41 resultados para pecuniary interestsMunicipal
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RÉSUMÉ FRANÇAIS Ce mémoire fait l’étude du régime de prévention et de sanction des conflits possibles entre les intérêts de la municipalité d’une part et de ceux de ses élus de l’autre. L’objet de recherche est abordé selon une approche historique et éthique basée sur le régime juridique actuel. Le mémoire est divisé en 3 chapitres : (1) la notion de conflit d’intérêts ; (2) le cadre juridique à la base du régime de sanction des conflits d’intérêts et (3) celui sur le régime de prévention des conflits d’intérêts dans le domaine municipal. Le chapitre préliminaire situe l’objet de recherche à l’intérieur des grandes tendances de la recherche juridique sur la question et présente un cadre de réflexion sur la notion de conflit d’intérêts. L’examen des conflits d’intérêts repose avant tout sur un questionnement et sur un jugement de nature subjective : ce qui a été considéré comme un conflit d’intérêts autrefois ne l’est pas nécessairement de nos jours et ce, en dépit du fait que le cadre juridique évolue aussi dans le temps. On ne peut donc pas dégager avec exactitude et pour toujours ce qui constitue un conflit d’intérêts de ce qui n’en constitue pas un. Le chapitre premier est divisé en 4 sections. On y traite notamment de la règle relative à l’interdiction pour un élu municipal de contracter avec la municipalité. On y démontre que l’origine de cette règle remonte aux premières lois municipales du XIXe siècle et que cette dernière a subi assez peu de modifications au fil des ans. La troisième section porte sur les cas de malversation, d’abus de confiance et les autres inconduites prohibées par la Loi sur les élections et référendums dans les municipalités (L.R.Q. c. E-2.2). Une quatrième section sur les accusations criminelles d’abus de confiance et de corruption vient clore le premier chapitre. Chacune de ces sections est abordée notamment en faisant l’historique des dispositions législatives en cause ainsi qu’en faisant certains parallèles avec la législation des autres provinces canadiennes. Le chapitre 2 sur le régime de prévention des conflits d’intérêts est divisé en 4 parties. La première section porte sur l’obligation pour un élu de déclarer annuellement ses intérêts pécuniaires. Cette obligation n’est pas unique au Québec puisqu’elle est présente dans quelques législations provinciales canadiennes. La deuxième section porte sur l’obligation pour cet élu de dénoncer verbalement son intérêt dans une question abordée par le conseil municipal réuni en séance ou en comité. Là encore, l’origine de cette approche préventive est fort ancienne et a longtemps été considéré comme le seul moyen de dénoncer son intérêt sans subir les sanctions prévues par la loi. Une troisième section s’intéresse au cadre juridique entourant les soumissions publiques et qui vise à éliminer toute situation possible de favoritisme ou de patronage. Une quatrième section aborde la question des codes d’éthique et de leur utilité ainsi que les développements récents sur cette question avec le dépôt en 2009 du rapport du Groupe de travail sur l’éthique dans le milieu municipal. Une conclusion vient clore le mémoire en présentant une synthèse de l’étude assortie de commentaires personnels sur les conclusions du Groupe de travail précité.
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This paper verifies the relationship between income inequality and pecuniary crimes. The elasticity of pecuniary crimes relative to inequality is 1.46, corroborating previous literature. Other factors important to decrease criminality are expanding job opportunities and a more efficient legal system, (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on constrained inefficiencies in economies with financial frictions. The purpose is to present two simple examples, inspired by the stochastic models in Gersbach-Rochet (2012) and Lorenzoni (2008), of deterministic environments in which such inefficiencies arise through credit constraints. Common to both examples is a pecuniary externality, which operates through an asset price. In the second example, a simple transfer between two groups of agents can bring about a Pareto improvement. In a first best economy, there are no pecuniary externalities because marginal productivities are equalised. But when agents face credit constraints, there is a wedge between their marginal productivities and those of the non-credit-constrained agents. The wedge is the source of the pecuniary externality: economies with these kinds of imperfections in credit markets are not second-best efficient. This is akin to the constrained inefficiency of an economy with incomplete markets, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
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We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.
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Agreement signed at Washington, Aug. 18, 1910, by James Bryce and Philander C. Knox.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física
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This study examines the quantification of compensation for non-pecuniary damage, awarded by means of judicial decisions based on equity, and seeks to verify whether such calculation safeguards legal certainty and predictability when applying the law, as well as whether it observes the principles of proportionality and equality. Firstly, the limits for discretionary judgment permitted to the judge were determined, by evaluating the criteria established under the law. Then, by examining the grounds of the judicial decisions in cases that had been selected beforehand, this study sought to detect operation modes in concrete considerations of equity used by judges. The examination of the grounds on which these judicial decisions are based permitted the comprehension of the calculation method used in each case and the observation that the criteria of compensatory nature, such as the extent of the damage and the respective consequences, assumed a primary role. Despite discrepancies in viewpoints with regard to certain issues of law, the jurisprudence examined reveals that great care is taken to consider the solutions reached in similar cases, in an attempt to ensure that the different criteria applied in the quantification of compensation are given uniform relevance. The comparison of decisions, reported to cases with similar legal contours, did not reveal relevant discrepancies in the calculation criteria used, nor are they disproportionate regarding the amount of compensation awarded, which means that resorting to equity, in determining the compensation to be awarded due to nonpecuniary damage, does not jeopardize legal certainty or predictability when applying the law, and observes the principle of proportionality, which is anchored in the constitutional principle of equality. The study performed, led to the conclusion that the grounds on which judicial decisions are based, by itemising the elements which are taken into account and the criteria adopted by the judge, allow these to be taken into consideration in similar cases, contributing towards uniform interpretation and application of the law, ensuring legal certainty and predictability when resorting to equity while quantifying compensation.
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Relatório de atividade profissional de mestrado em Direito dos Contratos e da Empresa
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This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.
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In this paper we examine whether variations in the level of public capital across Spain‟s Provinces affected productivity levels over the period 1996-2005. The analysis is motivated by contemporary urban economics theory, involving a production function for the competitive sector of the economy („industry‟) which includes the level of composite services derived from „service‟ firms under monopolistic competition. The outcome is potentially increasing returns to scale resulting from pecuniary externalities deriving from internal increasing returns in the monopolistic competition sector. We extend the production function by also making (log) labour efficiency a function of (log) total public capital stock and (log) human capital stock, leading to a simple and empirically tractable reduced form linking productivity level to density of employment, human capital and public capital stock. The model is further extended to include technological externalities or spillovers across provinces. Using panel data methodology, we find significant elasticities for total capital stock and for human capital stock, and a significant impact for employment density. The finding that the effect of public capital is significantly different from zero, indicating that it has a direct effect even after controlling for employment density, is contrary to some of the earlier research findings which leave the question of the impact of public capital unresolved.
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Institutional and organizational variety is increasingly characterizing advanced economic systems. While traditional economic theories have focused almost exclusively on profit-maximizing (i.e., for-profit) enterprises and on publicly-owned organizations, the increasing relevance of non-profit organizations, and especially of social enterprises, requires scientists to reflect on a new comprehensive economic approach for explaining this organizational variety. This paper examines the main limitations of the orthodox and institutional theories and asserts the need for creating and testing a new theoretical framework, which considers the way in which diverse enterprises pursue their goals, the diverse motivations driving actors and organizations, and the different learning patterns and routines within organizations. The new analytical framework proposed in the paper draws upon recent developments in the theories of the firm, mainly of an evolutionary and behavioral kind. The firm is interpreted as a coordination mechanism of economic activity, and one whose objectives need not coincide with profit maximization. On the other hand, economic agents driven by motivational complexity and intrinsic, non-monetary motivation play a crucial role in forming firm activity over and above purely monetary and financial objectives. The new framework is thought to be particularly suitable to correctly interpret the emergence and role of nontraditional organizational and ownership forms that are not driven by the profit motive (non-profit organizations), mainly recognized in the legal forms of cooperative firms, non-profit organizations and social enterprises. A continuum of organizational forms ranging from profit making activities to public benefit activities, and encompassing mutual benefit organizations as its core constituent, is envisaged and discussed.
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Drawing on data from two successive cohorts of PhD graduates, this paper analyses differences in overall job satisfaction and specific job domain satisfaction among PhDs employed in different sectors four years after completing their doctorate degrees. Covariate-adjusted job satisfaction differentials suggest that, compared to faculty members, PhD holders employed outside traditional academic and research jobs are more satisfied with the pecuniary facets of their work (principally, because of higher earnings), but significantly less satisfied with the content of their job and with how well the job matches their skills (and, in the case of public sector workers, with their prospects of promotion). The evidence regarding the overall job satisfaction of the PhD holders indicates that working in the public or private sectors is associated with less work well-being, which cannot be fully compensated by the better pecuniary facets of the job. It also appears that being employed in academia or in research centres provides almost the same perceived degree of satisfaction with the job and with its four specific domains. We also take into account the endogenous sorting of PhD holders into different occupations based on latent personal traits that might be related to job satisfaction. The selectivity-corrected job satisfaction differentials reveal the importance of self-selection based on unobservable traits, and confirm the existence of a certain penalisation for working in occupations other than academia or research, which is especially marked in the case of satisfaction with job content and job-skills match. The paper presents additional interesting evidence about the determinants of occupational choice among PhD holders, highlighting the relevance of certain academic attributes (especially PhD funding and pre-and-post-doc research mobility) in affecting the likelihood of being employed in academia, in a research centre or in other public or private sector job four years after completing their doctorate programme.
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Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent models of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as either altruism- based, equity-based, or reciprocity-based. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions.