Password Based Server Aided Key Exchange

We propose a new password-based 3-party protocol with a formal security proof in the standard model. Under reasonable assumptions we show that our new protocol is more efficient than the recent protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (FC 2005), proven in the random oracle model. We also observe some limitations in the model due to Abdalla, Fouque and Pointcheval (PKC 2005) for proving security of such protocols.

Multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange

We consider a new form of authenticated key exchange which we call multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange, where session establishment depends on successful authentication of multiple short secrets that are complementary in nature, such as a long-term password and a one-time response, allowing the client and server to be mutually assured of each other's identity without directly disclosing private information to the other party. Multi-factor authentication can provide an enhanced level of assurance in higher-security scenarios such as online banking, virtual private network access, and physical access because a multi-factor protocol is designed to remain secure even if all but one of the factors has been compromised. We introduce a security model for multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange protocols, propose an efficient and secure protocol called MFPAK, and provide a security argument to show that our protocol is secure in this model. Our security model is an extension of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway security model for password-authenticated key exchange and accommodates an arbitrary number of symmetric and asymmetric authentication factors.

One-time-password-authenticated key exchange

To reduce the damage of phishing and spyware attacks, banks, governments, and other security-sensitive industries are deploying one-time password systems, where users have many passwords and use each password only once. If a single password is compromised, it can be only be used to impersonate the user once, limiting the damage caused. However, existing practical approaches to one-time passwords have been susceptible to sophisticated phishing attacks. ---------- We give a formal security treatment of this important practical problem. We consider the use of one-time passwords in the context of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE), which allows for mutual authentication, session key agreement, and resistance to phishing attacks. We describe a security model for the use of one-time passwords, explicitly considering the compromise of past (and future) one-time passwords, and show a general technique for building a secure one-time-PAKE protocol from any secure PAKE protocol. Our techniques also allow for the secure use of pseudorandomly generated and time-dependent passwords.

Identity management : strengthening one-time password authentication through usability

Usability in HCI (Human-Computer Interaction) is normally understood as the simplicity and clarity with which the interaction with a computer program or a web site is designed. Identity management systems need to provide adequate usability and should have a simple and intuitive interface. The system should not only be designed to satisfy service provider requirements but it has to consider user requirements, otherwise it will lead to inconvenience and poor usability for users when managing their identities. With poor usability and a poor user interface with regard to security, it is highly likely that the system will have poor security. The rapid growth in the number of online services leads to an increasing number of different digital identities each user needs to manage. As a result, many people feel overloaded with credentials, which in turn negatively impacts their ability to manage them securely. Passwords are perhaps the most common type of credential used today. To avoid the tedious task of remembering difficult passwords, users often behave less securely by using low entropy and weak passwords. Weak passwords and bad password habits represent security threats to online services. Some solutions have been developed to eliminate the need for users to create and manage passwords. A typical solution is based on generating one-time passwords, i.e. passwords for single session or transaction usage. Unfortunately, most of these solutions do not satisfy scalability and/or usability requirements, or they are simply insecure. In this thesis, the security and usability aspects of contemporary methods for authentication based on one-time passwords (OTP) are examined and analyzed. In addition, more scalable solutions that provide a good user experience while at the same time preserving strong security are proposed.

Count-min sketches for estimating password frequency within Hamming distance two

The count-min sketch is a useful data structure for recording and estimating the frequency of string occurrences, such as passwords, in sub-linear space with high accuracy. However, it cannot be used to draw conclusions on groups of strings that are similar, for example close in Hamming distance. This paper introduces a variant of the count-min sketch which allows for estimating counts within a specified Hamming distance of the queried string. This variant can be used to prevent users from choosing popular passwords, like the original sketch, but it also allows for a more efficient method of analysing password statistics.

Kamouflage : loss-resistant password management

We introduce Kamouflage: a new architecture for building theft-resistant password managers. An attacker who steals a laptop or cell phone with a Kamouflage-based password manager is forced to carry out a considerable amount of online work before obtaining any user credentials. We implemented our proposal as a replacement for the built-in Firefox password manager, and provide performance measurements and the results from experiments with large real-world password sets to evaluate the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach. Kamouflage is well suited to become a standard architecture for password managers on mobile devices.

HPAKE : Password authentication secure against cross-site user impersonation

We propose a new kind of asymmetric mutual authentication from passwords with stronger privacy against malicious servers, lest they be tempted to engage in “cross-site user impersonation” to each other. It enables a person to authenticate (with) arbitrarily many independent servers, over adversarial channels, using a memorable and reusable single short password. Beside the usual PAKE security guarantees, our framework goes to lengths to secure the password against brute-force cracking from privileged server information.

Hidden credential retrieval from a reusable password

We revisit the venerable question of access credentials management, which concerns the techniques that we, humans with limited memory, must employ to safeguard our various access keys and tokens in a connected world. Although many existing solutions can be employed to protect a long secret using a short password, those solutions typically require certain assumptions on the distribution of the secret and/or the password, and are helpful against only a subset of the possible attackers. After briefly reviewing a variety of approaches, we propose a user-centric comprehensive model to capture the possible threats posed by online and offline attackers, from the outside and the inside, against the security of both the plaintext and the password. We then propose a few very simple protocols, adapted from the Ford-Kaliski server-assisted password generator and the Boldyreva unique blind signature in particular, that provide the best protection against all kinds of threats, for all distributions of secrets. We also quantify the concrete security of our approach in terms of online and offline password guesses made by outsiders and insiders, in the random-oracle model. The main contribution of this paper lies not in the technical novelty of the proposed solution, but in the identification of the problem and its model. Our results have an immediate and practical application for the real world: they show how to implement single-sign-on stateless roaming authentication for the internet, in a ad-hoc user-driven fashion that requires no change to protocols or infrastructure.

New paradigms for password security

For the past several decades, cryptographers have consistently provided us with stronger and more capable primitives and protocols that have found many applications in security systems in everyday life. One of the central tenets of cryptographic design is that, whereas a system’s architecture ought to be public and open to scrutiny, the keys on which it depends — long, utterly random, unique strings of bits — will be perfectly preserved by their owner, and yet nominally inaccessible to foes.

Secure modular password authentication for the web using channel bindings

Secure protocols for password-based user authentication are well-studied in the cryptographic literature but have failed to see wide-spread adoption on the Internet; most proposals to date require extensive modifications to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, making deployment challenging. Recently, a few modular designs have been proposed in which a cryptographically secure password-based mutual authentication protocol is run inside a confidential (but not necessarily authenticated) channel such as TLS; the password protocol is bound to the established channel to prevent active attacks. Such protocols are useful in practice for a variety of reasons: security no longer relies on users' ability to validate server certificates and can potentially be implemented with no modifications to the secure channel protocol library. We provide a systematic study of such authentication protocols. Building on recent advances in modelling TLS, we give a formal definition of the intended security goal, which we call password-authenticated and confidential channel establishment (PACCE). We show generically that combining a secure channel protocol, such as TLS, with a password authentication protocol, where the two protocols are bound together using either the transcript of the secure channel's handshake or the server's certificate, results in a secure PACCE protocol. Our prototype based on TLS is available as a cross-platform client-side Firefox browser extension and a server-side web application which can easily be installed on deployed web browsers and servers.

Security Analysis of salt||password Hashes

Protection of passwords used to authenticate computer systems and networks is one of the most important application of cryptographic hash functions. Due to the application of precomputed memory look up attacks such as birthday and dictionary attacks on the hash values of passwords to find passwords, it is usually recommended to apply hash function to the combination of both the salt and password, denoted salt||password, to prevent these attacks. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of salt||password hashing application. We show that when hash functions based on the compression functions with easily found fixed points are used to compute the salt||password hashes, these hashes are susceptible to precomputed offline birthday attacks. For example, this attack is applicable to the salt||password hashes computed using the standard hash functions such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256 and SHA-512 that are based on the popular Davies-Meyer compression function. This attack exposes a subtle property of this application that although the provision of salt prevents an attacker from finding passwords, salts prefixed to the passwords do not prevent an attacker from doing a precomputed birthday attack to forge an unknown password. In this forgery attack, we demonstrate the possibility of building multiple passwords for an unknown password for the same hash value and salt. Interestingly, password||salt (i.e. salts suffixed to the passwords) hashes computed using Davies-Meyer hash functions are not susceptible to this attack, showing the first security gap between the prefix-salt and suffix-salt methods of hashing passwords.

Efficient Dictionary for Salted Password Analysis

User authentication is essential for accessing computing resources, network resources, email accounts, online portals etc. To authenticate a user, system stores user credentials (user id and password pair) in system. It has been an interested field problem to discover user password from a system and similarly protecting them against any such possible attack. In this work we show that passwords are still vulnerable to hash chain based and efficient dictionary attacks. Human generated passwords use some identifiable patterns. We have analysed a sample of 19 million passwords, of different lengths, available online and studied the distribution of the symbols in the password strings. We show that the distribution of symbols in user passwords is affected by the native language of the user. From symbol distributions we can build smart and efficient dictionaries, which are smaller in size and their coverage of plausible passwords from Key-space is large. These smart dictionaries make dictionary based attacks practical.

RSA-Based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Revisited

The RSA-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols have been proposed to realize both mutual authentication and generation of secure session keys where a client is sharing his/her password only with a server and the latter should generate its RSA public/private key pair (e, n), (d, n) every time due to the lack of PKI (Public-Key Infrastructures). One of the ways to avoid a special kind of off-line (so called e-residue) attacks in the RSA-based PAKE protocols is to deploy a challenge/response method by which a client verifies the relative primality of e and φ(n) interactively with a server. However, this kind of RSA-based PAKE protocols did not give any proof of the underlying challenge/response method and therefore could not specify the exact complexity of their protocols since there exists another security parameter, needed in the challenge/response method. In this paper, we first present an RSA-based PAKE (RSA-PAKE) protocol that can deploy two different challenge/response methods (denoted by Challenge/Response Method1 and Challenge/Response Method2). The main contributions of this work include: (1) Based on the number theory, we prove that the Challenge/Response Method1 and the Challenge/Response Method2 are secure against e-residue attacks for any odd prime e; (2) With the security parameter for the on-line attacks, we show that the RSA-PAKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model where all of the off-line attacks are not more efficient than on-line dictionary attacks; and (3) By considering the Hamming weight of e and its complexity in the RSA-PAKE protocol, we search for primes to be recommended for a practical use. We also compare the RSA-PAKE protocol with the previous ones mainly in terms of computation and communication complexities.