Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation

We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.

Indian Patent Policy and Publich Health : implications from the Japanese Experience

The introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in India and other developing countries is expected to have a significant effect on public health and local pharmaceutical industries. This paper draws implications from the historical experience of Japan when it introduced product patents in 1976. In Japan, narrow patents and promotion of cross-licensing were effective tools to keep drug prices in check while ensuring the introduction of new drugs. While the global pharmaceutical market surrounding India today differs considerably from that of the 1970's, the Japanese experience offers a policy option that may profitably be considered by India today. The Indian patent system emphasizes the patentability requirement in contrast to the Japanese patent policy which relied on narrow patents and extensive licensing. R&D by local firms and the development of local products may be promoted more effectively under the Japanese model.

Patent policy and public health in developing countries: lessons from Japan

The introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in India and other developing countries is expected to have a significant effect on public health and local pharmaceutical industries. This paper draws implications from the historical experience of Japan when it introduced product patents in 1976. In Japan, narrow patents and promotion of cross-licensing were effective tools to keep drug prices in check while ensuring the introduction of new drugs. While the global pharmaceutical market surrounding India today differs considerably from that of the 1970's, the Japanese experience offers a policy option that may profitably be considered by India today. The Indian patent system emphasizes the patentability requirement in contrast to the Japanese patent policy which relied on narrow patents and extensive licensing. R&D by local firms and the development of local products may be promoted more effectively under the Japanese model.

Government patent policy. : Hearings before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-seventh Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Res. 55 on S. 1084 and S. 1176.

Mode of access: Internet.

Annual Report on Government Patent Policy

Reports for 1964/65 prepared by the Council in consultation with the Dept. of Justice

Pharmaceutical patent bargains: the Brazilian experience

In the backdrop of the strict patent regime flatly adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) for all countries, a few countries constantly challenge this system through aggressive patent bargains. Within the pharmaceutical sector, noticeably, some countries now threaten to issue or otherwise actually issue compulsory licenses that may sway large pharmaceutical companies into selling drugs with large discounts or into granting voluntary licenses domestically. That is conspicuously the negotiation strategy adopted by Brazil in its negotiations with big international pharmaceutical companies.This paper explains Brazil’s aggressive bargaining approach based on an analysis of two aspects of its political economy. The first has to do with the international context of patent bargaining in the post-WTO era. Accordingly, the existence of large and fast growing domestic markets position countries such as Brazil as strategic destinations for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade. Together with an absence of a propensity to innovate in pharmaceutical products, these conditions boost Brazil’s bargaining power for issuing compulsory licenses over pharmaceutical products. The second aspect is related to political economy dynamics inside Brazil. Accordingly, the political framework in Brazil undermines long-term policies and favors short-sighted ones also vis-a-vis R&D investments in the pharmaceutical industry. This remains true regardless of the strictness of the patent regime in place. The lesson of Brazil is relevant arguably for other more powerful developing countries which presently examine Brazil's approach while further challenging the WTO's strict patent policy for the future.

Intelin, Toshiban ja Samsungin patenttipolitiikka 1990-luvun alusta lähtien

Tämä kandidaatintyö käsittelee puolijohdeteollisuusyritysten Intelin, Toshiban ja Samsungin patenttipolitiikkaa 1990-luvun alusta lähtien. Työn tarkoituksena on antaa vastauksia siihen, miksi patentointiaktiivisuudet (patenttiaineiston määrät) vaihtelevat niin suuresti yrityksestä toiseen saman alan sisällä. Yrityksiä tarkastellaan erityisesti kotimaidensa suhteen. Patentointiaktiivisuuden analyysissä käytetään IPC-luokittain jaoteltua patenttiaineistoa sekä patentointiin liittyviä artikkeleita ja kirjallisuutta. Yritysten sijainti ja paikallinen yrityskulttuuri vaikuttavat merkittävästi yritysten patenttipolitiikkaan. Vertailuyrityksillä on omat arvot ja toimintatavat, joilla patentointiin liittyviä asioita hoidetaan. Puolijohdeteollisuudessa ja yleisesti informaatioteknologiateollisuudessa, joissa käytetään paljon patentointia, on tärkeää, että maan johto suhtautuu positiivisesti immateriaalioikeuksiin. Kyseisen alan merkitys maiden hyvinvoinnille kasvaa koko ajan. Empiria-aineiston mukaan Intelin patentit ovat eteen- ja taaksepäin viittausten perusteella laadukkaimpia. 1990-luvulla Etelä-Korea panosti suuresti immateriaalioikeuksien kehittämiseen, mikä näkyy Samsungin patenttimäärän nousuna. Samsungilla on vertailuyrityksistä eniten patentteja, mutta ne ovat heikkolaatuisimpia. Toshiban patentit eivät saavuta määrällisesti Intelin taakse- ja eteenpäinviittauksia. Laadullisesti Toshiban patentit ovat kuitenkin parempia kuin Samsungin patentit. Kaikkiaan patentointi on lisääntynyt 1990-luvulla lähtien muun muassa parantuneen patenttisuojan ja helpottuneiden hakuprosessien ansiosta. Aasiassa on yleisempää käyttää strategista patentointia, muun muassa portfolion maksimointia. Yhdysvalloissa suhtaudutaan patentointiin enemmän taloudelliselta kannalta, kun taas puolestaan Aasiassa t&k-toiminta on pitkäjänteisempää.

Ética hacker y propiedad intelectual: una nueva perspectiva para abordar la normatividad sobre derechos de autor en el espacio digital

En el presente texto se busca mostrar las capacidades explicativas que puede tener la conjunción entre las perspectivas de la ética hacker y la defensa de la propiedad intelectual para dar cuenta de las reacciones generalizadas de rechazo ante las normatividades de derechos de autor en el espacio digital. Así, se lleva a cabo un resumen de los principios de cada una de estas perspectivas dando cuenta de sus capacidades explicativas y características teóricas para, posteriormente, aplicarlas a la realidad empresarial, laboral y de opinión en el marco social contemporáneo. Cómo conclusión de este trabajo se logra observar que a pesar de que en principio ambas perspectivas podrían parecer contradictorias, existen aspectos comunes que permiten vislumbrar como un trabajo en conjunto permitiría generar normatividades que se acoplen a las realidades contemporáneas.

Patentability and Scope of Protection for DNA Sequence

Since the mapping of the human genome and the technical innovations in the field of biotechnology, patent law has gone through great controversies. Protection is required for an investor to make an investment but how broad should the given protection be? Whether the invention is a mi- cro-organism capable of dissolving crude oil, or the gene of a soya plant, the genetic engineering required for their production entails vast amounts of capi- tal. The policy in that respect is tailored by legislative acts and judicial decisions, ensuring a fair balance be- tween the interests of patent right holders and third parties. However, the policy differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, thus creating inconsistencies with re- gards to the given protection to the same invention, and as a result this could deter innovation and pro- mote stagnation. The most active actors shaping the patent policy on an international level are the patent offices of the United States of America, Japan and the European Patent Organization. These three patent offices have set up a cooperation programme in order to promote and improve efficiency with regards to their patent policies on a global scale. However, recent judicial de- velopments have shown that the policy in respect to the field of biotechnology differs between the patent regimes of the United States of America and the two- layer system of the European Patent Organisation/ the European Union.

NIH/ADAMHA/CDC technology transfer /

Mode of access: Internet.

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.

The policy dilemma of the unitary patent. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/13, 27 November 2014

This paper provides new evidence about the budgetary consequences – for patent offices – of the coexistence of the forthcoming Unitary Patent (UP) with the current European Patent (EP). Simulation results illustrate a dilemma between (1) high UP renewal fees to ensure enough financial income for all national patent offices (NPOs) and (2) low UP renewal fees to make the UP system affordable, with very few NPOs losing on financial revenues. The simulations help to understand the positions of several patent offices, and underline an alternative way to proceed with the negotiations while reducing financial risks for the whole system.

The answer of Mr. Sullivan, to the letter and mis-statements of the Hon. Cadwallader D. Colden, in his "Brief exposition" of himself as the advocate of monopoly. The unconstitutionality or limitation of the monopoly demonstrated. The bad policy and injurious effects of it on the community exposed. The legality of an extension of the term of time of a patent when for the good of a state; and the just views and claims of patentees in steam navigation fully explained.

Pages 29-34 contain "Mr. Duer's opinion on the claim of Mr. Sullivan as a patentee, to navigate with steam boats, the waters of the state of New-York."