Covenanter Politics: Evangelicalism, Political Liberalism and Ulster Presbyterians, 1798-1914

Historians of Ireland have devoted considerable attention to the Presbyterian origins of modern Irish republicanism in the 1790s and their overwhelming support for the Union with Great Britain in the 1880s. On the one hand, it has been argued that conservative politics came to dominate nineteenth-century Presbyterianism in the form of Henry Cooke who combined conservative evangelical religion with support for the established order. On the other hand, historians have long acknowledged the continued importance of liberal and radical impulses amongst Presbyterians. Few historians of the nineteenth century have attempted to bring these two stories together and to describe the relationship between the religion and politics of Presbyterians along the lines suggested by scholars of Presbyterian radicalism in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. This article argues that a distinctive form of Presbyterian evangelicalism developed in the nineteenth century that sought to bring the denomination back to the theological and spiritual priorities of seventeenth-century Scottish and Irish Presbyterianism. By doing so, it encouraged many Presbyterians to get involved in movements for reform and liberal politics. Supporters of ‘Covenanter Politics’ utilised their denominational principles and traditions as the basis for political involvement and as a rhetoric of opposition to Anglican privilege and Catholic tyranny. These could be the prime cause of Presbyterian opposition to the infringement of their rights, such as the marriage controversy and the Disruption of the Church of Scotland in the early 1840s, and they could also be employed as a language of opposition in response to broader social and political developments, such as the demands for land reform stimulated by the agricultural depression that accompanied the Famine. Despite their opposition to ascendancy, however, the Covenanter Politics of Presbyterian Liberals predisposed them towards pan-protestant unionism against the threat of ‘Rome Rule’.

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.

Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism.

Recovering Nussbaum's aristotelian roots

Abstract: The paper examines the relationship between Creating Capabilities and political liberalism. Originally founded on the basis of Aristotelian philosophy, the theory of ‘capabilities’ developed by Nussbaum turns to political liberalism in the mid 90’s. Throughout the article, the principles of both perspectives are depicted and contrasted, focusing on the capacity of affiliation, the concept of common good and the idea of freedom. Severine Deneulin argues that the current reality calls for the capabilities approach to be more rooted in a relational anthropology which the Aristotelian ethical tradition is more akin to. This line can be found in Nussbaum’s first approach to the theory of capabilities, where affiliation as an architectonic capability leads to the common good being the end of political action, and practical reason as an architectonic capability leads to reasoning ordered towards the achievement of the common good, to the detriment of individualism.

Liberalismo, neutralidad estatal y perfeccionismo : Rawls y su crítica

Resumen: Este artículo expone ciertos ejes del debate contemporáneo en torno al liberalismo político y la neutralidad estatal para intentar una recapitulación crítica que permita arrojar luz sobre la posibilidad de una posición que concilie el respeto a la pluralidad contemporánea y a ciertos principios constitucionales con la no abdicación del rol que la política debe tener en el fomento de la “vida buena” (lo que en la tradición de la filosofía política anglosajona se ha designado como “perfeccionismo”). El artículo explora, al menos preliminarmente, sobre qué premisas se asentaría dicha conciliación, a través del análisis de la justificación del “perfeccionismo” y del tratamiento del tema del paternalismo estatal, la coerción y el fomento. Se analizan las ideas de Rawls así como las de algunos de sus críticos, en especial de Sandel y – sobre todo– de Raz, dado que es un autor que abre las puertas a la posibilidad de un liberalismo “perfeccionista”, fiel a los principios del liberalismo político clásico, pero que abandona la exigencia de “neutralidad” ante distintas concepciones del bien.

As razões do direito: um estudo da razão pública a partir do modelo liberal-igualitário de John Rawls

Em 1993, John Rawls, notável filósofo e professor da distinta Harvard University, publicou seu Political Liberalism, um livro em que pela primeira vez sintetiza sistematicamente o conceito de razão pública, uma ideia chave de sua teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness). Segundo Rawls, a razão pública consiste fundamentalmente no modo e conteúdo adequados ao debate e à fundamentação de escolhas essenciais de justiça no espaço público de uma democracia constitucional. Nesse sentido, Rawls advoga que o único meio razoável de justificação da coerção estatal reside no reconhecimento e/ou obtenção de consensos (overlapping consensus) em relação às escolhas essenciais de uma sociedade democrática, o que só é possível se atores públicos e privados se despojarem de suas respectivas doutrinas filosóficas ou morais abrangentes ao debater e decidir tais questões essenciais de justiça. A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a proposta de razão pública de Rawls, dentro do contexto de sua teoria da justiça como equidade, propondo-se a verificar se o pensamento rawlsiano procede no contexto jurídico-filosófico da pós-modernidade e se a sua teoria pode ser concretamente aplicada aos ordenamentos jurídicos contemporâneos, em especial no que tange ao conteúdo e pleno exercício da liberdade religiosa pelos cidadãos de um estado constitucional democrático.

Regulação financeira sistêmica no Brasil: desafios e propostas de aprimoramento institucional

A presente dissertação versa sobre o estudo da regulação financeira sistêmica brasileira e está dividida em quatro capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, descreve-se a essência das atividades financeiras e narra-se a trajetória histórica que deu ensejo à criação de Bancos Centrais e o surgimento da regulação bancária no mundo. Em seguida, discorre-se sobre o processo de expansão do sistema financeiro e sua internacionalização face à globalização financeira dos mercados. Após a exposição de razões políticas, comportamentais, econômicas e técnicas consideradas determinantes para a consumação da última crise financeira mundial (caso subprime), demonstra-se que uma regulação financeira sistêmica adequada constitui um processo complexo, dinâmico e contínuo de gestão pública com vistas a evitar ou atenuar os efeitos de crises sistêmicas. Nesse sentido, são expostos os motivos por que o Brasil enfrentou bem tal crise, através da apresentação da evolução dos processos regulatórios domésticos nos últimos anos. No segundo capítulo, utilizado o marco político-filosófico de John Rawls, sustenta-se a ideia de que a estabilidade financeira sustentável ao longo do tempo é uma questão de justiça básica que deve influenciar o desenho político-institucional em sociedades democráticas constitucionais. Nesse sentido, afirma-se a possibilidade de geração de um consenso sobreposto, segundo o ideal de razão pública, quanto à necessidade de estabelecimento de instituições, relativamente descoladas dos ciclos político-eleitorais e dotadas de especialização técnica, responsáveis pelo planejamento e acompanhamento público e transparente da sustentabilidade da execução da política monetária e da regulação financeira sistêmica propriamente dita no longo prazo. Adicionalmente, em razão da globalização financeira dos mercados, discorre-se sobre os limites e possibilidades do ideal de razão pública nos organismos financeiros internacionais (redes globais de governo), instituídos para definir padrões de regulação financeira sistêmica, e são feitos comentários acerca da existência de um Direito Administrativo Global. No terceiro capítulo, defende-se a ideia de razão prática regulatória como a diretriz adequada de atuação sustentável do Estado na economia com foco em resultados, a fim de estimular o progresso nos processos regulatórios, mediante o uso do better regulation como paradigma de análise de custos e benefícios. Após, expõe-se a noção de juridicidade administrativa como a mais compatível com a Constituição, além de defender-se a legitimidade democrática e o poder normativo das agências reguladoras financeiras. Por fim, com fundamento nas características do desenho institucional da estrutura regulatória brasileira, são formuladas propostas de aprimoramento institucional. No último capítulo, são feitos comentários sobre as vantagens, limites e riscos de judicialização dos processos regulatórios financeiros em democracias constitucionais, o que motiva a construção de parâmetros institucionais e materiais de atuação judicial, posteriormente analisados em precedentes importantes julgados no Brasil nos últimos anos.

Partisanship and Public Reason

In the large body of literature concerning John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993) and his conception of public reason, little attention has been paid to the implications that the constraints of public reason have for partisans, i.e. citizens who participate in politics through political parties. This paper argues that even on the basis of a ‘mild’ understanding of Rawls’s conception of the constraints of public reason, which takes into account the various stipulations Rawls provided throughout his later work, when applied to partisans the constraints of public reason lose none or little of their hindering force. This seriously undermines the contribution that parties and partisans can provide to the change and the varieties of public reason that Rawls himself advocates as a response to social change and, therefore, to political justification and legitimacy. Parties articulate, coordinate and enhance societal demands which, without their support, may remain unheard and fail to change the acceptable terms of public reason and political justification. If the political speech of partisans is restrained, this potential for change (and, therefore, its contribution to political legitimacy) is seriously undermined.

Evidence-based policymaking and the public interest: lessons in legitimacy

This paper draws upon an analysis of regional spatial planning to highlight the centrality of ethics in praxis. In this context political liberalism is particularly helpful in developing a deeper understanding of the activities of those engaged in planning decision making. At the most basic level it demonstrates the importance of not only using shared liberal values as the foundation for public discourses but also achieving consensus through the development of an inclusive evidence base, derived from both lay and professional knowledge. Specifically, political liberalism provides a practical critique, enabling judgments to be made on problems which pervade operational planning practice and an evaluation to be conducted of the dynamic between and actions of participants.

Why are people liberal? : a motivated social cognition perspective

The present dissertation examined why people adopt or endorse certain political ideologies (i.e., liberal or conservative). According to a motivated social cognition perspective (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Kruglanslpolitical ideologies to fulfill dispositional and situationally induced needs or motivations. Previous research has found that political conservatism is related to a number of psychological needs (e.g., Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a). However, there is minimal research examining why individuals adopt political liberalism. By focussing on the political right and not considering the political left, there might be other motivational underpinnings of political orientation that have been overlooked. In four studies, the present dissertation ail)1ed to fill this gap by investigating what chronic and situationally induced needs underlie political orientation, with a focus on political liberalism. Based on psychological the9ries of ideology, research examining political conservatism, and experimental research examining differences between liberals and conservatives, it was proposed that four social-cognitive needs (Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, Need for Change, and Avoidance of Decisional Commitment) would be associated with liberalism. Moreover, research suggests that the relations between the needs and liberalism might be moderated by political sophistication (e.g., Converse, 1964). University students (Study 1; n == 201) and community adults (Study 2; n == 197) completed questionnaires assessing political liberalism, political sophistication, and individual differences 're~ective of the four proposed needs. As predicted, correlation and hierarchical regression analyses in both Studies 1 and 2 indicated that political liberalism was related to Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change. 11 Avoidance of Decisional Commitment uniquely predicted political liberalism in Study 2; however, contrary to predictions, it was unrelated to political liberalism in Study 1. Furthermore, some of these relations were moderated by political sophistication, such that among individuals with a greater knowledge of politics, the relation between certain needs and liberalism was positive. To explore the role of situationally induced needs on political liberalism, each of the four proposed needs were manipulated in Study 3. Participants (n == 120) completed one of five scrambled-sentence tasks (one for each need condition and control condition), measures of explicit and implicit political liberalism, political sophistication, and state and trait measures indicative of the four proposed needs. The ~anipulation did not successfully prime participants with the needs. Therefore, a replication of the analyses from Studies 1 and 2 was conducted on the dispositional needs. Results showed that Need for Inclusiveness, Need for Understanding, and Need for Change were linked with greater explicit and implicit political liberalism. Study 4 examined the effect of manipulated Need for Inclusiveness on participants' endorsement ofpolitical liberalism, independent of conservatism. Participants (n == 43) were randomly assigned to a Need for Inclusiveness or control condition, and completed separate measures of political liberalism and conservatism, and political sophistication. Participants in the Need for Inclusiveness condition reported greater liberalism than those in a control condition; this effect was not moderated by political sophistication. Generally, the findings from this dissertation suggest that there might be other needs underlying political ideology, especially political liberalism. Thus, consistent with others' (Jost, Glaser et aI., 2003a), individuals might adopt political liberalism as a way of gratifying certain psychological needs. Implications and future research are discussed.

Broyer du noir. Manifestations et répression policière au Québec.

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Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of Justice

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.

Autonomie et reconnaissance

La notion d’autonomie personnelle joue un rôle central dans les théories politiques contemporaines et, plus spécifiquement, dans les théories de la justice. Or, dans le paradigme libéral dominant, elle est définie par une compréhension rationaliste de l’agent individuel. La présente étude défend la nécessité de redéfinir ce concept d’autonomie à la lumière des développements philosophiques et psychologiques qui ont complexifié notre compréhension de la subjectivité. L’emploi du concept d’autonomie relationnelle développé par certains auteurs féministes et par certains théoriciens de la reconnaissance semble pour ce faire prometteur. En passant par une critique du libéralisme politique rawlsien, cette étude cherche à montrer qu’une compréhension relationnelle de l’autonomie est nécessaire pour expliquer la motivation à la coopération sociale et pour redéfinir la justice et l’injustice de façon à ce qu’elles correspondent à l’expérience sociale vécue.

Le libéralisme politique et l’éducation à l’autonomie individuelle

Ce mémoire explore la question des conséquences de l’interprétation rawlsienne du pluralisme éthique pour la légitimité de l’autonomie individuelle comme objectif d’éducation publique. Rawls (1993, 2003) soutient que seuls des objectifs éducatifs strictement politiques peuvent guider l’élaboration des politiques publiques en matière d’éducation obligatoire et justifier une intervention étatique dans l’éducation des enfants. Or, puisque Rawls définit l’autonomie individuelle comme un idéal éthique privé, il conclut qu’elle n’est pas un objectif légitime d’éducation publique. La thèse principale qui est défendue dans le cadre de ce mémoire est que Rawls est aveugle aux implications réelles de sa propre théorie politique en matière d’éducation commune, qui, contrairement à ce qu’il soutient, exigent précisément la promotion de l’autonomie individuelle comme idéal éthique (et non politique). Cette thèse remet en question le principe de neutralité de l’État envers toutes les doctrines éthiques, y compris l’idéal d’autonomie individuelle, qui caractérise et distingue la théorie rawlsienne des versions classiques du libéralisme. La deuxième partie de cette étude considère une stratégie possible pour sauver la neutralité du libéralisme politique, qui consiste à définir le concept d’autonomie individuelle de manière procédurale et éthiquement neutre. Ce chapitre montre que, indépendamment de la plausibilité strictement conceptuelle d’une telle caractérisation de l’autonomie individuelle, elle n’est pas appropriée au projet éducatif rawlsien, parce que celui-ci demande la valorisation de la pensée critique, et comporte donc un élément éthique incontournable. Enfin, la troisième partie de cette étude explore la problématique des moyens de promotion de l’autonomie individuelle et, plus spécifiquement, de la légitimité des écoles séparées religieuses. Elle soutient, d’un côté que l’école religieuse peut avoir une importante valeur instrumentale vis-à-vis du développement de l’autonomie individuelle, mais de l’autre côté, que l’école commune est nécessaire à un certain stade de développement.