The effect of ownership concentration on management behavior in Belgian banks: A case study

Double Degree. A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master’s Degree in Finance from NOVA – School of Business and Economics and a Masters Degree in Management from Louvain School of Management

Managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict using logistic regression approach : evidence from Bursa Malaysia

This paper adopted logistic regression model to examine the relationship between level of managerial ownership concentration and agency conflict which are proxied by level of risk, firms leverage and firms dividend policy. The study covers a period of 5 years from 1997 through 2001. The study is based on the 100 blue-chip stocks, majority of which are derived from CI components. The findings suggest a positive and significant association between level of level of risk at lower level and managerial ownership while a negative and significant association is also evidenced between risk at higher level and managerial ownership concentration. While debt policy which serves as positive monitoring substitute for agency conflict is found to be positive and significant explaining the level of ownership concentration. Furthermore, dividend policies, which also serve as monitoring, substitute to reduce agency conflict between manager and external shareholders do not appear to have any significant impact on managerial ownership. On the other hand, the level of institutional ownership, which serves as external monitoring force, is found to have inverse impact on level of managerial ownership concentration. This is marginally significant at 10 level (p=.12). The findings, in part explain the argument that the managerial ownership help reduce agency conflict between outside equity holders and managers.

Board composition, board activity and ownership concentration, the impact on firm performance

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder meetings, rather than board meetings, is positively associated with firm value. Tradable share ownership concentration has a positive and linear relationship with firm value, while state and total share ownership concentration represent U(V) shapes. Importantly, companies with the highest levels of both total share and tradable share ownership concentration have a greater firm values than companies with the highest levels of only a single concentration.

The ownership and ownership concentration? The impact on the performance of China’s firms

This paper investigates the impact if ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China's listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration, and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we find that ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance and that it has approximately positive linear relations with firm value. The tradable ownership concentration has a more significant and positive influence on firm performance than total ownership cocncentration. The highest level of firm performance is approached when a firm is characterized with both total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration. Thus, we conclude that it is a rule that ownership concentration enhances firm performance regardless of who the concentrated owners are.

Ownership and ownership concentration: which is important in determining the performance of China’s listed firms?

This article investigates the impact if ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China's listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration, and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we find that ownership concentration is more powerful than any category of ownership in determining firm performance and that it has approximately positive linear relations with firm value. The tradable ownership concentration has a more significant and positive influence on firm performance than total ownership cocncentration. The highest level of firm performance is approached when a firm is characterized with both total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration. Thus, we conclude that it is a rule that ownership concentration enhances firm performance regardless of who the concentrated owners are.

Ownership concentration and product innovation in Chinese private SMEs

Product innovation is extremely important to the growth, success, and ultimate survival of firms. Although its unique features in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have gained growing attention in the literature, there is limited knowledge as to how ownership concentration moderates the relationship between product innovation and its determinants. Based upon insights from agency and institutional theories, we examine the moderating effects of ownership concentration on the relationship between product innovation and its key determinants in Chinese SMEs, utilizing a large dataset of 43,728 Chinese firms over the period 2005-2006. We focus on examining the differences between single-owner SMEs, where there is dominant control of one family member, and multiple-owner SMEs, where principal-agent conflicts and principal-principal conflicts are more likely to occur. Our findings indicate that single-owned firms tend to convert research and development into product innovation more efficiently than firms with multiple owners, who are typically better at utilizing external sources of knowledge and human capital.

Determinants of ownership concentration in the Chilean stock market

Includes bibliography.

Ownership concentration:'Private benefits of control' and debt financing

Building on the ‘law and economics’ literature, this paper analyses corporate governance implications of debt financing in an environment where a dominant owner is able to extract ex ante ‘private benefits of control’. Ownership concentration may result in lower efficiency, measured as a ratio of a firm’s debt to investment, and this effect depends on the identity of the largest shareholder. Moreover, entrenched dominant shareholder(s) may be colluding with fixed-claim holders in extracting ‘control premium’. One of possible outcomes is a ‘crowding out’ of entrepreneurial firms from the debt market, and this is supported by evidence from the transition economies.

Does ownership concentration improve M&A outcomes in emerging markets?: Evidence from India

Using firm level data from India, we examine the impact of ownership concentration on post-M&A performance of firms. Our analysis has implications for both the M&A literature, which emphasises the role of agency conflict between managers and owners of widely held companies as a key reason for M&A failures, and the corporate governance literature, especially in the context of emerging market economies. A cautious interpretation of our results suggests that while ownership concentration may reduce the manager–owner agency conflict, it may nevertheless precipitate other forms of agency conflict such that ownership concentration may not necessarily improve post-M&A performance. In particular, our results have implications for the literature on the agency conflict between large (or majority) shareholders and small (or minority) shareholders of a company, especially in contexts such as emerging market economies where corporate governance quality is weak.

Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity : evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996–2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximate 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

The influence of family ownership on the quality of accounting information

This article explores the quality of accounting information in listed family firms. The authors exploit the features of the Italian equitymarket characterizd by high ownership concentration across all tpes of firms to disentangle the effects of family ownership from other major block holders on the quality of accounting information. The findings document that family firms convey financial information of higher quality compared to the nonfamily peers. Furthermore the authors provide evidence that the determinants of accounting quality differ across family and nonfamily firms.

Ownership, corporate governance and timeliness of price discovery : Australian evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s ownership and corporate governance affect its timeliness of price discovery, which is referred to as the speed of incorporation of value-relevant information into the stock price. Using a panel data of 1,138 Australian firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, we predict and find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of price discovery. We test the identity of the largest shareholder and find that only firms with family as the largest shareholder exhibit faster price discovery. There is no evidence that suggests that the presence of a second largest shareholder affects the timeliness of price discovery materially. Although we find a positive association between corporate governance quality and the timeliness of price discovery, as expected, there is no interaction effect between the largest shareholding and corporate governance in relation to the timeliness of price discovery. Further tests show no evidence of severe endogeneity problems in our study.

Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings : Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.