903 resultados para ownership structure
Resumo:
This paper presents early results from a pilot project which aims to investigate the relationship between proprietary structure of small and medium- sized Italian family firms and their owners’ orientation towards a “business evaluation process”. Evidence from many studies point out the importance of family business in a worldwide economic environment: in Italy 93% of the businesses are represented by family firms; 98% of them have less than 50 employees (Italian Association of Family Firms, 2004) so we judged family SMEs as a relevant field of investigation. In this study we assume a broad definition of family business as “a firm whose control (50% of shares or voting rights) is closely held by the members of the same family” (Corbetta,1995). “Business evaluation process” is intended here both as “continuous evaluation process” (which is the expression of a well developed managerial attitude) or as an “immediate valuation” (i.e. in the case of new shareholder’s entrance, share exchange among siblings, etc). We set two hypotheses to be tested in this paper: the first is “quantitative” and aims to verify whether the number of owners (independent variable) in a family firm is positively correlated to the business evaluation process. If a family firm is led by only one subject, it is more likely that personal values, culture and feelings may affect his choices more than “purely economic opportunities”; so there is less concern about monitoring economic performance or about the economic value of the firm. As the shareholders’ number increases, economic aspects in managing the firm grow in importance over the personal values and "value orientation" acquires a central role. The second hypothesis investigates if and to what extent the presence of “non- family members” among the owners affects their orientation to the business evaluation process. The “Cramer’s V” test has been used to test the hypotheses; both were not confirmed from these early results; next steps will lead to make an inferential analysis on a representative sample of the population.
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This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.
Resumo:
Using a sample of publicly listed firm in Korea from 2002 to 2006, this article examines the impact of board monitoring on firm value and productivity. We use outsider's attendance of board meetings as a proxy for board monitoring. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that outsider's attendance rate increases firm value, suggesting that attending board meeting itself is a strong signal that reflects outsider's intention to monitor insiders. While ownership of controlling shareholders negatively affects firm value, this relationship is not moderated by increased monitoring by outsiders. Our findings provide further evidence that the outside director system is less effective in chaebol-affiliated firms. Results also indicate that the effect of outsider's board monitoring activity on investor's valuation of the firm is greater than on productivity improvement of the firm. Our conclusions are robust for possible endogeneity in the relationship between firm value and board attendance by outside directors.
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This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure for a sample of 20,713 unlisted firms from 11 eastern European countries over the period 1994-2004. We employ usual firm-specific financial variables as well as country-specific variables that describe the degrees of governance structure and financial development of each country. Using regression analysis, our results indicate that firm ownership concentration and country governance structure are insignificant explanatory variables to the degree of leverage of the firms in our sample. On the other hand, indicators of country financial development are robust determinants of capital structure. However, the marginal explanatory power of country-specific variables is small. We conclude that firm-specific characteristics are decisive in capital structure.
Resumo:
Drawing on agency and flexible capability perspectives, the authors develop a theoretical framework explaining the impact of ownership structure on organisational flexibility and store performance in retail chains. The researchers argue that franchised stores attract more entrepreneurial managers with more flexible capabilities and they have a stronger incentive to align their flexible capabilities with the demands of the business environment. A sample of 105 franchised and company-owned stores of an optical retail chain is used to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, the study found strong support for the hypotheses that 'Franchised stores have a higher structural flexibility than company-owned stores', but only weak support for operational and strategic flexible capabilities. Furthermore, in line with the study's theoretical framework, it has been found that in a highly turbulent business environment, franchised stores perform better than company-owned stores. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for theory development and management of ownership structures in retail chains.
Resumo:
Management
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The case is based on Garland, a 240 years old Portuguese family business, now owned by the Dawson family. It focuses on a decision made 50 years ago, aligned with what had been the company’s history, about the ownership rules for family members, which influences the ownership structure of the firm. It addresses the main issues about ownership in family businesses, and tackles the problem of succession planning and fair process. It contains a teaching note to support the utilization of the case in a classroom context, with learning objectives, target audience, a teaching plan, questions and proposed answers, and theory that relates to the case. It is also complemented with an epilogue and an overview of the case.
Resumo:
The separation between ownership and the control of capital in banks generates differences in the preferences for risk among shareholders and the manager. These differences could imply a corporate governance problem in banks with a dispersed ownership, since owners fail to exert control in the allocation of capital. In this paper we examine the relationship between the ownership structure and risk for Colombian banks. Our results suggest that a high ownership concentration leads to higher levels of risk.
Resumo:
In business literature, the conflicts among workers, shareholders and the management have been studied mostly in the frame of stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory recognizes this issue as an agency problem, and tries to solve the problem by establishing a contractual relationship between the agent and principals. However, as Marcoux pointed out, the appropriateness of the contract as a medium to reduce the agency problem should be questioned. As an alternative, the cooperative model minimizes the agency costs by integrating the concept of workers, owners and management. Mondragon Corporation is a successful example of the cooperative model which grew into the sixth largest corporation in Spain. However, the cooperative model has long been ignored in discussions of corporate governance, mainly because the success of the cooperative model is extremely difficult to duplicate in reality. This thesis hopes to revitalize the scholarly examination of cooperatives by developing a new model that overcomes the fundamental problem in the cooperative model: the limited access to capital markets. By dividing the ownership interest into financial and control interest, the dual ownership structure allows cooperatives to issue stock in the capital market by making a financial product out of financial interest.
Resumo:
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine dividend policies in an emerging capital market, in a country undergoing a transitional period. Design/methodology/approach – Using pooled cross-sectional observations from the top 50 listed Egyptian firms between 2003 and 2005, this study examines the effect of board of directors’ composition and ownership structure on dividend policies in Egypt. Findings – It is found that there is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and firm performance, and both dividend decision and payout ratio. The results confirm that firms with a higher return on equity and a higher institutional ownership distribute higher levels of dividend. No significant association was found between board composition and dividend decisions or ratios. Originality/value – This study provides additional evidence of the applicability of the signalling model in the emerging market of Egypt. It was found that despite the high institutional ownership and the closely held nature of the firms, which imply lower agency costs, the payment of higher dividend was considered necessary to attract capital during this transitional period.
Resumo:
Purpose – This study seeks to provide valuable new insight into the timeliness of corporate internet reporting (TCIR) by a sample of Irish-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach – The authors apply an updated version of Abdelsalam et al. TCIR index to assess the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. The index encompasses 13 criteria that are used to measure the TCIR for a sample of Irish-listed companies. In addition, the authors assess the timeliness of posting companies’ annual and interim reports to their web sites. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of board independence and ownership structure on the TCIR behaviour. Board composition is measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman’s dual role and average tenure of directors. Ownership structure is represented by managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. Findings – It is found that Irish-listed companies, on average, satisfy only 46 per cent of the timeliness criteria assessed by the timeliness index. After controlling for size, audit fees and firm performance, evidence that TCIR is positively associated with board of director’s independence and chief executive officer (CEO) ownership is provided. Furthermore, it is found that large companies are faster in posting their annual reports to their web sites. The findings suggest that board composition and ownership structure influence a firm’s TCIR behaviour, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Practical implications – The findings highlight the need for improvement in TCIR by Irish-listed companies in many areas, especially in regard to the regular updates of information provided on their web sites. Originality/value – This study represents one of the first comprehensive examinations of the important dimension of the TCIR in Irish-listed companies.