trade Facilitation Seminar, carried out between 9 and 10 March of 1998, at the Headquarters of the World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. Its main purpose is to explain the importance of CEFACT's partnership between the public and private sectors; how this partnership works, and the trade facilitation instruments it has created.

Elk in Nebraska: Opportunity or Another Private-Public Land Conundrum

We conducted a comprehensive research project on elk in the Pine Ridge region of northwestern Nebraska from 1995 to 2002 to determine ecological factors that could be used to improve management and reduce damage. The population ranged from 120 to 150 animals, with an average calf:cow ratio of 0.5:1 and bull:cow ratio of 0.4:1. We located 21 radio-collared female elk 6,311 times during 1995 to 1997. Seasonal home ranges of 2 herds were 10 and 44 km2, while average annual home ranges of the herds were much larger (483 and 440 km2, respectively). All wintering areas (n = 21) and 80% of the calving areas (n = 22) were located on privately-owned land. Active timber harvest temporarily displaced elk, most notably during the calving season. Elk shifted home ranges in association with the seasonal availability of agricultural crops, in particular, alfalfa, oats, and winter wheat. Population models indicated that static levels of hunting mortality would lead to a stable population of about 130 elk over 10 years. Most landowners in the Pine Ridge (57%) favored free-ranging elk, but 26% were concerned about damage to agricultural crops and competition with livestock. Habitat suitability models and estimates of social carrying capacity indicate that up to 600 elk could be sustained in the Pine Ridge without significant impacts to landowners. We recommended an integrated management program used to enhance elk habitat on publicly-owned land and redistribute elk from privately-owned land.

Private security beyond private military and security companies:exploring diversity within private-public collaborations and its consequences for security governance

The aim of this special issue is to widen the existing debates on security privatization by looking at how and why an increasing number of private actors beyond private military and/or security companies (PMSCs) have come to perform various security related functions. While PMSCs produce security for profit, most other private sector actors make profit by selling goods and services that were originally not connected with security in the traditional understanding of the term. However, due to the continuous introduction of new legal and technical regulations by public authorities, many non- security related private businesses nowadays have to perform at least some security functions. Little research, however, has been done thus far, both in terms of security practices of non- security related private businesses and their impact on security governance. This introduction explains how this special issue contributes to closing this glaring gap by 1) extending the conceptual and theoretical arguments in the existing body of literature; and 2) offering a range of original case studies on the specific roles of non- security related private companies of all sizes, areas of businesses, and geographic origin.

O Impacto do project finance nas empresas portuguesas no setor têxtil

Dissertação para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças Orientador: Mestre Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade Pereira

Internalização de farmoquímicos e medicamentos para doenças tropicais negligenciadas: proposta de interação entre Governo - Universidade - Empresa

History shows that public health actions to combat epidemics are most effective when there is constant synergy of both government and society, exemplified by prevention actions in the fight against dengue fever, H1N1 influenza etc. Private-public-partnerships (PPP) can also provide more dynamic and consistent results in production through interaction among Government, University and Enterprise actors. This article puts forward proposals to tackle the problem of neglected tropical diseases via the formation of a Management Council using Etzkowitz's Triple Helix concept to attenuate this public health issue in Brazil.

The role of institutions as actors influencing Uganda’s cassava sector

We aim at mapping out a detailed framework that reveals the proportionate flow of cassava and its products along the value chain (VC). Furthermore, we aim at establishing the role of institutions and the linkages between institutions and other VC actors that influence the cassava VC in Uganda. We use both primary and secondary data obtained from four regions in Uganda. Results show that farmers, processors, transporters, traders, consumers and institutions are the major actors. There are four categories of institutions, viz, government, non-government, community based organisations and international agencies. Roles performed by institutions include: development and enforcement of policies, Research and Development (R&D), capacity building, and creation of market access linkages for cassava and its products. Findings reveal that there is no clear nexus and no coordination among farmers/producers, processors, traders, transporters and consumers. However, institutions are well coordinated and play various roles along the VC to influence the dynamics of actors. Policy-wise it is important to establish strong private-public partnerships to bridge the impaired linkages between the actors (farmers/producers, processors, traders, transporters, and consumers) and institutions. Strong partnerships are envisaged to reduce the associated transaction costs amongst the actors.

Parcerias público-privadas na presença de seleção adversa: uma análise numérica

Esta dissertação propõe-se a analisar a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas (PPP) em um ambiente de seleção adversa. Mais especi calmente, analiso se as tarefas de construir e operar uma infraestrutura para serviços públicos deve ser realizada por um consórcio ou se devem ser realizadas por fi rmas contratadas separadamente. Para tal, diferentemente da literatura existente para o problema, focadas nos problemas de contratos incompletos e moral hazard, construo um modelo de seleção adversa multidimensional, onde as firrmas possuem informação privada e podem exercer um esforço não observável em cada atividade, com a existência de externalidade entre as tarefas, em uma extensão do modelo de La¤ont e Tirole (1986). Após defi nir algumas condições sob as quais PPP domina os meios usuais de contratação, utilizo de uma análise numérica para melhor compreender a solução do modelo, que se mostra altamente dependente da correlação entre os parâmetros de informação privada das firmas.

Essays on incentives, procurement and regulation

Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, "Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard", é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, "Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection" é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, "Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure", por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Forms and role of the cluster initiatives in fostering innovation in post-industrial regions: A comparative study of environmental clusters in British West Midlands and Spanish Basque country. ACES Working Paper No. 8, August 2008

The objective of this research is to present cluster initiative approaches in post industrial regions characterized by similar economic history and challenges, with additional emphasis on their role in promoting innovation among regional businesses. The research is based on a comparison study of two environmental industry clusters: Environmental Technology Cluster (ET) from British West Midlands and ACLIMA from Spanish Basque Country. The study analyzes clusters' design and their role in fostering innovation based on environment industry clusters. In both regions environmental industry clusters represent strong potential for further dynamic development with grow opportunities driven by legislation introduced at EU, national or regional levels. The paper compares clusters' heterogeneity, goals and priorities, financing schemes, management structure, types of projects, character of private-public partnerships, challenges, as well as clusters' collaboration at regional/national/international levels. Also focus is given on how the clusters enhance innovation and what types of projects are executed by the regions in this field.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Public Sector Pay in Finland

This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within the public sector.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.