Political Institutions, Technology and Growth: a dynamic panel approach

This paper investigates whether the effect of political institutions on sectoral economic performance is determined by the level of technological development of industries. Building on previous studies on the linkages among political institutions, technology and economic growth, we employ the dynamic panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for a sample of 4,134 country-industries from 61 industries and 89 countries over the 1990-2010 period. Our main findings suggest that changes of political institutions towards higher levels of democracy, political rights and civil liberties enhance economic growth in technologically developed industries. On the contrary, the same institutional changes might retard economic growth of those industries that are below a technological development threshold. Overall, these results give evidence of a technologically conditioned nature of political institutions to be growth-promoting.

The ‘Us’ in Trust: Who Trusts Northern Ireland’s Political Institutions and Actors?

This article examines levels of interest and trust among the public in relation to Northern Ireland's newly established political institutions and actors, through an analysis of the results of the 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (NILT). It is important to reveal the specific groups of people with the highest levels of political disenchantment, particularly in the context of the longer-term stability of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive, since the willingness of the electorate to have faith and trust in the workability of these political institutions and in the various political actors in whose custody they lie is considered vital.

Political Institutions, Engagement and Outreach: The Case of the Northern Ireland Assembly

Democracies are faced increasingly with the challenge of engaging the public on the assumption that such activity will lead to greater understanding of, and enhanced trust in, political institutions. This is a particular difficulty for an institution such as the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), established against the backdrop of a historically divided society with high levels of political conflict and which has itself been suspended on several occasions. This article reports the findings from the NIA's first survey of public engagement, conducted as part of the Assembly's broader engagement strategy. It provides a baseline against which future levels of engagement can be judged. Moreover, it highlights a range of challenges that face both the NIA and its Members of the Legislative Assembly if the Assembly is to engage successfully with the public in the aftermath of the 2011 elections.

Translation practices in political institutions: a comparison of national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations

This paper explores the settings and practices of translation at three types of political institutions, i.e. national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations. The three institutions are the translation service of the German Foreign Office, the translation department of the European Central Bank, and translation provision by the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International. The three case studies describe the specific translation practices in place at these institutions and illustrate some characteristic translation strategies. In this way, we reflect on how different translation practices can impact on translation agency and how these practices in turn are influenced by the type of institution and its organisational structure. The article also aims to explore to which extent the characteristics of collectivity, anonymity and standardisation, and of institutional translation as self-translation are applicable to the institutions under discussion.

Citizenship and the political institutions of cultural diversity in Australia

This thesis uses political theory to analyse and compare the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and the Federation of Ethnic Communities' Councils of Australia. It argues that 'self-determination' and 'multiculturalism' in practice hide the power of the Anglo-Australian dominant culture and stifle the possibilities of more viable intercultural political innovation.

Essays on the economics of natural disasters and political institutions

This thesis examines how natural disasters—earthquakes, floods and storms—affect democracy by altering economic outcomes. The results indicate that earthquakes and floods improve the level of democracy, while storms lead to non-democratic transitions, particularly in island countries.

Political institutions as substitute for democracy: a political economy analysis of economic growth

This manuscript empirically assesses the effects of political institutions on economic growth. It analyzes how political institutions affect economic growth in different stages of democratization and economic development by means of dynamic panel estimation with interaction terms. The new empirical results obtained show that political institutions work as a substitute for democracy promoting economic growth. In other words, political institutions are important for increasing economic growth, mainly when democracy is not consolidated. Moreover, political institutions are extremely relevant to economic outcomes in periods of transition to democracy and in poor countries with high ethnical fractionalization.

Hybrid political institutions and governability: the budgetary process in Brazil

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.