Critical communications research in Australia : from radical populism to creative industries

This paper tracks the development of critical communicatiosn research in Australia over a 30 year period. It assesses the relative significance of critical theory, Marxist political economy and cultural studies to the development of such a tradition. it also evaluates the rise of 'creative industries' dicourse as an emergent development in the field, and a distinctive contribution of Australian media and communications research.

Punishment and 'the People' : Rescuing Populism from its Critics

The term 'penal populism' is now reflexively used by criminologists to describe what many see as a dominant trend within penal policymaking in many western countries. The epithet 'populist' is used with no Jess frequency by media and other public commentators to refer (always pejoratively) to this or that political announcement, policy or style of political leadership, whether the context be specifically related to crime or some other arena of public affairs. In most accounts 'penal populism' (or 'populist punitiveness': Bottoms, 1995) is treated as a composite term. The two words are inseparably coupled and it is the penal that receives most of the detailed attention. As in more general political commentary, populism is tacitly understood as a negative and rather dangerous phenomenon, suggestive of manipulation, shallow-ness and demagoguery: in short, a corruption of normal, healthy democratic politics. As against such accounts, I want to suggest that debate about penal policymaking and its future -and particularly the prospects for more progressive policymaking in the area -would be assisted if populism was taken more seriously both conceptually and politically. This requires a decoupling of the concept of populism from what is habitually taken to be its punitive partner and that which defines its content. Currently the term is used without clear definition, let alone conceptual elaboration, to reference political pathology. Instead populism should be examined as a regular, meaningful dimension of contemporary political practice that has to be understood and engaged, not just denounced and extirpated. That is, I am seeking to make a case for bringing populism in from the despised margins to the centre of political practice and reflection. I will also briefly consider some of the implications this may have for penal politics specifically.

Populism, law and order and the crimes of the 1%

The article examines the evidence of endemic financial crime in the global financial crisis (GFC), the legal impunity surrounding these crimes and the popular revolt against these abuses in the financial, political and legal systems. This is set against a consideration of the development since the 1970s of a conservative politics championing de-regulation, unfettered markets, welfare cuts and harsh law and order policies. On the one hand, this led to massively increased inequality and concentrations of wealth and political power in the hands of the super-rich, effectively placing them above the law, as the GFC revealed. On the other, a greatly enlarged, more punitive criminal justice system was directed at poor and minority communities. Explanations in terms of the rise of penal populism are helpful in explaining these developments, but it is argued they adopt a limited and reductionist view of populism, failing to see the prospects for a progressive populist politics to re-direct political attention to issues of inequality and corporate and white collar criminality.

Between Political Folklore and National Populism: Poles Apart?

This chapter offers a wry look at the changing position of Northern Ireland in Europe. From the anomaly of ‘joining Europe’ as part of the UK in 1973 just as ‘The Troubles’ confirmed Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’, to the twenty first century experience of peace process and the large scale influx of migrant workers from Poland and elsewhere.

Burger off!. The Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and the lenguage of scottish populism.

El artículo intenta dar una visión de la forma en la que el lenguaje usado en la prensa escocesa refleja la ideología tradicional del populismo y su relación con el contexto social.

Greece in crisis: austerity, populism and the politics of blame

Within the broader debate on the Greek crisis, the theory of ‘populist democracy’ postulates that populism is fundamental to the sustenance of the Greek political system and is at the heart of Greece's endemic domestic weaknesses. This article tests this assumption empirically through the use of a sophisticated framing analysis of speeches delivered by the leaders of the five parties in the Greek parliament in the period 2009–11. The findings confirm that populism: (a) is expressed through the narratives of political actors; (b) is observed across the party system; (c) is expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity; and (d) differs depending on position in the party system. The article contributes to the debate by testing and building on the theory of democratic populism, providing a novel way of measuring and operationalizing populism and identifying a new typology that distinguishes between mainstream and fringe populism.

Populism and Liberal Democracy: Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland and Switzerland

The enduring electoral success of populist parties across Europe and the increasing opportunities they have gained to access government in recent years bring once more into relief the question of whether populism and democracy are fully compatible. In this article we show how, despite playing different roles in government within very different political systems, and despite the numerous constraints placed upon them (for instance, EU membership, international law and domestic checks and balances), populist parties consistently pursued policies that clashed with fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. In particular, the idea that the power of the majority must be limited and restrained, the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers have all come under threat in contemporary Europe. This has contributed to the continuing erosion of the liberal consensus, which has provided one of the fundamental foundations of the European project from its start.

British Balance of Competence Reviews, Part II: Again, a huge contradiction between the evidence and Eurosceptic populism. EPIN Paper No. 40, June 2014

This paper is the second in a series for a CEPS project entitled “The British Question and the Search for a Fresh European Narrative”. It is pegged on an ambitious exercise by the British government to review all the competences of the European Union on the basis of evidence submitted by independent stakeholders. In all, 32 sectoral policy reviews are being produced over the period 2013-2015, as input into public information and debate leading up to a referendum on whether the UK should remain in, or secede from, the EU, planned for 2017. This second set of reviews covers a broad range of EU policies (for the single market for goods, external trade, transport policy, environment, climate change, research, asylum, non-EU immigration, civil judicial cooperation, tourism, culture and sport). The findings confirm what emerged from the first set of reviews, namely that there is little or no case for repatriation of EU competences at the level they are defined in the treaties. This does not exclude that at a more detailed level there can be individual actions or laws that might be done better or not at all. However, that is the task of all the institutions to work at on a regular basis, and hardly a rationale for secession. For the UK in particular the EU has shown considerable flexibility in agreeing to special arrangements, such as in the case of the policies here reviewed of asylum, non-EU immigration and civil judicial cooperation. In other areas reviewed here, such as the single market for goods, external trade, transport, environment, climate change and research, there is a good fit between the EU’s policies and UK priorities, with the EU perceived by stakeholders as an ‘amplifier’ of British interests.

Populism in the EU: new threats to the open society? CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014.

In May 2014, around one in four Europeans voted for protest parties and anti-establishment candidates in the first pan-European poll since the euro crisis began. The rise of populism across Europe has brought more extremism of various kinds into the European Parliament. It could change the balance of power between the institutions, and be detrimental to EU policies, legislation and funding that nurture open societies. This chapter will consider the impact of xenophobic populist parties, who have also become increasingly anti-EU, not considering here the extreme left Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who entered the Parliament.

Is globalisation really fuelling populism? CEPS Commentary, 11 May 2016

On both sides of the Atlantic, populism on the left and the right is on the rise. Its most visible standard-bearer in the United States is Donald Trump, the Republican Party’s presumptive presidential nominee. In Europe, there are many strands – from Spain’s leftist Podemos party to France’s right-wing National Front – but all share the same opposition to centrist parties and to the establishment in general. What accounts for voters’ growing revolt against the status quo?

Drivers of populism - A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections

The aim of this paper is to analyze what different types of populist communication styles emerged during the 2014 EP election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-up of the latest EP elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria and Greece. The paper presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic discourse, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that populist party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication.