Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology which gives a near exclusive focus to questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers' arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical enquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.

Queering the Cross-Cultural Imagination: (Trans)Subjectivity and Wilson Harris's The Palace of the Peacock

Ce mémoire comprend deux volets : une étude théorique et un texte de création littéraire. Dans un premier temps, il s’agir d’étudier le rôle du désir dans la démarche thématique et philosophique employée par l’écrivain Wilson Harris dans son roman The Palace of the Peacock. Ainsi démonterons-nous dans le premier chapitre que Harris se sert – de façon paradoxale – du désir empirique pour faire valoir les limites mêmes de celui-ci. Nous aborderons dans le deuxième chapitre le rapport problématique qu’entretient, chez Harris, la subjectivité féminine avec la subjectivité masculine. En particulier, nous examinerons la représentation de ce rapport sous la forme de métaphores ayant trait à l’environnement et à l’anatomie. Nous avancerons que le caractère problématique que revêt le rapport entre subjectivités féminine et masculine dans le roman est en quelque sorte nécessitée par l’écriture même de Harris. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous prendrons part aux débats sur la poétique qui animent la littérature contemporaine afin de situer notre propre élan vers la création littéraire. En même temps, nous entreprendrons une tentative de récupération de certains des concepts théoriques formulés par Harris, en lien avec notre propre poétique. S’ensuivra notre projet de création littéraire, intitulé HEROISM/EULOGIES, qui constitue le quatrième et dernier chapitre du mémoire. Ce texte, extrait d’un projet d’écriture créative plus vaste, trace les mouvements d’un certain nombre de sujets à travers une Amérique imaginée.

Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions

Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods (where intuitions are concerned) be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: (i) we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; (ii) we should carve intuitions finely; and, (iii) we should carve to a grain to which we are sensitive in our everyday philosophising. The reason is that, unless we do so, we don’t get what we want from philosophical methodology. I argue that what we want is information that will aid us in formulating practical advice concerning how to do philosophy responsibly/well/better.

How “intuition” exploded

Recent decades have seen a surge in interest in metaphilosophy. In particular there has been an interest in philosophical methodology. Various questions have been asked about philosophical methods. Are our methods any good? Can we improve upon them? Prior to such evaluative and ameliorative concerns, however, is the matter of what methods philosophers actually use. Worryingly, our understanding of philosophical methodology is impoverished in various respects. This article considers one particular respect in which we seem to be missing an important part of the picture. While it is a received wisdom that the word “intuition” has exploded across analytic philosophy in recent decades, the article presents evidence that the explosion is apparent across a broad swathe of academia (and perhaps beyond). It notes various implications for current methodological debates about the role of intuitions in philosophy.

Intuitions in the Face of Diversity

In recent decades, intuitions' role in philosophy has been hotly debated. Many claim intuitions play an important role. Others, some armed with data, challenge the use of intuitions. This thesis reflects on this debate and advances the debate in two main ways. Having a clear understanding of the challenge which intuition-use in philosophy faces is important. Part I focuses on this. Chapters 1-2 introduce the topic of intuitions, motivate the methodological study of intuitions, and present the historical background to recent empirical challenges to intuition-use. Chapters 3-5 concern the contemporary challenge. I present the empirical evidence the challenge uses, present what I argue to be the strongest version of the challenge, and defend that challenge against some objections. How one characterises intuitions is incredibly important in philosophical methodology. If we are to properly evaluate philosophical methods vis-a-vis their use of something called intuitions { if we are to assess the empirical challenge { it is important to be clear exactly what we mean by `intuitions'. Part II focuses on this. Chapter 6 argues there is little consensus among philosophers as to what intuitions are and their role in philosophy. Chapter 7 questions whether philosophers have developed an idiolect in which `intuition' has distinctive meaning | as frequently supposed. Chapter 8 points out a common misunderstanding about intuitions in philosophy; using quantitative tools to challenge the idea that an increased use of `intuition' in philosophy is the result of an increased use of intuition. So, the developing picture is one of confusion, without a clear idea of what sense of `intuition' is important. Fortunately, Chapter 9 sets us back on the right track. It sets out a positive programme for evaluative methodology: methodologists should adopt a permissive conception of intuitions and make fine distinctions between different intuitions, so long as we can track those distinctions while philosophising.

Platão e Aristóteles na filosofia da matemática

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Repensando o sentido formativo da atividade filosófica à luz do “Trabalho sobre si-mesmo” de Wittgenstein: se filosofar é trabalhar sobre si, o que se trabalha quando se filosofa?

Pós-graduação em Educação - FFC

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: transcendental phenomenology, science, and naturalism

In this paper, I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty's work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty's work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a "modest" rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty – e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty's work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, I seek to establish that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.

A novella of ideas : how interactive new media art can effectively communicate an indigenous philosophical concept

How interactive new media art can effectively communicate an indigenous philosophical concept. The sophistication and complexity of the philosophical concept concerning relationships between land and people and between people, intrinsic to the laws and customs of Australian Indigenous society, has begun to be communicated and accessed beyond the realm of anthropological and ethnological domains of Western scholarship. The exciting scope and rapid development of new media arts presents an innovative means of creating an interactive relationship with the general Australian public, addressing the urgent need for an understanding of Indigenous Australian concepts of relationship to land, and to each other, absent from Western narratives. The study is framed by an Indigenous concept of place, and relationships between land and people and between people; and explores how this concept can be clearly communicated through interactive new media arts. It involves: a creative project, the development of an interactive new media art project, a website work-in-progress titled site\sight\cite; and an exegesis, a Novella of Ideas, on the origins, influences, objectives, and potential of creative practices and processes engaged in the creative project. Research undertaken for the creative project and exegesis extended my creative practice into the use of interdisciplinary arts, expressly for the expression of philosophical concepts, consolidating 23 years experience in Indigenous community arts development. The creative project and exegesis contributes to an existing body of Indigenous work in a range of areas - including education, the arts and humanities - which bridges old and new society in Australia. In this study, old and new society is defined by the time of the initial production of art and foundations of knowledge, in the country of its origins, in Indigenous Australia dating back at least 40,000 years.

On the applicability of mathematics : philosophical and historical perspectives

The present thesis is a contribution to the debate on the applicability of mathematics; it examines the interplay between mathematics and the world, using historical case studies. The first part of the thesis consists of four small case studies. In chapter 1, I criticize "ante rem structuralism", proposed by Stewart Shapiro, by showing that his so-called "finite cardinal structures" are in conflict with mathematical practice. In chapter 2, I discuss Leonhard Euler's solution to the Königsberg bridges problem. I propose interpreting Euler's solution both as an explanation within mathematics and as a scientific explanation. I put the insights from the historical case to work against recent philosophical accounts of the Königsberg case. In chapter 3, I analyze the predator-prey model, proposed by Lotka and Volterra. I extract some interesting philosophical lessons from Volterra's original account of the model, such as: Volterra's remarks on mathematical methodology; the relation between mathematics and idealization in the construction of the model; some relevant details in the derivation of the Third Law, and; notions of intervention that are motivated by one of Volterra's main mathematical tools, phase spaces. In chapter 4, I discuss scientific and mathematical attempts to explain the structure of the bee's honeycomb. In the first part, I discuss a candidate explanation, based on the mathematical Honeycomb Conjecture, presented in Lyon and Colyvan (2008). I argue that this explanation is not scientifically adequate. In the second part, I discuss other mathematical, physical and biological studies that could contribute to an explanation of the bee's honeycomb. The upshot is that most of the relevant mathematics is not yet sufficiently understood, and there is also an ongoing debate as to the biological details of the construction of the bee's honeycomb. The second part of the thesis is a bigger case study from physics: the genesis of GR. Chapter 5 is a short introduction to the history, physics and mathematics that is relevant to the genesis of general relativity (GR). Chapter 6 discusses the historical question as to what Marcel Grossmann contributed to the genesis of GR. I will examine the so-called "Entwurf" paper, an important joint publication by Einstein and Grossmann, containing the first tensorial formulation of GR. By comparing Grossmann's part with the mathematical theories he used, we can gain a better understanding of what is involved in the first steps of assimilating a mathematical theory to a physical question. In chapter 7, I introduce, and discuss, a recent account of the applicability of mathematics to the world, the Inferential Conception (IC), proposed by Bueno and Colyvan (2011). I give a short exposition of the IC, offer some critical remarks on the account, discuss potential philosophical objections, and I propose some extensions of the IC. In chapter 8, I put the Inferential Conception (IC) to work in the historical case study: the genesis of GR. I analyze three historical episodes, using the conceptual apparatus provided by the IC. In episode one, I investigate how the starting point of the application process, the "assumed structure", is chosen. Then I analyze two small application cycles that led to revisions of the initial assumed structure. In episode two, I examine how the application of "new" mathematics - the application of the Absolute Differential Calculus (ADC) to gravitational theory - meshes with the IC. In episode three, I take a closer look at two of Einstein's failed attempts to find a suitable differential operator for the field equations, and apply the conceptual tools provided by the IC so as to better understand why he erroneously rejected both the Ricci tensor and the November tensor in the Zurich Notebook.

Che Vuoi? Politico-philosophical remarks on Leo Strauss' Spinoza

Rumors surrounding the Hebraic-American classical philosopher Leo Strauss’ supposed influence on leading neoconservative politicians and commentators make reconsidering Leo Strauss’ thought and legacy a philosophical task of the first political importance today. A host of articles have appeared by students and (more recently) books by Stephen Smith (2006), Heinrich Meier (2006) and Catherine and Michael Zuckert (2006). This essay is proffered as a critical contribution, by a non-Straussian student, to this literature. Its methodology and justification is to return to and reconsider Strauss’ earliest works, on the ‘political theology’ of Benedict de Spinoza. The paper argues two theses. The first is that the popular depiction of Strauss as an esoteric Nietzschean hiding behind a ‘noble’ classical or theological veneer importantly misses the mark. The second is that Strauss’ early work shows his proximity, via Jacobi, to the Heideggerian disclosure of the groundless grounds of philosophical reason, given which one must extra-rationally choose reason over faith. One striking implication of this argument, in the contemporary political climate, is to underscore the unlikely convergence between the philosophical sources of neoconservative and the ‘post-structuralist’ thought associated with much of the intellectual left in France and the Anglophone world. Yet in contrast to the widespread image of Strauss, I argue that the mature Strauss’ continuing commitment to this decisionistic framework is in fact most clear is his ‘exoteric,’ public statements on religion – i.e. it is not the ‘esoteric’ purloined letter Strauss’ critics seek out. The reason for Strauss’ continuing public advocacy of the impossibility of reason’s disproving faith, I propose, highlights the primarily political (versus philosophical) nature of this turn: in Strauss’ conservative acceptance of the political necessity of religion for social order, framed in terms of a revised commitment to the ‘medieval’ (versus modern) enlightenment of Maimonides and Farabi.

Semantic linking through spaces for cyber-physical-socio intelligence:a methodology

Humans consciously and subconsciously establish various links, emerge semantic images and reason in mind, learn linking effect and rules, select linked individuals to interact, and form closed loops through links while co-experiencing in multiple spaces in lifetime. Machines are limited in these abilities although various graph-based models have been used to link resources in the cyber space. The following are fundamental limitations of machine intelligence: (1) machines know few links and rules in the physical space, physiological space, psychological space, socio space and mental space, so it is not realistic to expect machines to discover laws and solve problems in these spaces; and, (2) machines can only process pre-designed algorithms and data structures in the cyber space. They are limited in ability to go beyond the cyber space, to learn linking rules, to know the effect of linking, and to explain computing results according to physical, physiological, psychological and socio laws. Linking various spaces will create a complex space — the Cyber-Physical-Physiological-Psychological-Socio-Mental Environment CP3SME. Diverse spaces will emerge, evolve, compete and cooperate with each other to extend machine intelligence and human intelligence. From multi-disciplinary perspective, this paper reviews previous ideas on various links, introduces the concept of cyber-physical society, proposes the ideal of the CP3SME including its definition, characteristics, and multi-disciplinary revolution, and explores the methodology of linking through spaces for cyber-physical-socio intelligence. The methodology includes new models, principles, mechanisms, scientific issues, and philosophical explanation. The CP3SME aims at an ideal environment for humans to live and work. Exploration will go beyond previous ideals on intelligence and computing.

Existentialist methodology and perspective: writing the first-person

Without proposing anything quite so grandiose as a return to existentialism, in this paper we aim to articulate and minimally defend certain core existentialist insights concerning the first-person perspective, the relationship between theory and practice, and the mode of philosophical presentation conducive to best making those points. We will do this by considering some of the central methodological objections that have been posed around the role of the first-person perspective and “lived experience” in the contemporary literature, before providing some neo-existentialist rejoinders. We will suggest that the dilemma that contemporary philosophy poses to existentialism, vis-à-vis methodology, is that it is: a) committed to lived experience as some sort of given that might be accessed either introspectively or retrospectively (with empirical science posing prima facie obstacles to the veridicality of each); and/or b) it advocates transformative experiences, and the power of philosophy in connection with such experiences, to radically revise our doxastic and inter-connected web of beliefs. In short, the charge is conservatism on the one hand, radicalism on the other. Each of these concerns will be addressed in turn, utilizing ideas from Kierkegaard (as the source for many existentialist themes, methodological concerns, and formal practices) and from the German and French twentieth century versions of existentialism