The Andhra Pradesh Microfinance Crisis and American Payday Lending: Two Studies in Vulnerability

Microcredit, a non-profit lending approach that is often championed as a source of women’s inclusion and empowerment, has in the past decade been followed by microfinance, a forprofit sibling of a different temperament. Microfinance in India is now in turmoil, precipitated by legislation in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which has encouraged withholding of payment, which in turn has frozen the market. This paper considers one precipitating condition of the crisis: the remarkable, new, and developing burden of formal economic debt that poor women in the state have only recently come to hold – debt that now surpasses one year’s family income, on average. The development of this lending sector follows upon innovation in lending to the poor of the global north over the past two decades, and the practices show noteworthy parallels. Both lending schemes have produced similar disproportionate burdens upon some low-status individuals within their respective economic orders, and both may exploit a vulnerability that is born of aspiration and produces great dysfunction for borrowers. This paper introduces the two lending schemes, sketches the parallels, and introduces the claim that ethical finance arrangements for the poor require attention to vulnerability, an under-utilized category in both liberal ethical theory and in finance.

Empirical analysis of the lending decisions of Chinese formal financial institutions in rural areas

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Bank capital and stock performance around the subprime lending risis

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Measuring the impact of short and lending practices using the DGTW benchmarks

Mutual fund managers increasingly lend their holdings and/or use short sales to generate higher returns for their funds. This project presents a first look into the impact these practices on performance using the performance measures: i) Characteristic Selectivity (CS), the ability of the fund's managers to choose stocks that outperform their benchmarks; ii) Characteristic Timing (CT), the ability of the manager to time the market; iii) and Average Style (AS), the returns from funds systematically holding stocks with certain characteristics. These returns are computed through the DGTW benchmarks. The effect of other variables that have also been shown to impact fund’s returns – total net assets under management, investment styles, turnover and expense ratios – will also be analyzed. I find that managers who use short-sales do not exhibit better stock picking abilities than those who do not, while mutual funds that lend do present higher CS returns. In addition, while lending is not significant for the total performance of a fund, the employment of short-sales and of both short-sales and lending has a negative impact on the fund’s performance.

Future lending income and security value

I test the Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen hypothesis that security prices incorporate expected future securities lending income. To determine whether institutional investors anticipate gains from future lending of securities, I examine their trading behavior around loan-fee increases. The evidence suggests that institutions buy shares in response to an increase in lending fees, and that this could explain the premium associated with high- lending-fee stocks. Expected future lending income affects stock prices, although the effect seems to be attenuated by the negative information that arises from short selling.

An empirical study of the effectiveness of Irish banks’ lending regulations

The objective of this thesis will be to examine the effectiveness of lending regulations for Irish banks both prior to and after the collapse of the banking sector. The research developed a profile of the banking sector in Ireland, then evaluate the levels of stability in the Irish banking sector. In the course of this research, the author tried to establish an understanding of who is responsible for lending regulations for banks in Ireland, Investigate in particular: AIB, Ulster Bank & Anglo Irish Bank’s level of compliance with lending regulations between the Celtic Tiger and the present.

Objectives of social entrepreneurs and federal lending programs, and the optimal allocation of external funds

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2010

The Effect of relationship lending on firm performance

We examine how relationship lending affects firm performance using a panel dataset of about 70,000 small and medium Spanish firms in the period 1993-2004. We model firm performance jointly with the firm's choice of the number of bank relationships. Controlling for firm fixed effects and using instrumental variables for the decision on the number of bank relationships, we find that firms maintaining exclusive bank relationships have lower profitability. The result is consistent with the view that banks appropriate most of the value generated through close relationships with its borrowers as long as they do not face competition from other lenders.

Is there Descriminatory Mortgage Pricing against Immigrants in the Spanish Lending Market?

In this paper, we investigate whether evidence of discriminatory treatment against immigrants in the Spanish mortgage market exists. More specifically, we test whether, ceteris paribus, immigrant borrowers tend to be charged with higher interest rates on their mortgages than their Spanish born counterparts. To do so, we use a unique dataset on granted mortgages that contains information not only regarding the conditions of the loan but also the socio-economic characteristics of the mortgagors. We observe that immigrants are systematically charged with higher interest rates. We apply the well known Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to measure the extent to which this disparate treatment of lenders in mortgage pricing against immigrants is due to discrimination. Our results indicate that approximately two thirds of the gap in the interest rate between Spanish born and immigrant borrowers can be attributed to discriminatory treatment. Key words: Immigration, discrimination, mortgage pricing, housing market. JEL codes: R21, G21, J14

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Payday Loans" -- Dollars Down the Drain?, April 2005

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about:"Payday Loans" -- Dollars Down the Drain?

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Lending to the borrower from hell: Debt and default in the age of Philip II, 1556-1598

What sustained borrowing without third-party enforcement, in the early days of sovereignlending? Philip II of Spain accumulated towering debts while stopping all payments tohis lenders four times. How could the sovereign borrow much and default often? Weargue that bankers ability to cut off Philip II s access to smoothing services was key. Aform of syndicated lending created cohesion among his Genoese bankers. As a result,lending moratoria were sustained through a cheat the cheater mechanism (Kletzer andWright, 2000). Our paper thus lends empirical support to a recent literature emphasizingthe role of bankers incentives for continued sovereign borrowing.

Relationship and transaction lending in a crisis

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending varyover the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationshipbanks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them toprovide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the servicesthey provide, operating costs of relationship-banks are higher thanthose of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-bankscompete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, butoffer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transactionbanks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit registerinformation for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers'default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banksresponded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationshipbanking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of themodel that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response tothe crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Be Wary of Online Payday Loans, July 2011

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Be Wary of Online Payday Loans

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.