Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize eof the subscription game involving positive contributions.

Evaluation of cumulative externality: environmental economics, oligopoly and the private provision of public goods

This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is cumulative. The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question form conjectural variations. A number of environments are encompassed within this classification and have received due attention in the literature. Each of these heterogeneous environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit subscription to a general model treatment. These environments include environmental externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words).

Special report to the President and to the Congress on a proposed contribution and subscription of resources to the Asian Development Bank /

Mode of access: Internet.

Private diary of travels, personal services, and public events, during mission and employment with the European armies in the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814. From the invasion of Russia to the capture of Paris.

Mode of access: Internet.

A practical grammar of the English language, synthetic and analytic : adapted to the wants of public schools, academies, and private learners /

Mode of access: Internet.

A practical grammar of the English language, synthetic and analytic : adapted to the wants of public schools, academies, and private learners /

Mode of access: Internet.

Regulation of the private provision of public water-related services

Includes bibliography

The Transvaal from within; a private record of public affairs,

Mode of access: Internet.

Reminiscences of the old navy. From the journals and private papers of Captain Edward Trenchard, and Rear-Admiral Stephen Decatur Trenchard.

"Edition limited to 750 copies, and the type distributed."

Work motivation and pro-social behavior in the delivery of public services : theoretical and empirical insights

This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to study the work motivation of employees in the delivery of public services. The questioning on work motivation in public services in not new but it becomes central for governments which are now facing unprecedented public debts. The objective of this research is twofold : First, we want to see if the work motivation of employees in public services is a continuum (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations cannot coexist) or a bi-dimensional construct (intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously). The research in public administration literature has focused on the concept of public service motivation, and considered motivation to be uni-dimensional (Perry and Hondeghem 2008). However, no study has yet tackled both types of motivation, the intrinsic and extrinsic ones, in the same time. This dissertation proposes, in Part I, a theoretical assessment and an empirical test of a global work motivational structure, by using a self-constructed Swiss dataset with employees from three public services, the education sector, the security sector and the public administrative services sector. Our findings suggest that work motivation in public services in not uni-dimensional but bi-dimensional, the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations coexist simultaneously and can be positively correlated (Amabile et al. 1994). Our findings show that intrinsic motivation is as important as extrinsic motivation, thus, the assumption that employees in public services are less attracted by extrinsic rewards is not confirmed for this sample. Other important finding concerns the public service motivation concept, which, as theoretically predicted, represents the major motivational dimension of employees in the delivery of public services. Second, the theory of public service motivation makes the assumption that employees in public services engage in activities that go beyond their self-interest, but never uses this construct as a determinant for their pro-social behavior. In the same time, several studies (Gregg et al. 2011 and Georgellis et al. 2011) bring evidence about the pro-social behavior of employees in public services. However, they do not identify which type of motivation is at the origin of this behavior, they only make the assumption of an intrinsically motivated behavior. We analyze the pro-social behavior of employees in public services and use the public service motivation as determinant of their pro-social behavior. We add other determinants highlighted by the theory of pro-social behavior (Bénabou and Tirole 2006), by Le Grand (2003) and by fit theories (Besley and Ghatak 2005). We test these determinants on Part II and identify for each sector of activity the positive or the negative impact on pro-social behavior of Swiss employees. Contrary to expectations, we find, for this sample, that both intrinsic and extrinsic factors have a positive impact on pro-social behavior, no crowding-out effect is identified in this sample. We confirm the hypothesis of Le Grand (2003) about the positive impact of the opportunity cost on pro-social behavior. Our results suggest a mix of action-oriented altruism and out-put oriented altruism of employees in public services. These results are relevant when designing incentives schemes for employees in the delivery of public services.

Resigned but satisfied: The negative impact of public service motivation and red tape on work satisfaction

This article examines the relationship between red tape, Public Service Motivation (PSM) and a particular work outcome labelled 'resigned satisfaction'. Using data from a national survey of over 3754 public servants working at the municipal level in Switzerland, this study shows the importance of looking more closely at the concept of work satisfaction and, furthermore, of thoroughly investigating the impact of the different PSM dimensions on work outcomes. Unsurprisingly, research findings show that red tape is the most important predictor of resignation. Nevertheless, when PSM dimensions are analysed separately, results demonstrate that 'commitment to public interest/civic duty' and, to a lesser extent, 'attraction to policy-making' decrease resignation, whereas 'compassion' and 'self-sacrifice' increase it. This study thus highlights some of the negative (or undesirable) effects of PSM that have not been previously addressed in PSM literature.

Engineering Study for the Evaluation of Public Road Administration and Maintenance Alternatives, HR-265, 1985

Iowa's public road system of 112,000 miles is one of the largest and the best in the nation. It represents a considerable financial investment of taxpayer revenues over the years. And, it requires a sustained investment to preserve an economical level of transport service into the future. In 1982, a Governor's Blue Ribbon Transportation Task Force evaluated the effectiveness of Iowa's entire transportation system. Four important Task Force recommendations dealt with public road administrative issues in Iowa. These issues were related to: (1) Design criteria and levels of maintenance; (2) Consistency in the use of standards among jurisdictions; (3) Consolidation of maintenance operations at one jurisdiction level; and (4) Jurisdicational authority for roads; The issues formed the background for Research Project HR-265.