An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test

We apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players’ behavior in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes.

Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Many problems in human society reflect the inability of selfish parties to cooperate. The “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma” has been used widely as a model for the evolution of cooperation in societies. Axelrod’s computer tournaments and the extensive simulations of evolution by Nowak and Sigmund and others have shown that natural selection can favor cooperative strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Rigorous empirical tests, however, lag behind the progress made by theorists. Clear predictions differ depending on the players’ capacity to remember previous rounds of the game. To test whether humans use the kind of cooperative strategies predicted, we asked students to play the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game either continuously or interrupted after each round by a secondary memory task (i.e., playing the game “Memory”) that constrained the students’ working-memory capacity. When playing without interruption, most students used “Pavlovian” strategies, as predicted, for greater memory capacity, and the rest used “generous tit-for-tat” strategies. The proportion of generous tit-for-tat strategies increased when games of Memory interfered with the subjects’ working memory, as predicted. Students who continued to use complex Pavlovian strategies were less successful in the Memory game, but more successful in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which indicates a trade-off in memory capacity for the two tasks. Our results suggest that the set of strategies predicted by game theorists approximates human reality.

The prisoners' dilemma, congestion games and correlation

Social dilemmas, in particular the prisoners' dilemma, are represented as congestion games, and within this framework soft correlated equilibria as introduced by Forgó F. (2010, A generalization of correlated equilibrium: A new protocol. Mathematical Social Sciences 60:186-190) is used to improve inferior Nash payoffs that are characteristic of social dilemmas. These games can be extended to several players in different ways preserving some important characteristics of the original 2-person game. In one of the most frequently studied models of the n-person prisoners' dilemma game we measure the performance of the soft correlated equilibrium by the mediation and enforcement values. For general prisoners' dilemma games the mediation value is ∞, the enforcement value is 2. This also holds for the class of separable prisoners’ dilemma games.

Evolutionary dynamics of the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with self-inhibition

In this paper we study the influence of interventions on self-interactions in a spatial Prisoner's Dilemma on a two-dimensional grid with periodic boundary conditions and synchronous updating of the dynamics. We investigate two different types of self-interaction modifications. The first type (FSIP) is deterministic, effecting each self-interaction of a player by a constant factor, whereas the second type (PSIP) performs a probabilistic interventions. Both types of interventions lead to a reduction of the payoff of the players and, hence, represent inhibiting effects. We find that a constant but moderate reduction of self-interactions has a very beneficial effect on the evolution of cooperators in the population, whereas probabilistic interventions on self-interactions are in general counter productive for the coexistence of the two different strategies. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with confirmed Proposals

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

Refinement of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation

Cooperation among unrelated individuals is an enduring evolutionary riddle and a number of possible solutions have been suggested. Most of these suggestions attempt to refine cooperative strategies, while little attention is given to the fact that novel defection strategies can also evolve in the population. Especially in the presence of punishment to the defectors and public knowledge of strategies employed by the players, a defecting strategy that avoids getting punished by selectively cooperating only with the punishers can get a selective benefit over non-conditional defectors. Furthermore, if punishment ensures cooperation from such discriminating defectors, defectors who punish other defectors can evolve as well. We show that such discriminating and punishing defectors can evolve in the population by natural selection in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game scenario, even if discrimination is a costly act. These refined defection strategies destabilize unconditional defectors. They themselves are, however, unstable in the population. Discriminating defectors give selective benefit to the punishers in the presence of non-punishers by cooperating with them and defecting with others. However, since these players also defect with other discriminators they suffer fitness loss in the pure population. Among the punishers, punishing cooperators always benefit in contrast to the punishing defectors, as the latter not only defect with other punishing defectors but also punish them and get punished. As a consequence of both these scenarios, punishing cooperators get stabilized in the population. We thus show ironically that refined defection strategies stabilize cooperation. Furthermore, cooperation stabilized by such defectors can work under a wide range of initial conditions and is robust to mistakes.

Evolution of cooperation by reciprocation within structured demes

The iterative two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game has been generalised to theN-person case. The evolution of cooperation is explored by matching the Tit For Tat (TFT) strategy (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) against the selfish strategy. Extension of TFT toN-person situations yields a graded set of strategies from the softest TFT, which continues cooperation even if only one of the opponents reciprocates it, to the hardest, which would do so only when all the remaining opponents cooperate. The hardest TFT can go to fixation against the selfish strategy provided it crosses a threshold frequencypc. All the other TFT are invadable by the selfish (D) or the pure defector strategy, while none can invadeD. Yet, provided a thresholdpc is crossed, they can coexist stably withD. AsN, the size of the group increases, the threshold pc also increases, indicating that the evolution of cooperation is more difficult for larger groups. Under certain conditions, only the soft TFT can coexist stably against the selfish strategyD, while the harder ones cannot. An interesting possibility of a complete takeover of the selfish population by successive invasions by harder and harder TFT strategies is also presented.

The Supercore for Normal Form Games

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

How resources control aggression in Drosophila

How animals use sensory information to weigh the risks vs. benefits of behavioral decisions remains poorly understood. Inter-male aggression is triggered when animals perceive both the presence of an appetitive resource, such as food or females, and of competing conspecific males. How such signals are detected and integrated to control the decision to fight is not clear. Here we use the vinegar fly, Drosophila melanogaster, to investigate the manner in which food and females promotes aggression.

In the first chapter, we explore how food controls aggression. As in many other species, food promotes aggression in flies, but it is not clear whether food increases aggression per se, or whether aggression is a secondary consequence of increased social interactions caused by aggregation of flies on food. Furthermore, nothing is known about how animals evaluate the quality and quantity of food in the context of competition. We show that food promotes aggression independently of any effect to increase the frequency of contact between males. Food increases aggression but not courtship between males, suggesting that the effect of food on aggression is specific. Next, we show that flies tune the level of aggression according to absolute amount of food rather than other parameters, such as area or concentration of food. Sucrose, a sugar molecule present in many fruits, is sufficient to promote aggression, and detection of sugar via gustatory receptor neurons is necessary for food-promoted aggression. Furthermore, we show that while food is necessary for aggression, too much food decreases aggression. Finally, we show that flies exhibit strategies consistent with a territorial strategy. These data suggest that flies use sweet-sensing gustatory information to guide their decision to fight over a limited quantity of a food resource.

Following up on the findings of the first chapter, we asked how the presence of a conspecific female resource promotes male-male aggression. In the absence of food, group-housed male flies, who normally do not fight even in the presence of food, fight in the presence of females. Unlike food, the presence of females strongly influences proximity between flies. Nevertheless, as group-housed flies do not fight even when they are in small chambers, it is unlikely that the presence of female indirectly increases aggression by first increasing proximity. Unlike food, the presence of females also leads to large increases in locomotion and in male-female courtship behaviors, suggesting that females may influence aggression as well as general arousal. Female cuticular hydrocarbons are required for this effect, as females that do not produce CH pheromones are unable to promote male-male aggression. In particular, 7,11-HD––a female-specific cuticular hydrocarbon pheromone critical for male-female courtship––is sufficient to mediate this effect when it is perfumed onto pheromone-deficient females or males. Recent studies showed that ppk23⁺ GRNs label two population of GRNs, one of which detects male cuticular hydrocarbons and another labeled by ppk23 and ppk25, which detects female cuticular hydrocarbons. I show that in particular, both of these GRNs control aggression, presumably via detection of female or male pheromones. To further investigate the ways in which these two classes of GRNs control aggression, I developed new genetic tools to independently test the male- and female-sensing GRNs. I show that ppk25-LexA and ppk25-GAL80 faithfully recapitulate the expression pattern of ppk25-GAL4 and label a subset of ppk23⁺ GRNs. These tools can be used in future studies to dissect the respective functions of male-sensing and female-sensing GRNs in male social behaviors.

Finally, in the last chapter, I discuss quantitative approaches to describe how varying quantities of food and females could control the level of aggression. Flies show an inverse-U shaped aggressive response to varying quantities of food and a flat aggressive response to varying quantities of females. I show how two simple game theoretic models, “prisoner’s dilemma” and “coordination game” could be used to describe the level of aggression we observe. These results suggest that flies may use strategic decision-making, using simple comparisons of costs and benefits.

In conclusion, male-male aggression in Drosophila is controlled by simple gustatory cues from food and females, which are detected by gustatory receptor neurons. Different quantities of resource cues lead to different levels of aggression, and flies show putative territorial behavior, suggesting that fly aggression is a highly strategic adaptive behavior. How these resource cues are integrated with male pheromone cues and give rise to this complex behavior is an interesting subject, which should keep researchers busy in the coming years.

Effect of information transmission on cooperative behavior

Considering the fact, in the real world, that information is transmitted with a time delay, we study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where agents update strategies according to certain information that they have learned. In our study, the game dynamics are classified by the modes of information learning as well as game interaction, and four different combinations, i.e. the mean-field case, case I, case II and local case, are studied comparatively. It is found that the time delay in case II smoothes the phase transition from the absorbing states of C (or D) to their mixing state, and promotes cooperation for most parameter values. Our work provides insights into the temporal behavior of information and the memory of the system, and may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the time delay in social and biological systems.

Promotion of cooperation in the form C0C1D classified by 'degree grads' in a scale-free network

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the public goods game (PGG) on a heterogeneous graph. By introducing a new effective topology parameter, 'degree grads' phi, we clearly classify the agents into three kinds, namely, C-0, C-1, and D. The mechanism for the heterogeneous topology promoting cooperation is discussed in detail from the perspective of C0C1D, which reflects the fact that the unreasoning imitation behaviour of C-1 agents, who are 'cheated' by the well-paid C-0 agents inhabiting special positions, stabilizes the formation of the cooperation community. The analytical and simulation results for certain parameters are found to coincide well with each other. The C0C1D case provides a picture of the actual behaviours in real society and thus is potentially of interest.

儿童社会价值取向的发展及其对合作行为的影响

Cooperation is a typical prosocial behavior, and social psychologists have traditionally used sociometric methods to measure cooperation. This research is aimed to explore the development of children’s social value orientation and its impact on cooperation. Study 1 used two-choice decomposed games to measure the social value orientation of 9- , 11-, to 14-year-old children and adults. Results indicated that most 9-, 11-, 14-year-old children are classified as proselfs, and most adults are classified as prosocials. Compared to 9 years, there are more prosocial orientations and less competitive orientations among 11 years. But compared to 11 years, there are less prosocial orientations and more competitive orientations among 14 years. Study 2 used prisoner’s dilemma to assess cooperative behavior, thus investigated the impact of social value orientation on cooperative decision-making. Results indicated that, on one hand, children of prosocial orientation expected no more cooperation from others, but adults of prosocial orientation expected more cooperation from others. On the other hand, prosocials make more cooperative choices than proselfs, and they show more reciprocity towards cooperative others and more altruism towards non-cooperative others.