Transreal proof of the existence of universal possible worlds

Transreal arithmetic is total, in the sense that the fundamental operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division can be applied to any transreal numbers with the result being a transreal number [1]. In particular division by zero is allowed. It is proved, in [3], that transreal arithmetic is consistent and contains real arithmetic. The entire set of transreal numbers is a total semantics that models all of the semantic values, that is truth values, commonly used in logics, such as the classical, dialetheaic, fuzzy and gap values [2]. By virtue of the totality of transreal arithmetic, these logics can be implemented using total, arithmetical functions, specifically operators, whose domain and counterdomain is the entire set of transreal numbers

By indirections find directions out : thinkable worlds in Abbott and Vonnegut

This thesis is concerned with the interaction between literature and abstract thought. More specifically, it studies the epistemological charge of the literary, the type of knowledge that is carried by elements proper to fictional narratives into different disciplines. By concentrating on two different theoretical methods, the creation of thought experiments and the framing of possible worlds, methods which were elaborated and are still used today in spheres as varied as modal logics, analytic philosophy and physics, and by following their reinsertion within literary theory, the research develops the theory that both thought experiments and possible worlds are in fact short narrative stories that inform knowledge through literary means. By using two novels, Abbott’s Flatland and Vonnegut’s The Sirens of Titan, that describe extra-dimensional existence in radically different ways, respectively as a phenomenologically unknowable space and as an outward perspective on time, it becomes clear that literature is constitutive of the way in which worlds, fictive, real or otherwise, are constructed and understood. Thus dimensions, established through extensional analogies as either experimental knowledge or modal possibility for a given world, generate new directions for thought, which can then take part in the inductive/deductive process of scientia. By contrasting the dimensions of narrative with the way that dimensions were historically constituted, the research also establishes that the literary opens up an infinite potential of abstract space-time domains, defined by their specific rules and limits, and that these different experimental folds are themselves partaking in a dimensional process responsible for new forms of understanding. Over against science fiction literary theories of speculation that posit an equation between the fictive and the real, this thesis examines the complex structure of many overlapping possibilities that can organise themselves around larger compossible wholes, thus offering a theory of reading that is both non-mimetic and non-causal. It consequently examines the a dynamic process whereby literature is always reconceived through possibilities actualised by reading while never defining how the reader will ultimately understand the overarching structure. In this context, the thesis argues that a causal story can be construed out of any one interaction with a given narrative—underscoring, for example, the divinatory strength of a particular vision of the future—even as this narrative represents only a fraction of the potential knowledge of any particular literary text. Ultimately, the study concludes by tracing out how novel comprehensions of the literary, framed by the material conditions of their own space and time, endlessly renew themselves through multiple interactions, generating analogies and speculations that facilitate the creation of new knowledge.

Against Logically Possible World-Relativized Existence

The thesis that entities exist in, at, or in relation to logically possible worlds is criticized. The suggestion that actually nonexistent fictional characters might nevertheless exist in nonactual merely logically possible worlds runs afoul of the most general transworld identity requirements. An influential philosophical argument for the concept of world-relativized existence is examined in Alvin Plantinga’s formal development and explanation of modal semantic relations. Despite proposing an attractive unified semantics of alethic modality, Plantinga’s argument is rejected on formal grounds as supporting materially false actual existence assertions in the case of actually nonexistent objects in the framework of Plantinga’s own underlying classical predicate-quantificational logic.

On a Syntactic Characterization of Classification with a Mind Change Bound

Most learning paradigms impose a particular syntax on the class of concepts to be learned; the chosen syntax can dramatically affect whether the class is learnable or not. For classification paradigms, where the task is to determine whether the underlying world does or does not have a particular property, how that property is represented has no implication on the power of a classifier that just outputs 1’s or 0’s. But is it possible to give a canonical syntactic representation of the class of concepts that are classifiable according to the particular criteria of a given paradigm? We provide a positive answer to this question for classification in the limit paradigms in a logical setting, with ordinal mind change bounds as a measure of complexity. The syntactic characterization that emerges enables to derive that if a possibly noncomputable classifier can perform the task assigned to it by the paradigm, then a computable classifier can also perform the same task. The syntactic characterization is strongly related to the difference hierarchy over the class of open sets of some topological space; this space is naturally defined from the class of possible worlds and possible data of the learning paradigm.

"Four Ways of Writing the City" : St. Petersburg-Leningrad as a Metaphor in the Poetry of Joseph Brodsky

The present study discusses the theme of St. Petersburg-Leningrad in Joseph Brodsky's verse works. The chosen approach to the evolving im-age of the city in Brodsky's poetry is through four metaphors: St. Petersburg as "the common place" of the Petersburg Text, St. Petersburg as "Paradise and/or Hell", St. Petersburg as "a Utopian City" and St. Petersburg as "a Void". This examination of the city-image focusses on the aspects of space and time as basic categories underlying the poet's poetic world view. The method used is close reading, with an emphasis on semantical interpretation. The material consists of eighteen poems dating from 1958 to 1994. Apart from investigating the spatio-temporal features, the study focusses on exposing and analysing the allusions in the scrutinised works to other texts from Russian and Western belles lettres. Terminology (introduced by Bakhtin and Yury Lotman, among others) concerning the poetics of space in literature is employed in the present study. Conceptions originating from the paradigm of possible worlds are also used in elucidating the position of fictional and actual chronotopes and heroes in Brodsky's poetry. Brodsky's image of his native city is imbued with intertextual linkings. Through reminiscences of the "Divine Comedy" and Russian modernists, the city is paralleled with Dante's "lost and accursed" Florence, as well as with the lost St. Petersburg of Mandel'shtam and Akhmatova. His city-image is related to the Petersburg myth in Russian literature through their common themes of death and separation as well as through the merging of actual realia with the fictional worlds of the Petersburg Text. In his later poems, when his view of the city is that of an exiled poet, the city begins to lose its actual world referents, turning into a mental realm which is no longer connected to any particular geographical location or historical time. It is placed outside time. The native city as the homeland in its entirety is replaced by another existence created in language.

Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making

In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview of the divine decision-making and discussing critically the criteria God favours in his choice, I provide an account of Leibniz's views on human deliberation, which includes some new ideas. One of these concerns is the importance of estimating probabilities in making decisions one estimates both the goodness of the act itself and its consequences as far as the desired good is concerned. Another idea is related to the plurality of goods in complicated decisions and the competition this may provoke. Thirdly, heuristic models are used to sketch situations under deliberation in order to help in making the decision. Combining the views of Marcelo Dascal, Jaakko Hintikka and Simo Knuuttila, I argue that Leibniz applied two kinds of models of rational decision-making to practical controversies, often without explicating the details. The more simple, traditional pair of scales model is best suited to cases in which one has to decide for or against some option, or to distribute goods among parties and strive for a compromise. What may be of more help in more complicated deliberations is the novel vectorial model, which is an instance of the general mathematical doctrine of the calculus of variations. To illustrate this distinction, I discuss some cases in which he apparently applied these models in different kinds of situation. These examples support the view that the models had a systematic value in his theory of practical rationality.

A New Definition of A Priori Knowledge: In Search of a Modal Basis

In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and merely possible, non-actual a priori propositions, as we will see when considering cases like Euclidean geometry. Furthermore, contrary to what Kripke seems to suggest, a priori knowledge is intimately connected with metaphysical modality, indeed, grounded in it. The task of a priori reasoning, according to this account, is to delimit the space of metaphysically possible worlds in order for us to be able to determine what is actual.

Assignment methods for incidence calculus

Incidence calculus is a mechanism for probabilistic reasoning in which sets of possible worlds, called incidences, are associated with axioms, and probabilities are then associated with these sets. Inference rules are used to deduce bounds on the incidence of formulae which are not axioms, and bounds for the probability of such a formula can then be obtained. In practice an assignment of probabilities directly to axioms may be given, and it is then necessary to find an assignment of incidence which will reproduce these probabilities. We show that this task of assigning incidences can be viewed as a tree searching problem, and two techniques for performing this research are discussed. One of these is a new proposal involving a depth first search, while the other incorporates a random element. A Prolog implementation of these methods has been developed. The two approaches are compared for efficiency and the significance of their results are discussed. Finally we discuss a new proposal for applying techniques from linear programming to incidence calculus.

Rational Partial Choice Functions and Their Application to Belief Revision.

Necessary and sufficient conditions for choice functions to be rational have been intensively studied in the past. However, in these attempts, a choice function is completely specified. That is, given any subset of options, called an issue, the best option over that issue is always known, whilst in real-world scenarios, it is very often that only a few choices are known instead of all. In this paper, we study partial choice functions and investigate necessary and sufficient rationality conditions for situations where only a few choices are known. We prove that our necessary and sufficient condition for partial choice functions boils down to the necessary and sufficient conditions for complete choice functions proposed in the literature. Choice functions have been instrumental in belief revision theory. That is, in most approaches to belief revision, the problem studied can simply be described as the choice of possible worlds compatible with the input information, given an agent’s prior belief state. The main effort has been to devise strategies in order to infer the agents revised belief state. Our study considers the converse problem: given a collection of input information items and their corresponding revision results (as provided by an agent), does there exist a rational revision operation used by the agent and a consistent belief state that may explain the observed results?

On the iteration of Katsuno and Mendelzon update

In this dissertation we present a model for iteration of Katsuno and Mendelzon’s Update, inspired in the developments for iteration in AGM belief revision. We adapt Darwiche and Pearls’ postulates of iterated belief revision to update (as well as the independence postulate proposed in [BM06, JT07]) and show two families of such operators, based in natural [Bou96] and lexicographic revision [Nay94a, NPP03]. In all cases, we provide a possible worlds semantics of the models.

Two Technological Dystopias: Le monde tel que'il sera and Alpha Ralpha Boulevard

The aim of this paper is to corn pare two technological dystopias: Emile Souvestre's Le Monde tel qu'il sera (1846) and Cordwainer Smith's "Alpha Ralpha Boulevard" (1961). Both texts present dystopian societies experienced by many of its inhabitants as being the best of possible worlds. The above authors question the massive use of technology, worry about what technology can do to human beings, how it can dehumanize them. They reveal serious social and moral concerns regarding the less privileged. These are excluded from the benefits of"Utopia" while making it possible. Both authors are childs of.. their time: they live in a period of national pride, they can see the shadows behind the luminous, the dangers resulting from human beings playing God with nature and humanity. Also, they are innovators: Souvestre announces dystopian science fiction and Smith renews with the genre announcing the New Wave movement in Anglo-American science fiction.