Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making

The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome ex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.

Understanding China's climate change mitigation policy development: Structures, processes and outcomes

Climate change is one of the most important and urgent issues of our time. Since 2006, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter. China’s role in an international climate change solution has gained increased attention. Although much literature has addressed the functioning, performance, and implications of existing climate change mitigation policies and actions in China, there is insufficient literature that illuminates how the national climate change mitigation policies have been formulated and shaped. This research utilizes the policy network approach to explore China’s climate change mitigation policy making by examining how a variety of government, business, and civil society actors have formed networks to address environmental contexts and influence the policy outcomes and changes. The study is qualitative in nature. Three cases are selected to illustrate structural and interactive features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different policy arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. The three cases include the regulatory evolution of China’s climate change policy making; the country’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) activity, and China’s exploration of voluntary agreement through adopting the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. The historical analysis of the policy process uses both primary data from interviews and fieldwork, and secondary data from relevant literature. The study finds that the Chinese central government dominates domestic climate change policy making; however, expanded action networks that involve actors at all levels have emerged in correspondence to diverse climate mitigation policy arrangements. The improved openness and accessibility of climate change policy network have contributed to its proactive engagement in promoting mitigation outcomes. In conclusion, the research suggests that the policy network approach provides a useful tool for studying China’s climate change policy making process. The involvement of various types of state and non-state actors has shaped new relations and affected the policy outcomes and changes. In addition, through the cross-case analysis, the study challenges the “fragmented authoritarianism” model and argues that this once-influential model is not appropriate in explaining new development and changes of policy making processes in contemporary China.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT THROUGH POLICY-MAKING A Case Study of the Brazilian Central Bank

A number of contemporary studies rightly emphasize the notion that policy outcomes result from institutional determinants. But as a growing literature on institutional development notes, these institutions are themselves impermanent. Sometimes, in crisis moments, institutions are replaced wholesale. More frequently, institutions evolve gradually over time. Using the Brazilian Central Bank as a case study, this article illustrates that the policy-making process itself can be a central driver of gradual institutional development, with institutions evolving through the accumulation of policy choices made over many years and under different policymakers in response to contemporaneous events and unforeseeable economic and political challenges.

The Role of Parliaments in European foreign policy

This book addresses the debate on the democratic deficit of European foreign and defence policies. This debate revolves around two dimensions. The first one has to do with the accountability of CFSP institutions. Is the current degree of parliamentary oversight of these policies the most appropriate? Has the disengagement of national parliaments regarding European foreign policy been counterbalanced by giving sufficient powers to the European Parliament? And, regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), are national parliaments effectively controlling it? The second dimension of the debate is related to the wider question of whether the European Parliament is capable of legitimising EU policy outcomes. In the absence of a Europe-wide demos and of a true party system, what interests do Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent when dealing with foreign policy issues? Are there transnational cleavages in foreign policy or are they mainly national? Furthermore, is the European Parliament developing a transnational, autonomous stance on foreign policy issues, different from that of the Council or the Commission? The present volume is the result of the 2nd Meeting of the FORNET Working Group on “Evolution and Accountability of CFSP Institutions” organised by the Observatory of European Foreign Policy (Research line of the Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus), which took place in Barcelona, the 4 and 5 March 2005.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them.

Complexity theory and planning: examining 'fractals' for organising policy domains in planning practice

This article examines selected methodological insights that complexity theory might provide for planning. In particular, it focuses on the concept of fractals and, through this concept, how ways of organising policy domains across scales might have particular causal impacts. The aim of this article is therefore twofold: (a) to position complexity theory within social science through a ‘generalised discourse’, thereby orienting it to particular ontological and epistemological biases and (b) to reintroduce a comparatively new concept – fractals – from complexity theory in a way that is consistent with the ontological and epistemological biases argued for, and expand on the contribution that this might make to planning. Complexity theory is theoretically positioned as a neo-systems theory with reasons elaborated. Fractal systems from complexity theory are systems that exhibit self-similarity across scales. This concept (as previously introduced by the author in ‘Fractal spaces in planning and governance’) is further developed in this article to (a) illustrate the ontological and epistemological claims for complexity theory, and to (b) draw attention to ways of organising policy systems across scales to emphasise certain characteristics of the systems – certain distinctions. These distinctions when repeated across scales reinforce associated processes/values/end goals resulting in particular policy outcomes. Finally, empirical insights from two case studies in two different policy domains are presented and compared to illustrate the workings of fractals in planning practice.

Fairness, Justice and an Individual Basis for Public Policy

Prior models of the policy process have examined how human characteristics can affect policy decision-making in such a way that it leads to aggregate effects on policy outcomes as a whole. I develop a model of the policy process which suggests that emotions related to fair and unfair experiences in the same policy domain are utilized by decision-makers as policy criteria. In the lab, I empirically tested this, and find that emotions and experience related to fairness do influence the policy decision to move away from the status quo alternative. Based upon this result, I simulated the evolution of a society of agents engaged in decision-making using similar criteria. The simulation suggests that incentives have an important role in leading to cooperation and social success. The external validity of the simulation also implies that it can act as a platform for future evolutionary policy experimentation.

Exceptional or just well connected? Political entrepreneurs and brokers in policy making

Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes; for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space. Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors; and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power, Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one on EU competition and transport policy.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

A comparative state policy analysis of the adoption of birth defects surveillance legislation

Birth defects are the leading cause of infant mortality in the United States and are a major cause of lifetime disability. However, efforts to understand their causes have been hampered by a lack of population-specific data. During 1990–2004, 22 state legislatures responded to this need by proposing birth defects surveillance legislation (BDSL). The contrast between these states and those that did not pass BDSL provides an opportunity to better understand conditions associated with US public health policy diffusion. ^ This study identifies key state-specific determinants that predict: (1) the introduction of birth defects surveillance legislation (BDSL) onto states' formal legislative agenda, and (2) the successful adoption of these laws. Secondary aims were to interpret these findings in a theoretically sound framework and to incorporate evidence from three analytical approaches. ^ The study begins with a comparative case study of Texas and Oregon (states with divergent BDSL outcomes), including a review of historical documentation and content analysis of key informant interviews. After selecting and operationalizing explanatory variables suggested by the case study, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was applied to publically available data to describe important patterns of variation among 37 states. Results from logistic regression were compared to determine whether the two methods produced consistent findings. ^ Themes emerging from the comparative case study included differing budgetary conditions and the significance of relationships within policy issue networks. However, the QCA and statistical analysis pointed to the importance of political parties and contrasting societal contexts. Notably, state policies that allow greater access to citizen-driven ballot initiatives were consistently associated with lower likelihood of introducing BDSL. ^ Methodologically, these results indicate that a case study approach, while important for eliciting valuable context-specific detail, may fail to detect the influence of overarching, systemic variables, such as party competition. However, QCA and statistical analyses were limited by a lack of existing data to operationalize policy issue networks, and thus may have downplayed the impact of personal interactions. ^ This study contributes to the field of health policy studies in three ways. First, it emphasizes the importance of collegial and consistent relationships among policy issue network members. Second, it calls attention to political party systems in predicting policy outcomes. Finally, a novel approach to interpreting state data in a theoretically significant manner (QCA) has been demonstrated.^

Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.