986 resultados para political costs
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After years of economic crisis, resulting in significant changes to economic governance at EU level, especially for the eurozone, the time has come to consider the longer term political and economic implications of this new situation for the economic integration process. Not only to determine how well the system is likely to function but also what more needs to be done to ensure long-term stability and to provide the EU institutions with sufficient political legitimacy to carry out this new role. This article does not consider abolishing the euro, based on the conviction that introducing the euro created a path dependency that makes trying to unpick the seams of the process extremely costly. While, economically, the exit of one eurozone member state might conceivably be manageable (but costly, especially for that country), the long term political costs might end up unravelling the whole European integration process, with the potential for a bankrupt and politically unstable state outside the euro but still within the EU. However, the status quo situation is still unstable, politically and economically, and needs further policy reforms.
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Non-state insurgent actors are too weak to compel powerful adversaries to their will, so they use violence to coerce. A principal objective is to grow and sustain violent resistance to the point that it either militarily challenges the state, or more commonly, generates unacceptable political costs. To survive, insurgents must shift popular support away from the state and to grow they must secure it. State actor policies and actions perceived as illegitimate and oppressive by the insurgent constituency can generate these shifts. A promising insurgent strategy is to attack states in ways that lead angry publics and leaders to discount the historically established risks and take flawed but popular decisions to use repressive measures. Such decisions may be enabled by a visceral belief in the power of coercion and selective use of examples of where robust measures have indeed suppressed resistance. To avoid such counterproductive behaviours the cases of apparent 'successful repression' must be understood. This thesis tests whether robust state action is correlated with reduced support for insurgents, analyses the causal mechanisms of such shifts and examines whether such reduction is because of compulsion or coercion? The approach is founded on prior research by the RAND Corporation which analysed the 30 insurgencies most recently resolved worldwide to determine factors of counterinsurgent success. This new study first re-analyses their data at a finer resolution with new queries that investigate the relationship between repression and insurgent active support. Having determined that, in general, repression does not correlate with decreased insurgent support, this study then analyses two cases in which the data suggests repression seems likely to be reducing insurgent support: the PKK in Turkey and the insurgency against the Vietnamese-sponsored regime after their ousting of the Khmer Rouge. It applies 'structured-focused' case analysis with questions partly built from the insurgency model of Leites and Wolf, who are associated with the advocacy of US robust means in Vietnam. This is thus a test of 'most difficult' cases using a 'least likely' test model. Nevertheless, the findings refute the deterrence argument of 'iron fist' advocates. Robust approaches may physically prevent effective support of insurgents but they do not coercively deter people from being willing to actively support the insurgency.
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Esta pesquisa investigou as motivações econômicas que explicam o nível de reconhecimento dos tributos diferidos sobre o lucro nas companhias abertas brasileiras no período inicial de adoção das IFRS no Brasil e da vigência obrigatória do Regime Tributário de Transição. Foram selecionadas companhias abertas não financeiras brasileiras componentes no índice IBrX 100, sendo identificadas 68 companhias nos anos de 2010 à 2013 compreendendo assim 272 observações. A análise descritiva dos dados evidenciou que o montante dos passivos fiscais diferidos foi superior ao montante dos ativos fiscais diferidos em todos os anos pesquisados, situação esta que contrata com o cenário pré-IFRS onde existiam menos passivos fiscais diferidos devido às reduzidas opções de exclusões temporárias, e que os ativos fiscais diferidos são majoritariamente oriundos de diferenças temporárias, porém ocorrendo um crescimento maior dos créditos fiscais referentes a prejuízos fiscais no período combinado com uma evolução maior dos ativos fiscais totais do que dos passivos fiscais diferidos. Por meio da análise multivariada de regressão múltipla com dados em painel foi possível constatar que: (i) não há relacionamento significativo entre o reconhecimento de tributos diferidos e o endividamento da empresa, isto é, não existe evidência que as companhias utilizem os tributos diferidos com a finalidade de influenciar o nível de endividamento, apesar da possibilidade de quebra de covenants e, consequentemente, aumento de seu risco de crédito, (ii) as maiores empresas tendem a registrar um valor menor de ativos fiscais diferidos líquidos de forma a reduzir seus lucros e divulgar sua sobretaxação a fim de reduzir sua exposição pública, e (iii) as empresas menos lucrativas são propensas a reconhecer um montante maior de ativos fiscais diferidos líquidos para, presumivelmente, atenuar o baixo resultado da empresa e com isso mascarar o seu fraco desempenho, e também, por outro lado, as companhias que possuem maior rentabilidade tendem a registrar valores menores de ativos fiscais diferidos líquidos no sentido de reduzir o lucro, e com isso, diminuir seus custos políticos. Assim, os resultados obtidos sugerem que as empresas utilizam a discricionariedade proporcionada pela regulação contábil dos tributos diferidos para atingir seus objetivos e demandas, no sentido de reduzir sua exposição pública e melhorar sua rentabilidade.
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We use a formal bargaining model to examine why, in many domestic and international bargaining situations, one or both negotiators make public statements in front of their constituents committing themselves to obtaining certain benefits in the negotiations. We find that making public commitments provides bargaining leverage, when backing down from such commitments carries domestic political costs. However, when the two negotiators face fairly similar costs for violating a public commitment, a prisoner's dilemma is created in which both sides make high public demands which cannot be satisfied, and both negotiators would be better off if they could commit to not making public demands. However, making a public demand is a dominant strategy for each negotiator, and this leads to a suboptimal outcome. Escaping this prisoner's dilemma provides a rationale for secret negotiations. Testable hypotheses are derived from the nature of the commitments and agreements made in equilibrium.
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The Japanese economy entered a long recession in spring 1997. Its economic growth has been much lower than in the US and the EU despite large fiscal stimulus packages, a monetary policy which has brought interest rates to zero since 1999, injections of public money to recapitalize banks, and programs of liberalization and deregulation. How could all these policies have failed to bring the Japanese economy back on a sustainable growth path? This paper argues that the failure of Japan's efforts to restore a sound economic environment is the result of having deliberately chosen inappropriate and inadequate monetary and fiscal instruments to tackle the macroeconomic and structural problems that have burdened the Japanese economy since the burst of the financial bubble at the beginning of the 90s. These choices were deliberate, since the "right" policies (in primis the resolution of the banking crisis) presented unbearable political costs, not only for the ruling parties, but also for the bureaucratic and business elites. The misfortunes of the Japanese economy during the long recession not only allow us to draw important economic policy lessons, but also stimulate reflections on the disruptive role on economic policies caused by powerful vested interests when an economy needs broad and deep structural changes. The final part of the paper focuses on ways to tackle Japan's banking crisis. In particular, it explores the Scandinavian solution, which, mutatis mutandis, might serve Japanese policy-makers well.
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Temporary work has expanded in the last three decades with adverse implications for inequalities. Because temporary workers are a constituency that is unlikely to impose political costs, governments often choose to reduce temporary work regulations. While most European countries have indeed implemented such reforms, France went in the opposite direction, despite having both rigid labour markets and high unemployment. My argument to solve this puzzle is that where replaceability is high, workers in permanent and temporary contracts have overlapping interests, and governments choose to regulate temporary work to protect permanent workers. In turn, replaceability is higher where permanent workers’ skills are general and wage coordination is low. Logistic regression analysis of the determinants of replaceability — and how this affects governments’ reforms of temporary work regulations — supports my argument. Process tracing of French reforms also confirm that the left has tightened temporary work regulations to compensate for the high replaceability.
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A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities, macroeconomic and structural measures that a requesting country should adopt to obtain an assistance package. The objective of this work is to conduct an empirical analysis of the economic and political determinants of such conditionalities. In particular, our main contribution consists in the development of a new measure of conditionality, fiscal adjustment, and its comparison with the most used in the literature, the number of conditions. We choose fiscal adjustment because it is an adequate proxy for program austerity, since its implementation carries economic and political costs. In the empirical exercise, we use data from 184 programs in the period of 1999 and 2012, and estimate how our two measures of conditionalities respond to the economic and political factors. Our results suggest that they are quite different. The main determinant of the number of conditions is the political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders, the members of G5. On the other hand, the main determinant of fiscal adjustment is the size of the government fiscal deficit. Finally, we did not find correlation between the size of fiscal adjustment and the number of conditions. These results suggest that the analysis of the content of IMF programs should take into account the different measures of agreed conditionality.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography
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The European Union is founded on a set of common principles of democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union. Whereas future Member States are vetted for their compliance with these values before they accede to the Union, no similar method exists to supervise adherence to these foundational principles after accession. EU history proved that this ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ was far from theoretical. EU Member State governments’ adherence to foundational EU values cannot be taken for granted. Violations may happen in individual cases, or in a systemic way, which may go as far as overthrowing the rule of law. Against this background the European Parliament initiated a Legislative Own-Initiative Report on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and proposed among others a Scoreboard on the basis of common and objective indicators by which foundational values can be measured. This Research Paper assesses the need and possibilities for the establishment of an EU Scoreboard, as well as its related social, economic, legal and political ‘costs and benefits’.
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Earnings from gold mining in Australia remained tax-exempt for almost seven decades until January 1, 1991. In the early 1980s, rapid economic prosperity induced by escalated gold prices brought the Australian gold-mining industry under intense political scrutiny. Using a variant of the modified Jones model, this paper provides evidence of significant downward earnings management by Australian gold-mining firms, which is consistent with their attempts to mitigate political costs during the period from June 1985 to May 1988. In contrast, test of earnings management over a similar period in a control sample of Canadian gold-mining firms produced insignificant results. Further, empirical results are robust to several sensitivity tests performed. During the period from June 1988 to December 1990, the Australian firms were found to have engaged in economic earnings management. This is consistent with the sample firms' incentive of maximizing economic earnings immediately prior to the introduction of income tax on gold mining. The findings of this study help to understand the impact of earnings management on the efficient resource allocation in an economy. They also contribute toward understanding the linkage between regulation of accounting for special purposes and general-purpose financial. reporting.