Income taxation with habit formation and consumption externalities

We analyze the dynamic behavior and the welfare properties of the equilibrium path of a growth model where both habits and consumption externalities affect the utility of consumers. We discuss the effects of flat rate income taxes and characterize the optimal income taxation policy. We show that, when consumption externalities and habit adjusted consumption are not perfect substitutes, a counter-cyclical income tax rate allows the competitive equilibrium to replicate the efficient path. Our analysis highlights the crucial role played by complementarities between externalities and habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium.

Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Optimal progressive taxation in a model with endogenous skill supply.

This paper examines whether efficiency considerations require that optimal labour income taxation is progressive or regressive in a model with skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector with capital-skill complementarity. We find that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation in the steady-state as well as along the transition path from the exogenous to optimal policy steady-state. We find that these results are explained by a lower labour supply elasticity for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the introduction of the skill acquisition technology.

Education, preferences for leisure, and the optimal income tax schedule

Recent advances in dynamic Mirrlees economies have incorporated the treatment of human capital investments as an important dimension of government policy. This paper adds to this literature by considering a two period economy where agents are di erentiated by their preferences for leisure and their productivity, both private information. The fact that productivity is only learnt later in an agent's life introduces uncertainty to agent's savings and human capital choices and makes optimal the use of multi-period tie-ins in the mechanism that characterizes the government policy. We show that optimal policies are often interim ine cient and that the introduction of these ine ciencies may take the form of marginal tax rates on labor income of varying sign and educational policies that include the discouragement of human capital acquisition. With regards to implementation, state-dependent linear taxes implement optimal savings, while human capital policies may require labor income taxes that depend directly on agents' schooling.

On the optimality of the Friedman Rule with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxation

We study the optimal “inflation tax” in an environment with heterogeneous agents and non-linear income taxes. We first derive the general conditions needed for the optimality of the Friedman rule in this setup. These general conditions are distinct in nature and more easily interpretable than those obtained in the literature with a representative agent and linear taxation. We then study two standard monetary specifications and derive their implications for the optimality of the Friedman rule. For the shopping-time model the Friedman rule is optimal with essentially no restrictions on preferences or transaction technologies. For the cash-credit model the Friedman rule is optimal if preferences are separable between the consumption goods and leisure, or if leisure shifts consumption towards the credit good. We also study a generalized model which nests both models as special cases.

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Capital Income Taxation, Depletion, Allowances and Non-Renewable Resource Extraction

Dans Cet Article, Nous Etudions les Distorsions Que Cause L'impot Sur le Revenu des Societes Dans le Profil de Production des Firmes Extractives et Dans L'allocation des Ressources Entre les Secteurs D'extraction et les Autres Secteurs Soumis a L'impot Sur les Societes. Nous Etudions En Particulier L'allocation D'epuisement, Dont Nous Montrons Qu'elle Peut Trouver Sa Justification, Non Pas a Assurer la Neutralite de L'impot, Mais En Permettant L'etablissement de Taux Effectifs D'imposition Identiques Dans les Secteurs D'extraction et Dans les Autres Secteurs.

The structure of the optimal income tax in the quasi-linear model

Existing numerical characterizations of the optimal income tax have been based on a limited number of model specifications. As a result, they do not reveal which properties are general. We determine the optimal tax in the quasi-linear model under weaker assumptions than have previously been used; in particular, we remove the assumption of a lower bound on the utility of zero consumption and the need to permit negative labor incomes. A Monte Carlo analysis is then conducted in which economies are selected at random and the optimal tax function constructed. The results show that in a significant proportion of economies the marginal tax rate rises at low skills and falls at high. The average tax rate is equally likely to rise or fall with skill at low skill levels, rises in the majority of cases in the centre of the skill range, and falls at high skills. These results are consistent across all the specifications we test. We then extend the analysis to show that these results also hold for Cobb-Douglas utility.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Income taxation of emigrants and immigrants under Spanish law

Análisis de las consecuencias tributarias de los cambios de residencia de las personas físicas.

The income tax : a study of the history, theory and practice of income taxation at home and abroad /

Bibliography: p. [675]-700.

Federal income taxation of farmers, June, 1961 /

Bibliographical footnotes.

Municipal income taxation in the United States.

Mode of access: Internet.

Cambios en el régimen de pensiones en Colombia y su efecto en el margen intensivo de la oferta laboral

En Colombia, como en muchos países de América Latina, en los años 80 y 90 se hicieron cambios importantes en los regímenes de pensiones. Este trabajo hace un análisis de uno de esos cambios en Colombia. El cambio consistió en aumentar el tiempo de cotización necesario para reclamar los beneficios pensionales y la inclusión del salario dentro de la fórmula del monto de pensiones. Para este propósito se estudia el impacto sobre la oferta laboral de un cambio exógeno en estas condiciones usando un diseño de regresión discontinua. Se encuentra un efecto positivo sobre las horas promedio trabajadas en la semana.